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ABSTRACT 
According to several major theories in the field of consciousness research, the valid 
assessment of conscious awareness requires subjective measures, i.e. participants’ reports 
about their conscious experience. However, there is a considerable amount of uncertainty in 
the field if and how scientifically valuable data can be obtained from subjective measures.  
The present work empirically examines how subjective measures of conscious 
awareness need to be designed and applied to provide maximally useful data for empirical 
studies of visual consciousness. Specifically, it is investigated what contents subjective 
measures should require participants to report, at which granularity subjective measures ought 
to be recorded, and what statistical procedures should be used to quantify the relation between 
subjective measures and discrimination task performance.  
Concerning content, subjective measures that referred to the accuracy of a preceding 
discrimination response and subjective measures referring to participants’ visual experience 
of the task-relevant stimulus feature were compared during a series of visual psychophysical 
experiments. Subjective measures about the accuracy of the responses were associated with 
more liberal psychophysical thresholds: At lower stimulus quality, participants reported that 
they feel confident that their discrimination response was correct without reporting a visual 
experience of the stimulus feature. Only at greater stimulus quality, they reported that they 
had a visual experience of the stimulus feature in addition to being confident. Moreover, 
subjective measures about confidence in discrimination responses predicted task accuracy 
more efficiently than measures about visual experience. Finally, subjective measures of 
experience and task accuracy as content were compared while event-related potentials (ERP) 
were recorded. The earliest electrophysiological correlates of subjective measures where 
predictive of the fact if participants reported that they selected the response to the 
discrimination task based on knowledge instead of guessing, but were not yet predictive 
whether participants reported a clear experience over and above making the task response 
based on knowledge. The strongest ERP correlate of visual experience occurred a short period 
in time before participants responded to the discrimination task. As a consequence, it is 
argued that conceptual considerations are required which conscious contents are relevant for a 
specific research question, and subjective measures should be about the relevant contents 
accordingly.  
v 
Concerning the granularity of subjective measures, a continuous scale and a scale with 
four discrete labelled categories were compared as subjective measure of conscious 
experience of motion. The subjective measures contained more information when participants 
used the continuous scale instead of the discrete scales. The greater amount of information 
provided by continuous scales rendered subjective measures more predictive of task accuracy 
and enhanced internal consistency. 
Regarding the statistical procedure to quantify the relation between subjective 
measures and task performance, it was found that logistic regression is a suboptimal method 
because the relationship between subjective measures and the transformed accuracy was 
frequently not linear. In contrast, meta-da, a measure of the relationship between subjective 
reports and task accuracy derived from signal detection theory (SDT), provided the most 
consistent results across all studies.  
Overall, it is concluded that subjective measures are suited to provide highly useful 
data to address non-trivial research questions for the scientific study of consciousness: As 
prerequisite, the content of a subjective measures should be tailored to the current research 
question. In addition, the problem of a lacking objective standard can be addressed by using 
the relation between subjective measures and task performance as a reference frame. 
  
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Introduction 1 
1.1. What are subjective measures of conscious awareness? 2 
1.2. Concepts of consciousness 5 
1.2.1. Phenomenal Consciousness 5 
1.2.2. Conscious access 6 
1.2.3. Higher-order consciousness 7 
1.3. Why objective measures of conscious awareness are not sufficient 8 
1.4. Can subjective measures provide scientifically useful data? 10 
1.5. Milestones for creating subjective measures of consciousness 14 
1.5.1. The content of subjective measures 14 
1.5.2. The granularity of subjective measures 16 
1.5.3. Quantifying type 2 sensitivity 17 
2. Stimulus-related vs. response-related subjective measures 19 
2.1. Abstract 19 
2.2. Introduction 19 
2.2.1. Objective vs. subjective measures 20 
2.2.2. Blindsight type 2 phenomena 21 
2.2.3. Stimulus-related vs. response-related ratings 22 
2.2.4. Evaluation criteria for subjective measures of consciousness 24 
2.2.5. Empirical differences between subjective measures 25 
2.2.6. Rationale of the present study 26 
2.3. Experiment 2-1 27 
2.3.1. Methods 28 
2.3.2. Results 31 
2.3.3. Discussion 34 
2.4. Experiment 2-2 36 
2.4.1. Methods 36 
2.4.2. Results 37 
2.4.3. Discussion 40 
2.5. Experiment 2-3 40 
2.5.1. Methods 41 
2.5.2. Results 42 
vii 
2.5.3. Discussion 43 
2.6. Experiment 2-4 45 
2.6.1. Methods 45 
2.6.2. Results 46 
2.6.3. Discussion 47 
2.7. Experiment 2-5 48 
2.7.1. Methods 48 
2.7.2. Results 50 
2.7.3. Discussion 52 
2.8. General discussion 52 
2.8.1. Type 2 blindsight in normal observers? 53 
2.8.2. Stimulus vs. response-related ratings 54 
2.8.3. A continuum of multiple thresholds? 55 
2.8.4. Relation to previous studies 56 
2.9. Conclusion 57 
2.10. Acknowledgements 57 
3. Electrophysiological correlates of confidence and experience 58 
3.1. Abstract 58 
3.2. Introduction 58 
3.3. Experiment 64 
3.3.1. Material and Methods 64 
3.3.2. Results 70 
3.4. Discussion 76 
3.4.1. Why is confidence earlier than experience? 76 
3.4.2. The timing of neural markers of consciousness 78 
3.4.3. Confidence and experience are not interchangeable 79 
3.5. Acknowledgements 79 
4. Visual analogue and discrete scales as measures of visual experience 80 
4.1. Abstract 80 
4.2. Introduction 80 
4.2.1. The content of subjective scales 81 
4.2.2. Visual analogue vs. discrete scales 83 
4.2.3. Continuous vs. binary discrimination task 84 
viii 
4.2.4. Criteria to evaluate subjective scales 86 
4.2.5. Rationale of the present study 87 
4.3. Experiment 88 
4.3.1. Material and Methods 88 
4.3.2. Results 93 
4.4. Discussion 99 
4.4.1. The amount of information in VAS and discrete scales 100 
4.4.2. The impact of report time 101 
4.4.3. Are visual analogue scales used binarily? 102 
4.4.4. Discussion of methodology 102 
4.4.5. Equivalent conscious access? 103 
4.4.6. Conceptual reasons to prefer VASs or discrete scales 104 
4.5. Conclusion 105 
4.6. Acknowledgements 105 
5. Type 2 sensitvity of decisional confidence and visual experience 106 
5.1. Abstract 106 
5.2. Introduction 106 
5.2.1. Visual experience and confidence as content of subjective reports 107 
5.2.2. Type 2 signal detection theory 109 
5.2.3. Empirical studies on confidence and visual experience 110 
5.2.4. Meta-da as measure of type 2 sensitivity 111 
5.2.5. Logistic regression as measure of type 2 sensitivity 113 
5.2.6. Rationale of the present study 115 
5.3. Reanalysis 116 
5.3.1. Material and Methods 116 
5.3.2. Results 119 
5.4. Discussion 124 
5.4.1. Why confidence outperforms experience in predicting accuracy 125 
5.4.2. What factors contribute to the variability across studies? 126 
5.4.3. How should we quantify type 2 sensitivity? 127 
5.5. Conclusion 128 
5.6. Acknowledgements 129 
5.7. Appendix: Code to compute meta-da in R 130 
ix 
6. Final Discussion 133 
6.1. The content of subjective measures 134 
6.1.1. Theoretical implications for phenomenal consciousness 134 
6.1.2. Theoretical implications for global workspace theory 136 
6.1.3. Theoretical implications for higher-order theories of consciousness 138 
6.1.4. Methodological implications 140 
6.2. The granularity of subjective measures 141 
6.2.1. Theoretical implications 141 
6.2.2. Methodological implications for research on conscious awareness 143 
6.2.3. Methodological implications for research on subjective measures 144 
6.3. Quantifying the relation between subjective measures and task accuracy 145 
6.3.1. Logistic regression as measure of type 2 sensitivity 145 
6.3.2. Alternative logistic regression models 148 
6.4. Subjective measures: useful data for consciousness research? 150 
7. References 152 
8. List of publications 164 
9. Affidavit / Eidesstattliche Erklärung 165 
10. Declaration of author contributions 166 
 
1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is probably the most prominent yet 
unresolved problem in modern neuroscience (Crick & Koch, 1990, 2003; Rees, Kreiman, & 
Koch, 2002). According to a standard definition, the NCC is the minimum set of neural events 
jointly sufficient to give rise to a specific conscious experience (Mormann & Koch, 2007). 
Empirical studies of the NCC are usually based on the same principle, a comparison of two 
different kinds of measurements: (i) a measurement of on-going neural events, and (ii) a 
measurement of the conscious experiences of the subject given a specific stimulus or 
situation. A major obstacle to the prosperity of the field of consciousness research is that there 
is great disagreement on how to measure the latter, i.e. conscious experience (Chalmers, 
1998).  
What is the appropriate measurement for consciousness research? First and foremost, 
choosing a measurement of consciousness poses a conceptual question: Several different 
concepts of consciousness exist, each providing a different definition of what it means to be 
conscious (for overviews see e.g. Block, 2002; Rosenthal, 2009; van Gulick, 2014). Some of 
these concepts imply specific measurement procedures by implying that specific behaviours 
are indicative of consciousness (Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans, Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008). 
Conceptual clarity is not only important for identifying appropriate behavioural measures; in 
fact, different concepts of consciousness may be realized by separate NCCs (Block, 2005; 
Rees et al., 2002). As a consequence, empirical studies on consciousness need to clarify first 
which concept of consciousness is addressed by their research.  
However, while the key features of a measure of consciousness can be determined by 
conceptual considerations, many specific features cannot be deduced from the concepts. For 
example, higher order theories of consciousness typically imply that visual consciousness 
needs to be assessed by some kind of subjective measure (Dienes, 2004, 2008; Lau & 
Rosenthal, 2011; Lau, 2008b; c.f. section 1.2.3.), but they do not specify whether visual 
consciousness should be measured by a visibility rating, a confidence rating, whether reports 
should be made at a continuous or a multi-category scale, or whether joystick or keyboards 
should be used as measurement device. Whenever several measures are conceptually equally 
valid, empirical studies are required to investigate how a measurement needs to be designed 
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to provide the most useful data (Dienes & Seth, 2010; Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & 
Cleeremans, 2010).  
This work addresses the basic research question how subjective measures need to be 
designed to provide useful measures of visual consciousness. It begins with a discussion of 
the distinctive features of subjective measures in comparison to so-called objective measures, 
which concepts of consciousness can be assessed by subjective measures, and what is the 
rationale to prefer subjective measures over objective ones. Subsequently, three key 
characteristics of subjective measures are empirically investigated:  
(i) the content of subjective measures 
(ii) the granularity of subjective measures 
(iii) the method to quantify the relation between subjective measures and objective task 
performance 
Regarding content, it is investigated whether subjective measures that refer to the 
visual experience of the stimulus are interchangeable with subjective measures that refer to 
participants’ confidence in having made a correct response at the discrimination task. The 
effect of content of subjective measures is examined in terms of behaviour in psychophysical 
experiments (cf. Chapter 2; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013) and event-related potential (ERP) 
correlates (Chapter 3). Regarding the granularity of subjective measures, it is investigated if 
subjective reports should preferably be recorded by scales with four discrete categories, or by 
a visual analogue scale (VAS; Chapter 4; Rausch & Zehetleitner, 2014). Finally, concerning 
the association between subjective measures and discrimination performance, it is examined if 
mixed-model logistic regression or the recently suggested meta-da is a more convenient 
method of analysis (Chapter 5; Rausch, Müller, & Zehetleitner, 2015).  
1.1. What are subjective measures of conscious awareness? 
Two general approaches to measuring conscious awareness can be distinguished: 
objective measures and subjective measures (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984; Lau, 2008; Seth et 
al., 2008). A measure is considered objective if conscious experiences are ascribed to the 
subject based on performance in a task (Eriksen, 1960). For example, assuming that 
participants are presented with one out of two possible stimuli “A” and “B”, the participants 
are said to be conscious of the stimulus if they respond correctly more often than expected 
from chance when asked to classify the stimulus. In contrast, measures are considered as 
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subjective if participants are required to make a report about their conscious experiences 
(Cheesman & Merikle, 1984). In this case, the participants might be asked if they are seeing 
the stimulus, and it is assumed that they have a visual experience if they respond “yes”. 
According to a standard view in the consciousness studies literature, the fundamental 
difference between objective and subjective measures lies in the kind of processes indicated 
by each measure (Dienes, 2008). Fig. 1-1 provides an overview of the hypothesized causal 
pathways leading to a discrimination response (i.e. an objective measure) as well as subjective 
report (i.e. a subjective measure). Discrimination performance above chance shows that the 
visual system of the observer provided at least some sensory evidence, which was available to 
the processes engaged in decision making. The decision must also have successfully triggered 
a motor response. In contrast, subjective measures require participants to report their mental 
state directly (Dienes, 2004; Seth et al., 2008), for instance their visual experience of the 
stimulus. Such a report requires the participant to make a decision between the different 
response options offered by a subjective measure (called rating decision in Fig. 1-1). This 
rating decision depends on metacognitive processes in the sense that participants need to 
know they saw the stimulus in order to report that they saw the stimulus (Dienes, 2008). Some 
of the causal pathways underlying rating decisions are yet controversial: Standard signal 
detection theory assumes that rating decision are made based on the same sensory evidence as 
the discrimination decision (Kepecs, Uchida, Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008; Ko & Lau, 2012; 
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Other models have suggested a parallel causal pathway for 
sensory evidence to rating decisions bypassing the discrimination decision (Cleeremans, 
Timmermans, & Pasquali, 2007; Dehaene, 2010). Some models unify both accounts in 
assuming rating decisions are influenced by both sensory evidence used in the discrimination 
task as well as parallel sensory evidence (Jang, Wallsten, & Huber, 2012; Pleskac & 
Busemeyer, 2010). Finally, recent studies proposed that rating decisions are influenced by the 
motor action of the previous discrimination response (Fleming et al., 2015). Overall, the 
mechanisms underlying subjective measures may involve metacognitive components in 
addition to those processes engaged in objective measures.  
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Figure 1-1. A schematic view of the causal pathways underlying objective and subjective 
measures of consciousness. A discrimination decision is a decision process where participants 
select one out of the possible responses to the task, based on sensory evidence provided by 
perceptual processes. A rating decision is a process where participants select one out of 
several options provided by the rating scale. The causal pathways leading to rating decisions 
are still controversial, as indicated by the question marks. 
 
Besides these differences, Fig. 1-1 also illustrates an important feature objective and 
subjective measures have in common: Both kinds of measures ultimately depend on an overt 
behavioural response by the participant. For objective and subjective measures, the most 
common response in the context of an experiment is that the participant presses one out of 
several buttons. This is important to acknowledge because subjective measures seem to 
depend on introspection, i.e. the observation of one’s own mind, which has been exiled from 
scientific psychology for decades (Boring, 1953; Danziger, 1980). However, participants’ 
subjective report recorded and interpreted by the experimenter is a physical fact about the 
world just in the same way as a discrimination judgement, public and thus readily accessible 
for scientific investigations. Consequently, subjective reports about conscious experience are 
legitimate data for science as long as the experimenter and the participant who engages in 
introspection are not the same person (Dennett, 2003, 2007). Even more, it was argued that 
subjective reports about conscious experience are exactly those events that a science of 
consciousness should collect as data and strive to explain (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; 
Dehaene, 2010; Dennett, 2003, 2007).  
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1.2. Concepts of consciousness 
Before discussing whether subjective and objective measures are more appropriate for 
a specific research question, researchers should always clarify first which concept of 
consciousness is investigated in a specific study. Concepts of consciousness fall into the two 
superordinate categories of transitive consciousness and intransitive consciousness (Dehaene, 
Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006). When used in the intransitive sense, 
consciousness refers to a person or to an agent as a whole: Intransitive consciousness 
differentiates awake humans from non-conscious entities (e.g. robots, philosophical zombies) 
or other humans in dreamless sleep or coma. In the transitive sense, consciousness always 
refers to events or mental states one is conscious or aware of (Rosenthal, 1986, 2009; Van 
Gulick, 2014): Transitive consciousness differentiates conscious stimuli or perception from 
unconscious stimuli or perception. Researchers often use the term awareness or conscious 
awareness to explicitly refer to the transitive meaning of consciousness of something. Both 
superordinate categories involve various different concepts (see Van Gulick, 2014, for an 
overview). As the present work is only concerned with subjective measures of conscious 
awareness of visual stimuli, only the three most influential concepts of transitive 
consciousness for contemporary research and the corresponding theories of consciousness are 
described briefly:  
(i) phenomenal consciousness (Block, 2002; Jackson, 1982; Nagel, 1974) 
(ii) conscious access (Baars, 2002, 2005; Block, 2002; Dehaene et al., 2006; Dehaene & 
Naccache, 2001) 
(iii) higher-order consciousness (Carruthers, 2011; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Timmermans, 
Schilbach, Pasquali, & Cleeremans, 2012) 
For each of these concepts, it is discussed whether it can be adequately assessed by 
means of subjective measures. 
1.2.1. Phenomenal Consciousness 
Conscious awareness in the sense of phenomenal consciousness is defined as what-it-
is-like to have an experience of an external stimulus or an inner event. What-it-is-likeness, the 
qualitative aspect of experience, always depends on the first person perspective of the 
observer (Nagel, 1974). If conscious awareness is understood along the lines of phenomenal 
consciousness, observers are conscious of a stimulus if they have first person experiences of 
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the stimulus (Block, 2002; Chalmers, 1994; Nagel, 1974). Concerning the NCC, proponents 
of phenomenal consciousness often defend a sensory cortex view, assuming that conscious 
experience is instantiated by brain events during sensory processing of the stimulus, for 
instance recurrent processing along the visual ventral stream (Block, 2005; Lamme, 2006).  
Is there a possibility of measuring phenomenal experience by subjective measures? 
According to one view, in order to really know what a specific experience is like, it is 
necessary to experience that particular sensation oneself (Jackson, 1982). As phenomenal 
consciousness is defined as experience from the first person perspective (Block, 2002; 
Chalmers, 1994; Nagel, 1974), but science is an endeavour that crucially relies on the third 
person perspective (Dennett, 2007), it appears unlikely that measurements from the third-
person perspective are ever able to measure phenomenal consciousness in a scientifically 
appropriate way, irrespective of the measures being subjective or objective. However, 
although phenomenal experience cannot be accessed from third person perspective, it may be 
possible that phenomenal experience can be shared (Velmans, 2000, 2007): This view 
maintains that if the perceptual and cognitive apparatus of different observers is similar, and if 
different observers give similar reports of what they experience, it is reasonable to assume 
their conscious experience of a given stimulus is also similar. This approach does not aim for 
objectivity in the sense of measuring conscious experience independently from the observer. 
Instead, it investigates agreement between different first-person perspectives, i.e. 
intersubjectivity. However, inferences about first-person experiences based on subjective 
measures relies on the assumption that similar perceptual and cognitive apparatuses give 
similar experiences; and while this intuition may appear reasonable to many, the argument is 
not compelling to those who do not share this intuition.  
1.2.2. Conscious access 
According to the second concept of consciousness, termed conscious access or access 
consciousness, a representation is conscious if it is available for reasoning and direct control 
of action (including reporting) (Baars, 2002; Block, 2002; Dehaene et al., 2006). This means 
for visual consciousness that observers perceive a stimulus consciously if the contents 
generated by the visual system can be used to guide behaviour based on reason and if the 
contents can be reported. Conscious access is the concept of consciousness underlying global 
workspace theory (Baars, 2002; Dehaene et al., 2006; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). The 
global workspace theory assumes that representations encapsulated in brain systems operating 
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in parallel are unconscious. A global workspace is instantiated by broadcasting 
representations to multiple other brain systems. The global availability of representations 
through the workspace is subjectively experienced as a conscious state (Dehaene & Naccache, 
2001). The neural implementation of conscious access is an “ignition”-like spread of neural 
activity from sensory cortices to a fronto-parietal network resulting in a widely distributed 
NCC (Dehaene et al., 2006).  
Are subjective measures eligible to measure conscious access to visual contents? As 
reportability is among the two cognitive functions that are included in the definition of 
conscious access, subjective reports are a natural choice of measuring conscious awareness 
from the viewpoint of conscious access and global workspace theory (Dehaene & Naccache, 
2001; Dehaene, 2010). If visual contents are reportable, it means that visual contents cannot 
be encapsulated into the visual system; instead, it shows that the visual contents are available 
to decision making and language as required for rating decisions (Dienes, 2008). Overall, 
subjective measures are adequate measures of conscious access.  
1.2.3. Higher-order consciousness 
According to the third prominent concept of consciousness, an observer is conscious 
of a particular mental state if the mental state is accompanied by a higher-order mental state 
that represents the observer as being in a particular mental state (Carruthers, 2011; Lau & 
Rosenthal, 2011). According to different flavours of higher-order consciousness, this higher 
order mental state can be a thought (Rosenthal, 1986), a percept (Lycan, 2004), or a statistical 
inference (Lau, 2008a). In terms of visual consciousness, observers perceive a stimulus 
consciously only if they possess a mental state that represents them as perceiving the 
stimulus, i.e. observers need to know/sense/infer that they perceive the stimulus. As these 
higher-order mental states require metacognition, higher order theories predict a close 
connection between consciousness and metacognitive systems (Rosenthal, 2000). 
Consequently, the neural correlates of higher-order consciousness are assumed to be similar 
to those of metacognition and thus located in frontal and parietal cortex (Lau & Rosenthal, 
2011). 
Endorsing a higher-order consciousness is the most common theoretical background 
for using subjective measure of conscious awareness because subjective measures can be seen 
as a test of higher-order mental states (Dienes, 2004, 2008): In order to report that they saw 
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the stimulus, participants need to know, sense or infer that they saw the stimulus. The 
metacognitive aspect of subjective measures makes subjective measures the most valid 
measure of conscious awareness in the higher-order sense (Lau, 2008b).  
1.3. Why objective measures of conscious awareness are not sufficient 
Given the fact that objective measures have dominated cognitive psychology for the 
second half of the 20
th
 century (Boring, 1953; Danziger, 1980; Eriksen, 1960), it may appear 
surprising why more and more researchers, even from different theoretical perspectives, have 
come to argue for using subjective measures in consciousness research (Dehaene & Naccache, 
2001; Dienes, 2008; Lau, 2008b; Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). The main argument why 
objective measures need to be accompanied by subjective measures starts from the premise 
that conscious experiences are not necessarily in accordance with performance in 
discrimination tasks (Lau, 2008b; Seth et al., 2008). The reason is that all three major theories 
of consciousness allow for the possibility that conscious awareness is in disagreement with 
discrimination task performance (Dienes, 2008).  
First, there may be cases where discrimination performance is above chance in 
absence of conscious awareness. The standard example is blindsight, which is caused by 
lesions to primary visual cortex. These patients report to be blind in the visual hemifield 
contralateral to the damaged brain area. Despite their apparent blindness to stimuli presented 
in their visual field corresponding to the lesion, these patients are able to perform well above 
chance in forced-choice tasks on stimuli presented in regions in space where they report to be 
blind (Weiskrantz, 1986). Proponents of phenomenal consciousness believe this is possible 
because the occipital lesion destroys pathways necessary for conscious experience, while 
discrimination performance is supported by neural circuits not part of the NCC (Lamme, 
2006). Global workspace theory assumes that blindsight is mediated by a processing stream 
that does not trigger a global workspace and thus occurs in absence of conscious awareness 
(Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). Finally, higher-order theories assume that blindsight patients 
fail to have an accurate metarepresentation of their perceptual capacities (Lau, 2008a).  
Second, there may also be cases where conscious experience exceeds the manifest 
discrimination performance. For example, when participants are presented with arrays of 
several letters, observers report they can see all or almost all letters, but typically are able to 
report no more than 3 to 4 of the letters (Block, 2011; Sperling, 1960). Conscious experience 
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without discrimination performance may occur when contents in visual short-term visual 
memory associated with phenomenology are overwritten by new stimuli before they can be 
transferred to working memory (Block, 2011; Vandenbroucke, Sligte, & Lamme, 2011). 
According to higher-order theories, conscious experience without performance can be 
explained by illusory metacognition of percepts at unattended locations (Lau & Rosenthal, 
2011). Conscious experience without discrimination performance is however not consistent 
with global workspace theory (Kouider, de Gardelle, Sackur, & Dupoux, 2010). Nevertheless, 
all three major concepts of consciousness predict at least some instances where discrimination 
performance deviates from conscious awareness.  
If discrimination performance alone is not sufficient to measure conscious awareness, 
can conscious awareness be assessed without asking the participant to make a response? So-
called no-report paradigms promise to disentangle the NCC from the correlates of reports by 
instructing the participant not to make a response at all (Frässle, Sommer, Jansen, Naber, & 
Einhäuser, 2014; Pitts, Martínez, & Hillyard, 2012; Pitts, Metzler, & Hillyard, 2014). One 
flavour of these experiments relies on a modified inattentional blindness paradigm (Pitts et al., 
2012): In the first phase of the experiment, participants perform a demanding perceptual task 
while task-irrelevant line segments forming a configuration are presented. In a following 
interview, participants are interrogated about their awareness of the configurations and thus 
their attention is directed towards the configurations when the task is repeated. Finally, 
awareness of the configurations is assessed by interview a second time. The idea is that 
participants are unaware of the configuration in the first phase of the experiment, but after the 
first interview they become aware of the stimuli. However, the whole “no-report” paradigm 
does rely heavily on subjective measures, because integral parts of the experiment are the two 
interviews. The participants’ answers during the interview are subjective reports and thus 
subjective measures of consciousness. The second flavour of no-report paradigms tries to 
replace subjective reports during the experiment by physiological markers: As the alternations 
of conscious experiences during binocular rivalry are correlated with pupil size and opto-
kinetic nystagmus, Frässle et al. (2014) suggested to replace subjective measures by 
supposedly more objective eye-tracking based measures. However, eye-tracking based 
measures may not be the best choice as physiological marker of awareness because multiple 
dissociations between conscious awareness and eye movements exist (Spering & Carrasco, 
2015). In general, this method requires a validation phase for each physiological marker, 
where the close correlation between conscious experiences and the marker is established. For 
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this purpose, again subjective measures of conscious awareness are typically used. As 
discussed above, discrimination performance cannot be used to establish a physiological 
marker because discrimination performance does not necessary indicate that observers are 
also conscious of the stimulus. Overall, no-report paradigms avoid subjective measures only 
at the point in time when neural processes are measured, while subjective measures are still an 
integral part of the experiments.  
When dissociations between subjective reports and objective measures are observed, 
many empirical researchers tend to place their trust on the objective measure (e.g. Eriksen, 
1960; Hannula, Simons, & Cohen, 2005; Shanks & St. John, 1994). However, all existing 
concepts of consciousness imply that dissociations between objective measures and conscious 
awareness may exist. As a consequence, objective measures should always be accompanied 
by subjective measures (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dehaene, 2010; Dienes, 2004, 2008; 
Lau, 2008b; Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004).  
1.4. Can subjective measures provide scientifically useful data? 
The term “subjective” in subjective measures has the negative connotations of 
“biased” and “unscientific”. Unsurprisingly, subjective measures have not been considered as 
serious scientific data for most of the 20
th
 century (Boring, 1953; Danziger, 1980; Eriksen, 
1960), and many still consider subjective measures as problematic (Hannula et al., 2005; 
Irvine, 2012; Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). Opponents of subjective measures usually defend 
their view with variants of the following arguments: 
(i) Language and words may be inadequate to reflect conscious experiences (Eriksen, 
1960). 
(ii) Subjective measures depend on applying criteria (Block, 2005; Irvine, 2012; Schmidt 
& Vorberg, 2006). 
(iii) Subjective measures do not exhaustively detect all instances where participants are 
aware of the stimulation (Hannula et al., 2005; Persaud, McLeod, & Cowey, 2007; 
Shanks & St. John, 1994). 
Critique (i) argues that words and language, and consequently subjective measures, are 
inadequate to reflect consciousness experiences. As Eriksen (1960) pointed out, words are 
highly abstract symbols with no physical resemblance to the relationships they denote. This 
argument seems to apply to a concept of consciousness as phenomenal consciousness 
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inaccessible to verbal report. After all, there is no principle reason why participants are unable 
to verbalize the characteristic relationships of conscious access and higher order 
consciousness. However, it seems questionable why inaccessible phenomenal consciousness 
is more adequately assessed by objective measures than by subjective ones. After all, the 
metrics of discrimination performance is also quite different from the metrics of phenomenal 
experience. If conscious experiences are not associated with subjective reports, there is little 
reason to believe that conscious experiences are associated with discrimination responses. If 
indeed the only way to know what a specific experience is like is to share it (Jackson, 1982), 
neither subjective nor objective measures are adequate measures of conscious experience; 
there will probably never be a satisfactory way to measure conscious experience at all. If a 
more optimistic view on the human ability to communicate their phenomenal experiences is 
adopted (Velmans, 2000, 2007), words and language appear to be a natural choice as medium 
of communication. After all, language is the primary mechanism of communication of 
humankind. Some theories even suggest that perceptual awareness evolved to enhance 
communication with other humans (Frith, 2011; Graziano & Kastner, 2011).  
A more modest interpretation of argument (i) asserts that the translation of conscious 
experiences into a subjective measure is not impossible, but prone to errors. However, this is 
not a principle argument against the use of subjective measures; instead, it suggests that 
researchers should not blindly trust in their subjective measures (Velmans, 2007). At a 
consequence, a series of studies attempted to identify the most suitable subjective measures of 
conscious awareness empirically (Dienes & Seth, 2010; Rausch & Zehetleitner, 2014; 
Sandberg, Bibby, Timmermans, Cleeremans, & Overgaard, 2011; Sandberg et al., 2010; 
Szczepanowski, Traczyk, Wierzchoń, & Cleeremans, 2013; Wierzchoń, Asanowicz, 
Paulewicz, & Cleeremans, 2012; Wierzchoń, Paulewicz, Asanowicz, Timmermans, & 
Cleeremans, 2014). How can the eligibility of a specific subjective measure be evaluated? The 
first possibility is to assess the correlation between subjective measures and objective 
discrimination performance: If there is a correlation between subjective measures and task 
performance, it means that the sensory systems were able to provide some sensory evidence, 
which directly or indirectly has propagated to the processes engaged in the rating decision. 
Consequently, the degree to which subjective measures predict trial accuracy, a.k.a. type 2 
sensitivity (Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 2003), can be used as a reference frame to 
interpret the credibility of subjective measures (Fleming & Lau, 2014). If participants report a 
conscious experience of a stimulus and their subjective reports are correlated with 
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discrimination performance about the stimulus, it is widely agreed that observers are 
conscious of the stimulus (e.g. Vandenbroucke et al., 2014). A second possibility is to 
evaluate the relationship to variations of stimulus quality (e.g. stimulus contrast, presentation 
time). If a subjective measure stands in no relation to the physical quality of the stimulus (e.g. 
its presentation time or its luminance), it appears unlikely that a representation of the stimulus 
was available at the rating decision. The final proposal was to consider the neural correlates of 
subjective measures: The credibility of subjective measures also increases when they are 
reliable predictors of brain activity (Charles, Van Opstal, Marti, & Dehaene, 2013). Overall, 
the difficulty of translating conscious experiences into a subjective measure does not rule out 
the usefulness of subjective measures per se; instead specific subjective measures need to be 
examined carefully if they are suitable measures of conscious awareness.  
Argument (ii) maintains that subjective measures are not immediate measures of 
conscious awareness because they always involve comparison between the internal decision 
variable and a criterion for a subjective report (Block, 2005; Irvine, 2012). This response 
criterion depends on a variety of different factors such as motivation, training, and the aims of 
the participant, all of which are no perceptual factors (Irvine, 2012). Uncontrolled changes of 
the participants’ criteria may result in different subjective reports between two conditions, 
although awareness is the same (Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). As a consequence of the ubiquity 
of response criteria, Irvine argued objective measures should be used instead of subjective 
measures. However, the confound between internal signal and response criteria can be 
eliminated by the mathematical tools developed by type 2 signal detection theory (Galvin et 
al., 2003). Standard signal detection theory provides a rationale to distinguish between 
participants’ sensitivity to distinguish between two response options and their criteria (Green 
& Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Wickens, 2002). Type 2 signal detection 
theory adds tools to distinguish between participants’ ability to distinguish between correct 
and incorrect trials, a measure of metacognition, and the criteria applied in rating decisions 
(Fleming & Lau, 2014; Galvin et al., 2003). As a consequence, the dependency of rating 
decisions on criteria is no longer a decisive argument against the use subjective measures.  
Critique (iii) refers the use of subjective measures in the implicit perception literature 
(Cheesman & Merikle, 1984). The argument asserts that subjective measures are limited 
because they do not exhaustively indicate all instances of conscious awareness. Critique (iii) 
comes in several variants: The first concern is that the statistical power of subjective measures 
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might be too low (Newell & Shanks, 2014; Shanks & St. John, 1994). Statistical power is an 
important issue because of the underlying logic of the majority of implicit perception 
experiments: A test of explicit (= conscious) processing is contrasted with a test of implicit (= 
unconscious) processing. If the test of unconscious processing is significant, but the test of 
conscious processing is not, it is usually concluded that perception is implicit (Schmidt & 
Vorberg, 2006). As the probability of obtaining a significant result depends on the statistical 
power of the test (Dienes, 2011), if the power of the implicit test is larger than the power of 
the explicit test, the experimental setup is prone to misclassify effects as implicit (Shanks & 
St. John, 1994). However, this reasoning rests on a misunderstanding of standard statistics: 
Non-significant p-values should never be interpreted as evidence for the absence of an effect; 
such a conclusion requires a power analysis based on a theoretically specified effect size 
(Dienes, 2011). Typically, many researchers indeed fail to conduct or report a power analysis, 
which creates the risk that the design is biased for implicit processing (Vadillo, 
Konstantinidis, & Shanks, 2015). If researchers ensure that the power of the explicit test is 
adequate, there is no reason why subjective measures cannot be used to test explicit 
processing. Alternatively, researchers can also pursue a Bayesian approach to hypothesis 
testing, which provides an even more elegant solution to the power problem in subliminal 
perception than power analysis (Dienes, 2015).  
The second flavour of critique (iii) maintains that participants may be not sufficiently 
motivated to reveal all conscious experiences they in fact have (Persaud et al., 2007). Indeed, 
subjective measures depend strongly on motivated participants; if participants carelessly or 
maliciously choose to conceal their conscious experiences, there are not many possibilities to 
control for that. A potential solution to the motivational problem may be to ask participants to 
wager money on the outcome of their own performance. In this case, participants maximize 
their earnings only if they report all conscious experience that they have (Persaud et al., 
2007). Unfortunately, post-decisional wagering is biased by participants’ risk aversion 
(Dienes & Seth, 2010) and loss aversion (Fleming & Dolan, 2010). Nevertheless, it appears 
unlikely that lack of motivation will distort the results of standard subjective measures if 
participants are naïve to the research question: When participants are unmotivated to follow 
the instructions of the experimenter, some of them will fail to report exhaustively all 
conscious experiences they have. However, it is equally probable that some of them will 
report conscious experiences they in fact do not have. In summary, the effects of unmotivated 
participants are likely to cancel out between conditions.  
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The final variant of critique (iii) argues that subjective measures do not exhaustively 
test all conscious contents relevant for the task (Shanks & St. John, 1994). For example, in 
visual perception, there may be so-called fringe experiences, experiences where the subject is 
aware that an event occurred, but does not experience any characteristics of the stimulus 
(Mangan, 2001; Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). If a subjective measure only requires 
participants to report whether they had an experience of the stimulus, fringe experiences 
remain undetected. However, the content-specificity of subjective measures can also be 
interpreted as an advantage of subjective measures, because it is possible to tailor the content 
of a subjective measure to the conscious content of interest to a specific research question. If 
both brief glimpse experiences as well as content-specific experiences are of interest to a 
specific research question, a scale can be designed that offers response options for both of 
them. If all knowledge the participant may have is of relevance to the research question, one 
might just ask participants to rate their confidence in being correct at the discrimination task 
(Dienes, 2004, 2008). Overall, varying the contents of subjective measures allows for more 
flexibility in inquiring different conscious contents than discrimination tasks.  
1.5. Milestones for creating subjective measures of consciousness 
1.5.1. The content of subjective measures 
The first characteristic of subjective measures investigated in the present work is the 
content of subjective measures of visual consciousness. For the purpose of the present 
discussion, the content of subjective measures can be defined as what participants are asked to 
make a report about. Subjective measures always have some content by virtue of the fact it is 
necessary to instruct participants what they should report. Notably, subjective measures exist 
where the first experience on the unaware-aware-spectrum is explained to the participants as 
experiences without content (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004) . However, even these first vague 
experiences do have content; possibly the experience is more of an intuition or a feeling that 
some stimulus is or had been present, without a visual experience of the separate features of 
the stimulus (Mangan, 2001). 
As highlighted by Fig. 1-2, there are always at least two potential contents of 
subjective measures in a standard experimental situation: the stimulus and the discrimination 
response (cf. Chapter 2 and 3, Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013). This raises the question which 
of the two should be the content of subjective measures of conscious awareness. Empirical 
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studies are excellently suited to investigate whether these two semantic contents are 
associated with different behaviours and neural correlations. Many theorists have considered 
reports of visual experience and decisional confidence to be interchangeable (Ko & Lau, 
2012; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Seth et al., 2008), although others have argued for the opposite 
(Charles et al., 2013; Sahraie, Weiskrantz, & Barbur, 1998; Schlagbauer, Müller, Zehetleitner, 
& Geyer, 2012).  
 
Figure 1-2. The content of subjective measures. Subjective measures may stand in a semantic 
relation to the discrimination response, for example at confidence ratings or post-decisional 
wagering. However, they may also refer semantically to the stimulus, for example at visibility 
or visual experience ratings. 
 
While empirical investigations are able to show whether there are differences between 
subjective measures of visual experience and decisional confidence, it remains a conceptual 
issue what conclusions are to be drawn from the results. Many previous studies rested on the 
assumption that visual experience and decisional confidence are equally valid as measures of 
conscious awareness (Sandberg et al., 2011, 2010; Wierzchoń et al., 2012, 2014). Their 
rationale is that one measure should be preferred as subjective measure of conscious 
awareness that outperforms all the other measures in predicting trial accuracy. In contrast to 
this assumption, others have proposed that participants can be consciously aware of being 
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correct or wrong without being consciously aware of the stimulus (Carota & Calabrese, 2013; 
Charles et al., 2013; Sahraie et al., 1998). As a consequence, the question whether subjective 
measures should be about visual experience of the stimulus or about confidence in having 
made a correct discrimination response is again conceptual: Specific research questions may 
imply that either visual experience or decisional confidence is the relevant conscious content. 
To differentiate between these two interpretations, the present studies evaluate subjective 
measures not only by the correlation with discrimination performance, but also the correlation 
with stimulus quality as well as neural correlates. If either subjective measures that relate to 
the experience of the stimulus or to decisional confidence was corrupted from a great amount 
of unsystematic noise, it would be expected that the correlation with accuracy, stimulus 
quality, and brain activity should all be diminished. If the pattern of correlation varies across 
criteria, it would mean that subjective measures of visual experience and decisional 
confidence are different independently from the quality of measurement. 
1.5.2. The granularity of subjective measures 
The second characteristic of subjective measures investigated in the present work is 
the degree of granularity of subjective measures of visual consciousness: How many different 
scale steps should such a measure provide? The question of the preferred degree of 
granularity has both a theoretical as well as a methodological dimension. The reason for the 
theoretical importance is a prediction by global workspace theory, which asserts conscious 
awareness does not vary gradually, but in an all-to-none fashion (Dehaene et al., 2006; 
Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Sergent, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2005). Other theories, for instance 
the radical plasticity thesis, assume that there are multiple degrees of conscious awareness 
(Cleeremans, 2008, 2011). If participants either were unconscious of the stimulus or fully 
conscious of the stimulus, i.e. if there were only two distinct states of conscious awareness, 
there would be no benefit of using scales with multiple response options. In contrast, if 
participants were able to consistently differentiate between more than two rating categories, it 
would follow that the number of degrees of conscious awareness is greater than two. The 
methodological aspect of investigating the granularity of subjective measures attempts to 
maximize the amount of information provided by subjective measures. If participants were 
able to differentiate between more conscious states than the number of scale steps provided by 
subjective measures, the consequence would be an unnecessary loss of information. However, 
if the number of scale steps is larger than the number of conscious states participants can 
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discriminate, there will be no benefit of adding more scale steps; participants might even get 
confused by the superfluous number of response options, resulting again in a loss of 
information (Overgaard, Rote, Mouridsen, & Ramsøy, 2006).  
1.5.3. Quantifying type 2 sensitivity 
The third and final research question addressed by the present work is to identify the 
preferred method to quantify the relationship between subjective measures and performance 
in visual discrimination tasks. Quantifying the relationship between subjective reports and 
discrimination performance is a very useful tool for consciousness research: First, it can be 
used as a reference frame to interpret subjective reports (Fleming & Lau, 2014). When a 
correction between subjective reports and discrimination performance is empirically 
observed, it shows that at least some conscious contents relevant for performance in the task 
are available for the rating decision. In contrast, when subjective measures and discrimination 
performance are unrelated, it can be concluded that the rating decision was not influenced by 
processes engaged in the discrimination task. Consequently, no correlation between 
discrimination performance and confidence was proposed as a criterion for implicit 
performance (Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995). Second, the association between 
discrimination performance and subjective reports can be used as a tool to validate subjective 
measures (Dienes & Seth, 2010; Sandberg et al., 2010; Wierzchoń et al., 2012, 2014): If the 
conscious experiences underlying participants’ subjective reports are the same between two 
subjective measures, but the correlation with task performance is different between two 
subjective measures, it can be inferred that one measure is corrupted by a greater amount of 
noise or does not record the same amount of information than the other one (see Chapters 4 
and 5; Rausch et al., 2015; Rausch & Zehetleitner, 2014). Finally, when the association 
between subjective measures and task accuracy is quantified by a measure of type 2 
sensitivity, it can be used to counter arguments that subjective measures are inadequate to 
assess conscious awareness because they depend on a criterion (Irvine, 2012; see section 1.4). 
Type 2 sensitivity is defined as degree to which subjective reports differentiate between 
correct and incorrect trials irrespective of the criteria participants apply (Fleming & Lau, 
2014; Galvin et al., 2003). Different measures of the association between subjective measures 
and task accuracy may vary in their eligibility as measure of type 2 sensitivity. Nevertheless, 
to fulfil this last purpose, it must be ensured that the control over criteria provided by the 
method to quantify the relation between subjective measures and task accuracy is effective. 
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Despite the theoretical importance and practical usefulness of the association between 
subjective reports and discrimination performance, there is no universally accepted method to 
quantify the relation between the two. Three competing approaches were proposed:  
(i) logistic regression analysis, with subjective measure as predictor and trial correctness 
as dependent variable (Sandberg, Bibby, & Overgaard, 2013; Sandberg et al., 2010) 
(ii) type 2 receiver operating characteristics (Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010) 
(iii) meta-da (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012) 
While (ii) and (iii) are measures derived from type 2 signal detection theory and thus 
were developed to account for criteria, logistic regression analysis is a method for binary 
dependent variables without special intent to control for criteria. However, up to now, it has 
never been investigated whether logistic regression is a suitable measure of the relation 
between subjective measures and discrimination performance. If the results obtained by 
logistic regression and signal detection theory based measures do not converge, the question 
arises what is the relationship between the results obtained by the two. 
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2. STIMULUS-RELATED VS. RESPONSE-RELATED 
SUBJECTIVE MEASURES
1
 
by Michael Zehetleitner and Manuel Rausch
2
 
 
2.1. Abstract 
Can observers be confident about the accuracy of a discrimination response without a 
visual experience of the stimulus? In a series of five experiments, observers performed a 
masked orientation discrimination task, a masked shape discrimination task, or a random-dot 
motion discrimination task, followed by two subjective ratings after each trial, in which 
participants either reported their visual experience of the stimulus, or their confidence in 
being correct. We observed that the threshold for ratings of the perception of the stimulus was 
above the threshold for ratings about the accuracy of the discrimination response, that 
response-related ratings outperformed stimulus-related ratings in predicting trial accuracy, 
and different response-related scales were more strongly associated with other response-
related scales than with stimulus-related ratings. We propose a taxonomy of subjective 
measures of consciousness that differentiates between subjective measures relating to the 
percept of the stimulus and measures relating to the accuracy of discrimination response and 
discuss the relation to type 2 blindsight. 
2.2. Introduction 
The quest for neural correlates of consciousness relies typically on a comparison 
between two different types of measurements: those of neuronal processes on and those of 
consciousness (Crick & Koch, 1990; Rees et al., 2002). This approach critically relies on 
                                                 
1
 A version of this Chapter has been published as Zehetleitner, M., & Rausch, M. (2013). 
Being confident without seeing: What subjective measures of visual consciousness are about. 
Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 75, 1406–1426. doi: 10.3758/s13414-013-0505-2. 
Reproduced with permission by Springer.  
2
 Michael Zehetleitner and Manuel Rausch share first authorship. Michael Zehetleitner 
conceived the research questions, Michael Zehetleitner and Manuel Rausch conceived the 
experiments, Manuel Rausch collected and analysed the data, Michael Zehetleitner and 
Manuel Rausch co-wrote the manuscript.  
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defining measures of consciousness, which presents a huge obstacle in empirical science 
(Chalmers, 1998). With respect to measures of consciousness, currently several 
operationalizations are proposed in the literature. 
2.2.1. Objective vs. subjective measures 
One prominent view distinguishes between objective measures and subjective 
measures (Seth et al., 2008). Measures of consciousness are considered objective if the 
participant’s state of awareness is determined based on their performance on a task. For 
example, it is often assumed that if observers are able to discriminate a stimulus or respond 
differentially to it, they are conscious of that stimulus (Eriksen, 1960; Schmidt & Vorberg, 
2006). When a subject performs at chance level on a discrimination task, this is typically 
considered a reliable indicator of the absence of conscious awareness of the presented stimuli 
(Hannula et al., 2005). Proponents of this view often make use of signal detection theory 
(Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Wickens, 2002), assuming that 
observers are conscious if their sensitivity to discriminate between signal and noise is above a 
pre-defined level (e.g., above zero). 
A second approach to operationalizing consciousness is based on subjective measures. 
It has been questioned whether subjective measures are an acceptable method for empirical 
science at all (Hannula et al., 2005), for example because they might be corrupted by 
uncontrolled changes of the response criterion (Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). By contrast, 
according to Daniel Dennett’s heterophenomenology (Dennett, 2003, 2007) the participant’s 
utterances about his or her experience should be considered as empirical raw data, which 
requires a scientific explanation. This means that the modulation of verbal reports in an 
experiment can be an object of scientific study in the same way as other kinds of behaviour, 
such as button presses. 
Several types of subjective measures are currently proposed in the literature. The most 
frequent measurements are confidence ratings: The participants indicate how confident they 
feel about the correctness of their response (Peirce & Jastrow, 1885). Another possibility is to 
ask participants about the reason why they chose a particular response alternative; for 
example, after a response is given, participants might attribute their response to guessing, 
intuition, memory, or knowledge (Dienes & Scott, 2005; Scott & Dienes, 2008). Also, 
recently, observers have been asked to place a wager on the accuracy of their response, either 
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with the possibility that the reward is lost if the wager is incorrect (Persaud et al., 2007) or 
without the risk of losing the wager (Dienes & Seth, 2010). As wagering is independent of 
speech, it has successfully been used to explore awareness in animals, specifically in monkeys 
(Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007) and pigeons (Nakamura, Watanabe, Betsuyaku, & Fujita, 
2011). A third approach asks the observers directly to make judgements about their visual 
experiences. For example, observers can be asked to rate the degree of visual experience 
evoked by a stimulus on a visual analogue rating scale (Del Cul, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2007; 
Sergent & Dehaene, 2004). Assessing the degree of visual experience as well, but avoiding 
the use of continuous scales, the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) provides the participants 
with a discrete scale with verbal labels for each scale point to rate their visual experiences 
(Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004).  
2.2.2. Blindsight type 2 phenomena 
A classical example held to support a dissociation between objective and subjective 
measures of consciousness is blindsight: After a unilateral lesion to V1, patients suffer from 
apparent blindness in the visual field contralateral to the lesion. Blindsight is defined as the 
ability of patients to discriminate visual stimuli presented in their seemingly blind visual field 
in forced-choice tasks with remarkable accuracy, despite the fact that they report no visual 
experiences of these stimuli (Weiskrantz, 1986). The subjective reports of blindsight patients 
fall into two categories (Sahraie, Weiskrantz, Trevethan, Cruce, & Murray, 2002), blindsight 
type 1 and type 2. In blindsight type 1, patients report no awareness of the stimulus and very 
low confidence in discrimination choice, even though their choice is reliably above chance. 
However, the subjective reports of patients are apparently inconsistent in blindsight type 2: 
These patients occasionally report a feeling or knowing that something happened in their 
blind visual field, although they insist their experience was qualitatively different from 
normal seeing (Riddoch, 1917; Weiskrantz, Barbur, & Sahraie, 1995; Zeki & Ffytche, 1998). 
Critically, these patients may report a considerable amount of confidence in two-alternative 
forced choice (2AFC) judgments (Sahraie et al., 1998), and even be willing to wager the same 
amount of money in the blind and in the intact hemifield when discrimination difficulty is 
matched (Persaud et al., 2011), although in these studies, no visual experience of the stimulus 
was reported at all. 
A similar dissociation between subjective reports of confidence and visual experience 
has been reported when brain activity in posterior cortex was only transiently disrupted via 
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transcranial magnetic stimulation: Occipital TMS between 86 -114 ms after the presentation 
of the stimulus suppressed reports of visual experience of the stimulus, although 
discrimination performance was still quite good (Boyer, Harrison, & Ro, 2005). Interestingly, 
confidence ratings were strongly correlated with the accuracy of the discrimination 
judgement, indicating that TMS affected the reports of subjective experience more than the 
reports of subjective confidence. 
2.2.3. Stimulus-related vs. response-related ratings3 
The discrepancy between subjective measures in type 2 blindsight and posterior TMS 
raises questions as to whether subjective measures of consciousness form one single category. 
In the present study, we propose a taxonomy of subjective measures of consciousness that 
differentiate between subjective measures relating to the percept of stimulus (stimulus-related 
rating), and measures relating to the accuracy of the discrimination response (response-related 
rating). In detail, we discuss whether stimulus-related and response-related ratings:  
(i) might relate to different events in terms of signal detection theory  
(ii) can be interpreted as measures of different processes within the cognitive architecture  
(iii) might be associated with different experiences from the first-person perspective 
First, it can be argued that the stimulus-related and response-related ratings mirror a 
distinction in SDT between type 1 tasks and type 2 tasks (Galvin et al., 2003). In SDT, the 
distinction between type 1 and type 2 tasks is based on the events about which an observer 
makes a discrimination decision: In type 1 tasks, the observer discriminates whether an event 
(a stimulus) is either signal or noise. The discrimination response of the observer can be 
considered as a new event, which can be either correct or incorrect. In SDT, type 2 tasks 
require the participant to make a judgement whether the previous type 1 response was correct 
or incorrect. Subjective ratings can refer to the events of the type 1 task, e. g. when 
participants are asked to rate the clarity of their percept, but they can also refer to the events 
of the type 2 task, e. g. when participants give confidence ratings. The mere wording of 
                                                 
3
 In the original version of the manuscript published at Attention, Perception, and Psychophysics, the two classes 
were called stimulus rating and decision rating. However, the latter is more accurately be characterized as 
“response-related rating”: When participants are unconfident because they realize that they made an error due to 
accidently hitting the wrong button, their confidence is probably not based on their decision (which is correct in 
this event), but on their incorrect response instead. Consequently, the term “response-related rating” is used 
throughout the thesis. 
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existing subjective measures suggests such a correspondence, as they semantically reference 
either to the stimulus or to the response: “How clearly did you experience the stimulus?”, 
“how confident are you that your response was correct?” Thus, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the events in the world the two kinds of ratings refer to are different. 
Concerning the second point, it is possible to connect stimulus- and response-related 
ratings to different functions within the cognitive architecture. Nelson and Narens’ model of 
metacognition distinguishes between two different levels of cognitive processing: On the one 
hand, there are processes concerned with performing the task, which they call the object-level, 
and on the other hand, there are processes forming a dynamic model of the object-level, and 
giving rise to verbal reports, which they call the meta-level (Nelson & Narens, 1990). 
According to standard assumptions about processes on the object-level, when an observer 
performs a visual discrimination task and a stimulus is presented, this stimulus first creates 
sensory data within the brain, which is integrated over time into a decision variable. A 
decision is selected by applying a decision rule to the decision variable, and the respective 
response is triggered (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff, 1978). When processes on the meta-
level give rise to verbal reports about the stimulus or the response, it is possible that both 
kinds of subjective reports are created by sub-sampling out of the same underlying dimension 
of sensory data. Another hypothesis might be that, when participants rate the clarity of their 
visual experience, they might estimate the strength or the quality of the internal signals that 
form part of the sensory data. In contrast, in confidence ratings or wagering, participants 
might evaluate those internal signals that are involved in the decision for a response. 
Third, stimulus- and response-related ratings are qualitatively different from the first-
person perspective. When observers rate how clearly they perceived the stimulus, it seems to 
them that they judge their visual experience elicited by the presentation of the stimulus. This 
is different from the experience observers refer to when they give a response-related rating: In 
this case, the first-person experience in question is above all a feeling of confidence in being 
correct or incorrect or alternatively, a rational belief concerning the likelihood of being 
correct. For individuals, visual experience is not the primary referent of response-related 
ratings, and likewise, a feeling of confidence is not the primary referent of stimulus-related 
ratings. 
It should be noted that the distinction between stimulus- and response-related ratings 
proposed here overlaps with but is not identical to the distinction between introspective 
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reports and metacognitive reports proposed by Overgaard and Sandberg (Overgaard & 
Sandberg, 2012). They argued that introspective reports and metacognitive reports reveal 
different kinds of metacognitive access: Whereas introspective reports require participants to 
report their conscious experience directly, metacognitive reports are based on metacognitive 
judgements about a mental process (such as the selection of the task response), which is 
assumed to be dependent on introspection of one’s conscious experience. In the view outlined 
in the present study, the relationship between stimulus- and response-related ratings is 
symmetrical in the sense that they are both based on a metacognitive judgement: When 
participants rate their percept of the stimulus, they evaluate cognitive processes involved in 
the representation of the stimulus. When participants rate their confidence in the 
discrimination judgement, they assess those processes involved in selecting one out of several 
task alternatives. However, both stimulus- and response-related ratings are associated with a 
certain subjective experience that is qualitatively different in both cases: In the first case, a 
visual experience of the stimulus, in the second case, a subjective feeling of being correct or 
incorrect. 
In any case, as the cognitive functions of stimulus perception and decision making are 
closely connected, it is to be expected that the behavioural patterns of rating the stimulus and 
the decision are quite similar. The three lines of argumentation outlined above thus do not 
imply the prediction that both kinds of subjective reports contradict each other in a 
fundamental way, but indicate the possibility of subtle differences. 
To summarize, it is conceptually possible that ratings of visual experience can be 
sorted into one class of subjective measures, while confidence ratings as well as wagering 
belong to another class of subjective measures of consciousness. The two classes are probably 
not associated with fundamentally different behavioural patterns. At least in the case of 
disturbance of the occipital cortex though, it has been demonstrated that the results obtained 
by the two classes are not identical. The present study aims to investigate whether there is 
empirical support for any dissociation between the two classes of stimulus- and response-
related subjective reports in healthy human participants. 
2.2.4. Evaluation criteria for subjective measures of consciousness 
The selection of criteria to evaluate measurements of consciousness is non-trivial 
given the fact we cannot observe another person’s consciousness from the third person 
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perspective (Jackson, 1982; Nagel, 1974). As the extent to which a measurement “really” 
captures consciousness is impossible to determine, we will only consider three objective 
characteristics. Assuming that stimulus- and response-related ratings refer to different 
external events, the first relevant relationship is between the measures and properties of the 
stimulation. Specifically, measures might differ with respect to the relative sensitivity to 
changes of stimulus quality as well as the thresholds they impose upon observers (analogous 
to SDT type 1 sensitivity and criterion). The second relevant characteristic is their relation to 
the accuracy of the discrimination response. Again, measures might vary in their 
predictability for trial accuracy as well as the response criterion (analogous to SDT type 2 
sensitivity and criterion). According to the zero correlation criterion, an observer is assumed 
to be conscious if there is a positive correlation between his or her confidence ratings and task 
performance (Dienes et al., 1995). This correlation can be assessed separately for each level 
of stimulation to determine the weakest level of stimulation with a positive correlation 
between the measure and trial. The third relevant property of subjective measures is their 
relation to other rating scales. Measures can vary in the degree their variance is specific to 
them, or is shared by the other measures. 
2.2.5. Empirical differences between subjective measures 
Different subjective measures of consciousness have been previously compared to 
each other in two experiments with artificial grammar tasks and only one experiment with a 
visual discrimination task. Concerning artificial grammar tasks, one study compared 
confidence ratings and wagering, reporting that wagering is confounded by risk aversion, but 
no substantial differences between confidence and wagering occurred after the possibility of 
loss had been eliminated from wagering (Dienes & Seth, 2010). The second study reported 
that confidence ratings outperformed wagering and ratings of rule awareness in predicting 
trial accuracy and confidence ratings imposed a more liberal criterion for ratings in terms of 
accuracy than the other scales (Wierzchoń et al., 2012). Concerning the experiment with a 
visual paradigm, a masked object identification task, the PAS outperformed confidence 
ratings and wagering in predicting trial accuracy (Sandberg et al., 2010). By means of fitting 
psychometric functions to the data, the authors observed that the threshold in terms of 
stimulus duration for confidence ratings was below the threshold for the PAS. Furthermore, 
both the threshold for confidence and the PAS were below the threshold for wagering 
(Sandberg et al., 2011).  
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2.2.6. Rationale of the present study 
To summarize, the present study addressed two main research questions: First, we 
investigated whether the pattern of decisional confidence in absence of visual experience as 
occasionally reported in blindsight patients can also be found in healthy human observers. 
Second, we explored the hypothesis that subjective measures of consciousness fall into two 
categories, depending on whether these measures refer to the experience of the stimulus or to 
the correctness of a discrimination response. 
To address these issues, we conducted a series of five experiments. In each 
experiment, observers performed a 2AFC discrimination task with varying levels of difficulty. 
Within each trial, participants were asked to give two out of four possible subjective ratings 
after their discrimination response. When rating the stimulus, participants reported their 
clarity of experience of explicitly stated features of the stimulus. When rating the accuracy of 
the response, participants were instructed to either wager imaginary money on their response, 
to express their confidence in being correct, or to give an attribution of choice rating whether 
their orientation discrimination judgement was based on a guess or on knowledge. In Exp. 2-1 
and 2-2, participants performed a masked orientation discrimination task, followed by one 
stimulus-related rating and one response-related rating (in Exp. 2-1) and two response-related 
ratings (in Exp. 2-2). In Exp. 2-3 and 2-4, observers performed a masked shape discrimination 
task with a stimulus- and a response-related rating (in Exp. 2-3) and three different response-
related scales (in Exp. 2-4). Exp. 2-5 was conducted to compare stimulus- and response-
related ratings in a motion discrimination task with random dot kinematograms (RDK). We 
collected ratings with visual analogue rating scales (VARS), because continuous scales might 
encourage participants to rely more on their intuition and less on verbal categorization, as 
discrete scales with verbal labels do. In addition, it has been suggested that VARS are 
sensitive to gradual manipulations of target durations in masked discrimination tasks (Sergent 
& Dehaene, 2004). We manipulated the quality of stimulation by varying the stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA) between stimulus and mask in Exp. 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4 and the 
proportion of dots moving coherently in one direction in Exp. 2-5, which allowed us to 
estimate psychometric functions relating the quality of stimulation with mean ratings. The 
slope of the psychometric functions quantifies the relative sensitivity of the scale to changes 
of stimulus quality and the centre of the function determines its threshold (Gescheider, 1997). 
In addition, we could test whether the zero correlation criterion was violated at each level of 
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task difficulty by testing whether ratings in correct trials were higher than ratings in incorrect 
trials. Two ratings after each single trial of the experiment were presented; this procedure 
enabled us to assess the association of two different scale types on a single trial basis. By 
using a hierarchical regression with random intercepts we could, in addition, account for the 
clustered nature of the data across participants. In order to quantify the SDT type 2 
characteristics of the different scales we estimated receiver operating characteristics (ROC) 
and determined sensitivity and response criterion based on the area under the curve. 
If subjective measures showed a similar pattern to type 2 blindsight, we hypothesized 
that stimulus-related and response-related ratings would exhibit different psychometric 
thresholds and different levels of difficulty where the zero correlation criterion is met: 
Response-related ratings should have lower thresholds and should predict trial accuracy at a 
weaker level of stimulation. Second, concerning the classification of subjective measures into 
stimulus- and response-related ratings, we predicted that the association of stimulus- and 
response-related ratings is not as close as the association of two different response-related 
ratings. Third, as response-related ratings unlike stimulus-related ratings refer primarily to 
trial accuracy, we predict that response-related ratings exhibit a more pronounced SDT type 2 
sensitivity than stimulus-related rating do. Response-related ratings should only be more 
efficient in predicting trial accuracy, not stimulus quality; consequently, we expect that the 
psychometric slope of stimulus-related ratings would be at least the same as the psychometric 
slopes of response-related ratings.  
2.3. Experiment 2-1 
Exp. 2-1 addressed the issue of comparing stimulus-related ratings against the three 
different response-related scales. Observers performed a masked orientation discrimination 
task with varying SOAs between 10 and 140 ms. After each trial, observers submitted three 
responses: A 2AFC judgment about the orientation of the stimulus, a stimulus-related rating, 
and a response-related rating. There were three different response-related scales: Observers 
were either asked to wager imaginary money on the correctness of their discrimination 
response, to attribute whether the discrimination decision was rather based on a guess or on 
knowledge, or to give a confidence rating. 
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2.3.1. Methods 
2.3.1.1. Participants 
20 participants (2 male, 2 left-handed) participated in the experiment. The age of the 
participants ranged between 19 and 29, with a median of 23. All reported to have normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, confirmed that that they did not suffer from epilepsy or seizures, 
and gave written-informed consent. The experiment has been conducted according to the 
principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki, 6th revision (World Medical Association, 
2008) and the experimental procedure was approved by the ethics committee of the 
Department of Psychology of the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. Participants 
received either €8 per hour or course credits in return for participation. 
2.3.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was performed in a sound-attenuated cabin with dim illumination to 
prevent reflections on the monitor. The stimuli were presented on a Diamond Pro 2070 SB 
(Mitsubishi) monitor with 24 inch screen size and at a refresh rate of 100 Hz, driven by a PC 
with Windows XP as operating system. The viewing distance was approximately 80 cm. The 
experiment was programmed using MATLAB (MathWorks, USA) and Psychophysics 
Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). The target stimulus was a square filled with 
either a horizontal or a vertical oriented sinusoidal grating (frequency: 1 cycle per degree of 
visual angle, maximal luminance: 85.0 cd/m², minimal luminance: 9.5 cd/m
2
), presented in 
front of a grey (12.5 cd/m²) background. Squares subtended 3° x 3° degrees of visual angle. 
The mask consisted of a rectangular box (4° side length) with a black (1.3 cd/m²) and white 
(85.0 cd/m²) chequered pattern consisting 6 x 6 equally sized squares. Both stimulus and 
mask were always presented at fixation. Concerning responses, participants performed the 
orientation discrimination judgment task by pressing “A” or “S” on the keyboard. When 
participants were presented with a rating, the corresponding question was displayed on the 
screen, with a continuous scale and labelled boundaries underneath, all coloured black (1.3 
cd/m
2
). An index box was always initially located at the scale centre. Participants used a 
Cyborg V1 joystick (Cyborg Gaming, UK) to move the index along the scale and to select a 
location on the scale. The question of the stimulus-related rating was always “how clearly did 
you see the grating?” with the anchors “unclear” and “clear”. The three different response-
related scales were “how confident are you that your response was correct?” with the anchors 
“unsure” and “sure”, “did you guess or did you know the response” with the anchors “guess” 
 
29 
and “know”, and finally “how much money would you place as wager that you answer was 
correct?” with the anchors “€0” and “€20”. 
2.3.1.3. Trial structure 
Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross at screen centre for 1,000 ms. 
Then, the target stimulus was presented for a brief period of time, until it was replaced by the 
mask. There were 10 possible stimulus-onset-asynchronies between target and mask: 10, 20, 
30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 90, 110, and 140 ms. In order to prevent participants from giving 
premature responses, there was a period of 600 ms after the onset of the mask when 
participants could not yet respond to the stimulus. After this delay period, participants gave a 
2AFC judgment about the orientation of the sinusoidal grating of the target, while the mask 
remained on the screen. Immediately afterwards, the first question appeared on the screen. 
Participants were always asked to deliver both a stimulus-related rating and a response-related 
rating after each single trial. The scale type of the response-related ratings changed after three 
blocks in both sessions, with every scale being presented in each session and the sequence of 
scales being random. The sequence of whether the stimulus-related rating or a response-
related rating was asked first changed between sessions. When participants had given the first 
rating, they had to move the index back to the scale centre, before the second rating was 
displayed on the screen. If the 2AFC orientation judgment had been erroneous, the trial ended 
with the display of “error for 1,000 ms then, before the next trial started (see Fig. 2-1). 
 
Figure 2-1. The trial sequence in Exp. 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4.  
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2.3.1.4. Design and procedure 
The experiment comprised of two sessions performed on two consecutive days at the 
same time of the day. For the orientation discrimination task, participants were instructed to 
perform the task as accurately as possible, to follow their intuition about the orientation if 
they had not seen the orientation, and to guess if they had no idea about the orientation. For 
the stimulus-related ratings, participants were told that the question “how clearly did you see 
the grating?” referred to the clarity of experience of the grating on the stimulus. For response-
related ratings, participants were told that the ratings referred to their previous orientation 
discrimination response. Furthermore, participants were instructed to give the two ratings as 
independently from each other as possible and to give their ratings as carefully and as 
accurately as possible. At the beginning of session one, participants performed 20 training 
trials to familiarize the participant with the task. Each session of the main experiment 
involved 9 blocks with 40 trials each and took on average 45 minutes. 
2.3.1.5. Analysis 
All analysis were performed using R 2.12.2 (R Core Team, 2012). In order to assess 
the effect of asking a rating immediately after the trial or as a second rating after the trial, we 
did two separate ANOVAs with rating as dependent variable: one ANOVA with the factors 
sequence (whether the rating was first or second within the trial), scale type (stimulus-related 
rating vs. confidence vs. wagering vs. attribution of choice), and SOA (10-140), the other 
ANOVA with the factors timing, scale type, and trial accuracy (correct vs. false). 
2.3.1.5.1. Psychometric functions 
To assess the relationship between stimulus- and response-related ratings and SOA, 
psychometric functions were fit on the data of each individual. Logistic functions were used 
because they produced slightly better fits than Weibull or Error functions. Steepness, 
threshold, upper and lower asymptotes were allowed to vary as free parameters, leading to the 
following formula 
𝑓(𝑥) =  δ + (1 − δ − γ)
1
1 + 𝑒−𝛽(𝑥−𝜃)
 
where β denotes the steepness of the function, γ indicates its upper asymptote, δ 
denotes its lower asymptote, x the logarithm of the SOA, and θ the threshold. The parameters 
sets of stimulus- and response-related ratings were compared by two-tailed paired t-tests. 
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2.3.1.5.2. SDT type 2 analysis 
ROCs were constructed separately for each individual and for stimulus- and response-
related ratings: For this reason, the rating data of each individual was divided into nine bins. 
ROC-curves were obtained by plotting the cumulative frequencies for ratings in each interval 
for incorrect trials on the x-axis and for correct trials on the y-axis. Measures of SDT type 2 
sensitivity (Aroc) and response bias (Broc) were computed based on formulae provided by 
(Fleming et al., 2010) and (Kornbrot, 2006). One individual was excluded from SDT-type 2 
analysis because he or she was extremely reluctant in wagering, rating on average 2 standard 
deviations below the mean the mean rating over all observers. 
In addition, to evaluate the zero correlation criterion, a series of one-tailed paired t-
tests were computed separately for stimulus- and response-related ratings and each stimulus-
onset asynchrony, assessing whether ratings for correct trials were higher than for incorrect 
trials. To avoid alpha error inflation, p-values were adjusted according the Holm correction. 
The relationship between stimulus-related ratings and ratings of each different type of 
response-related scale was assessed by fitting a hierarchical linear model for each response-
related scale using R package nlme (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Development Core 
Team, 2012) with the response-related ratings as dependent variable, SOA and stimulus-
related rating as fixed factors, and a random intercept for each participant. 
2.3.2. Results 
2.3.2.1. Timing effects 
The mixed ANOVA revealed significant effects of SOA, F(9,171) = 220.1, p < .001, 
ηG
2  = .81, and scale type, F (3,57) = 6.8, p < .001, ηG
2  = .09, as well as an interaction between 
these two, F(27,513) = 2.8, p < .05, ηG
2  = .02. There was no effect of sequence, and no 
interaction of sequence with SOA or scale type, all F’s < 1. The second ANOVA yielded 
significant effects of trial accuracy, F(1,19) = 180.4, p < .001, ηG
2  = .78, scale type, F(3,57) = 
5.4, p < .01, ηG
2  = .09, as well as an interaction, F(3,57) = 7.0, p < .001, ηG
2  = .02. Critically, 
there was again no effect of sequence, and no interaction of sequence with any of the other 
factors, all F’s < 1. Given these results, all subsequent analyses were performed without 
distinguishing between first and the second ratings. 
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2.3.2.2. Descriptive statistics 
The mean error frequency in the discrimination task was .17 (SD = .08), and ranged 
between .41 for the shortest SOA and .01 for the longest SOA. Across the complete 
experiment, stimulus-related ratings averaged 46.8% of the scale range (SD = 10.0). For the 
response-related ratings, the mean rating was 55.0% (SD = 12.2) for confidence, 50.4% (SD = 
16.8) for wagering, and 57.9% (SD = 10.1) for attribution of choice ratings. 
2.3.2.3. Psychometric functions 
Within-subject ANOVAs revealed that there were no significant differences between 
the three response-related scales in terms of threshold, F(2,38) = 1.2, n. s., and slope, F < 1. 
Therefore, the rating data was pooled across different response-related scales. An estimation 
of psychometric functions on stimulus-related ratings aggregated across participants revealed 
a threshold of 4.05 (SE = .09), a slope of 2.81 (SE = .64), a lower asymptote of .10 (SE = .3), 
and an upper asymptote of .10 (SE = .07). For response-related ratings, the threshold was 3.93 
(SE = .06), the slope 2.84 (SE = .54), the lower asymptote .10 (SE = .03), and the upper 
asymptote .03 (SE = .05, see Fig. 2-2).  
 
Figure 2-2. . Estimated logistic functions for stimulus-related ratings and response-related 
ratings. Points indicate the averaged ratings for each SOA, the solid line indicates the 
estimated psychometric function for stimulus-related ratings, and the dashed line the 
estimated psychometric function for response-related ratings. 
 
Paired t-tests on coefficients estimated on the level of each individual revealed that the 
threshold for response-related ratings was lower than the threshold for stimulus-related 
ratings, t(19) = 2.2, p < .05, d = .45, and the upper asymptote was higher for response-related 
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ratings than for stimulus-related ratings, t(19) = 2.6, p < .05, d = .61. However, there were no 
significant differences in terms of slope, t(19) = 1.6, n. s., as well as lower asymptote t(19) = 
.8, n. s. 
2.3.2.4. SDT type 2 analysis 
The data was again pooled across different response-related scales as a within-subject 
ANOVA suggested there was no significant difference between the three response-related 
ratings in terms of Aroc, F(2,38) < 1, and Broc, F(2,38) = 3.1, n. s. Fig. 2-3 displays the ROC-
curves for stimulus- and response-related ratings for the whole sample.  
 
Figure 2-3. Receiver-operating-characteristics. On the x-Axis, there is the cumulative 
probability of each rating bin given that the trial was incorrect; on the y-axis, there is the 
cumulative probability for each rating given that the rating was correct. The area under the 
curve is used to determine the SDT type 2 sensitivity. White circles indicate binned stimulus-
related ratings, black squares binned response-related ratings 
 
The mean type-2- sensitivity as quantified by Aroc was .79 for response-related ratings 
(SD = .07) and .78 for stimulus-related ratings (SD = .07). Paired t-tests revealed that the 
difference Aroc between stimulus-related ratings and response-related ratings was significant, 
t(18) = 2.4, p < .05, d = .20. The mean type-2 criterion (Broc) was -.15 (SD = .73) for 
response-related ratings and -.74 (SD = .82) for stimulus-related ratings. The difference 
between stimulus- and response-related ratings in terms of Broc was significant as well, t(18) = 
4.2, p < .001, d = 1.03. 
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2.3.2.5. Zero correlation criterion analysis 
Multiple paired t-tests suggested that response-related ratings in correct trials were 
always greater than response-related ratings in incorrect trials at each single SOA, all pcor’s < 
.05. By contrast, stimulus-related ratings were not significantly greater in correct trials than in 
incorrect trials at the shortest SOA, t(19) = .89, n. s. Significant results were obtained only for 
SOAs of 20 ms, pcor < .05, and 40 -90 ms, pcor’s < .05. In addition, for 9 out of 10 SOAs, the 
effect sizes as indexed by Cohen’s d were greater for response-related ratings than for 
stimulus-related ratings (see Table 2-1). 
Table 2-1 
T-tests comparing ratings in correct vs. incorrect trials, separately for stimulus-related and 
response-related ratings and each SOA. 
  Stimulus-related ratings Response-related ratings 
SOA df t pcor d t pcor d 
10 19 0.9 n. s. 0.1 2.0 < .05 0.2 
20 19 2.8 < .05 0.3 3.2 < .05 0.4 
30 19 1.6 n. s. 0.3 2.4 < .05 0.4 
40 19 2.7 < .05 0.5 3.2 < .05 0.8 
50 17 4.3 < .01 1.2 4.3 < .01 1.4 
60 18 3.9 < .01 1.1 4.8 < .001 1.3 
70 14 4.4 < .01 1.4 4.2 < .01 1.3 
90 13 4.4 < .01 1.5 7.0 < .001 3.4 
110 9 2.4 n. s. 0.9 3.2 < .05 1.3 
140 6 2.1 n. s. 1.1 3.1 < .05 1.6 
 
2.3.2.6. Within-trial regression 
The hierarchical linear regressions revealed that for each scale type, response-related 
ratings predicted stimulus-related ratings. The regression coefficients were .61, SE = .01, 
t(4770) = 51.8, p < .001, when stimulus-related ratings predicted confidence ratings, .64, SE = 
.01, t(4770) = 58.6, p < .001, when stimulus-related ratings predicted attribution of choice 
ratings, and .67, SE = .01, t(4770) = 59.7, p < .001, when stimulus-related ratings predicted 
wagering. 
2.3.3. Discussion 
Exp. 2-1 addressed the issue of whether subjective measures of consciousness show 
different properties depending on whether they refer to the stimulus or whether they refer to 
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the discrimination response. In addition, it was investigated whether the pattern of high 
confidence in absence of visual experiences known from blindsight patients can also be 
observed in normal participants. 
We compared stimulus-related and response-related ratings with respect to their 
psychometric functions, the zero correlation criterion at different SOAs, and SDT-type 2 
characteristics. It was observed that response-related ratings were associated with a lower 
psychometric threshold than stimulus-related ratings. We did not observe a substantial 
difference in the psychometric slope of stimulus and response-related ratings, indicating that 
both types of ratings had comparable relative sensitivities to changes of the quality of 
stimulation. Concerning the analysis of zero correlation criterion, response-related ratings 
were greater in correct trials than in incorrect trials for each SOA; while for stimulus-related 
ratings, the difference was not significant at SOAs of 10 and 30 ms. In addition, the effect 
sizes of the zero correlation criterion analysis were greater for response-related ratings than 
for stimulus-related ratings at 9 out of 10 SOAs. Regarding SDT type 2 measures, response-
related ratings significantly outperformed stimulus-related ratings in predicting trial accuracy 
and imposed a considerably less conservative response criterion. 
These results resemble to some degree the data pattern of subjective measures 
obtained in type 2 blindsight. Under certain stimulus conditions these patients express a high 
degree of confidence in their responses, although they report no visual experience (Persaud et 
al., 2011; Sahraie et al., 1998). In line with this, observers in the current experiment also 
exhibit higher thresholds towards reporting visual experience than reporting confidence. 
These data seem to suggest that a weaker level of stimulation is needed to elicit confidence in 
the response than to elicit a visual experience of the stimulus in both blindsight patients and 
healthy participants. 
A potential concern with the data presented here is the fact that our procedure of 
presenting two ratings after each trial might have biased the ratings. In particular, models that 
assume that ratings are formed by a stochastic diffusion process might predict the second 
rating to be higher or more accurate because there is more time for the sensory evidence to 
accumulate (Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010). In the present study, we found no evidence that the 
sequence or ratings influenced the ratings directly or interacted with scale type, SOA, or trial 
accuracy. We cannot rule out the possibility that the procedure of asking two ratings after 
each trial might have influenced both of the two ratings, for example, if two contradicting 
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ratings caused cognitive dissonance, or if participants understood the instruction to give two 
ratings after each trial in a way they felt the two ratings had to be different. However, if this 
was the case, the bias would affect both stimulus-related and response-related ratings to the 
same extent and cannot account for the threshold offset between stimulus-related and 
response-related ratings or for the difference in SDT type 2 sensitivity. 
2.4. Experiment 2-2 
Exp. 2-2 was designed to investigate the relationship between different subjective 
measures referring to the discrimination judgement. Observers performed the same 
discrimination task as in Exp. 2-1, except that each trial was followed by two out of three 
possible response-related scales. Observers were either asked how much money they would 
place was wager that there orientation discrimination was correct, report whether their 
orientation choice was rather based on a guess or on knowledge, or a confidence rating. 
2.4.1. Methods 
2.4.1.1. Participants 
20 participants (6 male, 1 left-handed) participated in the Exp. 2-2. The age of the 
participants ranged between 20 and 40, with a median age of 27. All participants reported to 
have normal or corrected-to-normal vision, confirmed that that they did not suffer from 
epilepsy or seizures and gave written-informed consent. Participants received either €8 per 
hour or course credits in return for participation. 
2.4.1.2. Apparatus, stimuli, design, and procedure 
Apparatus, stimuli, design and procedure were identical to Exp. 2-1. 
2.4.1.3. Trial sequence 
The trials were identical to Exp. 2-1, except that instead of asking one stimulus-related 
rating and one response-related rating after each trial, there were always two out of the three 
possible response-related ratings. Each combination of ratings was presented for three blocks. 
The sequence of ratings was randomized and was opposite for the consecutive session. 
2.4.1.4. Analysis 
To ensure comparability between Exp. 2-1 and 2-2, the same analysis was performed 
for Exp. 2-2 than for Exp. 2-1, except that instead of comparing stimulus-related ratings 
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against response-related ratings, the three different response-related scales as confidence, 
attribution-of-choice, and wagering were compared against each other by an analysis of 
variance with scale type (confidence vs. wagering vs. attribution) as within-subject factor. 
Significant main effects of scale type were further examined by two-sided t-tests with p-
values adjusted according to the Holm correction. One participant was removed from the 
analysis of psychometric functions, because his/her ratings were insensitive to varying SOA 
and the corresponding psychometric functions would have been parallel to the horizontal. 
Another participant was removed from the SDT type 2 analysis because his/her response 
criterion for all three scales was extremely conservative, so the Broc-value could not be 
computed. 
2.4.2. Results 
2.4.2.1. Descriptive statistics 
On average, the proportion of erroneous trials in Exp. 2-2 was .16 (SD = .08). On 
average, observers gave confidence ratings of 63.1% of the scale range (SD = 11.2), 
attribution of choice ratings of 65.1% (SD = 10.6), and mean wagers of 59.1% (SD = 12.9). 
2.4.2.2. Psychometric functions 
Fig. 2-4 displays observed data and estimated psychometric functions for each scale 
type for the aggregated data. Comparing the parameters derived from the different scales, a 
within-subject ANOVAs revealed that there was a main effect of scale type on thresholds, 
F(2,36) = 5.6, p < .01, ηG
2  = .02, and lower asymptote, F(2,36) = 6.8, p < .01, ηG
2  = .03, but 
there were no effects on slope, F(2,36) = 1.1, n. s. and upper asymptote, F < 1. Post-hoc t-tests 
revealed that the threshold for wagering was above the threshold for attribution of choice, 
t(18) = 2.7, p < .05, d = .35, and for confidence, t(18) = 3.6 < .01, d = .22, but there was no 
difference between thresholds for confidence and attribution of choice, t(18) = 1.1, n. s. For 
the lower asymptotes, post-hoc comparisons suggested a significant difference between 
attribution of choice ratings and wagering, t(18) = 3.0, p < .05, d = .41, but there were no 
significant differences between attribution of choice and confidence, t(18) = 1.5, n. s. and 
between and between wagering and confidence, t(18) = 2.5, n. s. 
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Figure 2-4. Estimated functions for confidence ratings, attribution of choice ratings, and 
wagering. Squares indicate mean confidence ratings for each SOA, diamonds indicate 
attribution of choice ratings, and triangles indicate wagering. Separate lines indicate the 
estimated psychometric curves. 
 
2.4.2.3. SDT type 2 analysis 
Fig. 2-5 displays the ROC-curves for the three different scales averaged across 
participants.  
 
Figure 2-5. Receiver-operating characteristics in Exp. 2-2. The area under each curve 
indicates SDT type 2 sensitivity. Squares indicate confidence ratings, diamonds indicate 
attribution of choice ratings, and triangles indicate wagering. 
 
39 
The mean type-2- sensitivity as quantified by Aroc  was .79 for confidence (SD = .07) 
and .80 for the wagering (SD = .06) and attribution of choice (SD: = .05). The main effect of 
scale type on Aroc was not significant, F < 1. The mean type-2 criterion (Broc) was -0.94 (SD = 
.62) for confidence ratings, -1.05 (SD = .39) for attribution of choice ratings, and -.92 (SD = 
.55) for wagering. There was no significant effect of scale type on Broc, F(2,34) = 1.3, n. s. 
2.4.2.4. Zero correlation criterion analysis 
As Table 2-2 shows, trial correctness predicted ratings in all three scale types starting 
with a SOA of 20 ms, all p’s < .05. At the shortest SOA of 10 ms, only wagering 
differentiated between correct and incorrect trials, t(19) = 2.6, p < .05, but attribution of 
choice ratings did not, t(19) = .6, n. s., as well as confidence ratings, t(19) = .7, n. s. Effect 
sizes varied inconsistently between the different scales at different SOAs (see Table 2-2). 
Table 2-2 
Results of multiple t-tests comparing ratings in correct and incorrect trials in Exp. 2-2, 
separately for each different scale.  
  Attribution of choice Wagering Confidence 
SOA df t pcor d t pcor d t pcor d 
10 19 0.6 n. s. 0.0 2.6 < .05 0.2 0.7 n. s. 0.1 
20 19 4.1 < .01 0.6 2.7 < .05 0.4 3.0 < .05 0.3 
30 19 5.3 <. 001 0.7 4.8 <. 001 0.7 5.8 <. 001 1.0 
40 19 3.6 < .01 0.9 5.3 <. 001 1.3 4.5 <. 001 1.3 
50 15 3.6 < .01 1.1 3.5 <.01 1.0 2.7 <.01 0.8 
60 17 5.1 <. 001 1.4 4.3 <.01 1.4 4.6 <. 001 1.4 
70 13 6.5 <. 001 2.7 4.1 <.01 1.4 5.5 <. 001 1.9 
90 11 5.8 <. 001 2.2 4.0 <.01 1.5 4.7 <. 001 1.9 
110 9 4.0 <.01 1.8 4.7 <.01 2.7 6.0 <. 001 3.0 
140 7 3.6 <.01 1.7 4.2 <.01 1.7 3.5 <.01 1.8 
 
2.4.2.5. Within-trial regression 
The hierarchical linear regressions revealed that ratings of each scale type could be 
predicted by ratings of each other scale type. The regression coefficients for wagering 
predicting attribution of choice ratings were .76, SE = .01, t(4770) = 82.3, p < .001, for 
wagering predicting confidence ratings .85, SE = .01, t(4770) = 97.6, p < .001, and for 
attribution of choice predicting confidence ratings .79, SE = .01, t(4770) = 89.4, p < .001. 
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2.4.3. Discussion 
Exp. 2-2 was conducted in order to investigate the relationship between three 
response-related subjective measures: confidence ratings, attribution of choice ratings, and 
wagering in terms of psychometric functions, SDT type 2 properties, zero correlation 
criterion, and within-trial regressions. Regarding psychometric functions, we observed no 
difference between the three scales in terms of slope, but the threshold for wagering was 
significantly above the threshold for confidence ratings and attribution of choice ratings. With 
respect to the ROC-analysis, we neither found any significant differences regarding SDT type 
2 sensitivity, nor response criterion. Concerning the zero correlation criterion, the effects 
seemed to vary unsystematically between scales, with each scale being predicted by trial 
accuracy more efficiently at several SOAs. Concerning the association between the different 
types of ratings, we observed that all three scales were effective in predicting the other scale. 
Critically, the association of two different response-related ratings in Exp. 2-2 seemed to be 
stronger than the association of response-related ratings with stimulus-related ratings as 
observed in Exp. 2-1. 
To summarize, Exp. 2-2 revealed a considerable amount of similar empirical 
properties of confidence ratings, attribution of choice ratings, and wagering, which is 
consistent with the view that all three scales belong to the same class of subjective measures 
of consciousness. Contradicting this view, the threshold for wagering was more conservative 
than for the other two ratings. A potential explanation for this finding is that wagering is not 
only a measure of the cognitive processes involved in the discrimination task, but might also 
be biased by loss aversion (Fleming & Dolan, 2010) or risk aversion (Dienes & Seth, 2010). 
Presumably, risk aversion might influence wagering with imaginary money although there 
was no objective risk of losing reward in the present experiment. We will resume the 
discussion of a distinct group of response-related ratings after Exp. 2-4. 
2.5. Experiment 2-3 
Exp. 2-3 investigated whether the differences between stimulus-related and response-
related ratings as observed in Exp. 2-1 generalize to a masked object discrimination task. 
After each trial, observers indicated how clearly they experienced the shape of the stimulus 
(instead of the orientation of its grating as in Exp. 2-1) and how confident they felt about the 
accuracy of their discrimination choice. 
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2.5.1. Methods 
2.5.1.1. Participants 
16 participants (2 male, 1 left-handed) participated in the Exp. 2-3. The age of the 
participants ranged between 19 and 26, with a median of 22. All participants reported to have 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, confirmed that that they did not suffer from epilepsy or 
seizures and gave written informed consent. Participants received either €8 per hour or course 
credits in return for participation. 
2.5.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
The apparatus was the same as in Exp. 2-1 and 2-2, expect that the refresh rate was 
increased to 120 Hz. The target stimulus was either a square or a circle filled with either a 
horizontal or a vertical oriented sinusoidal grating (frequency: 1 cycle per degree of visual 
angle, maximal luminance: 85.0 cd/m², minimal luminance: 9.5 cd/m
2
), presented in front of a 
grey (12.5 cd/m²) background. Squares and circles subtended 3° x 3° degrees of visual angle. 
Mask and rating scales were identical to Exp. 2-1. 
2.5.1.3. Trial structure 
The trial structure was the same as in the previous experiments, except that SOAs of 
8.3, 16.7, 25.0, 33.3, 50.0, 66.7, 83.3, and 116.7 ms were used. After onset of the mask and an 
additional delay period of 600 ms, participants gave a two-alternative forced-choice 
judgement about the global shape of the stimulus by pressing “A” or “S” on the keyboard. 
After the discrimination response was given, two subjective ratings were presented on the 
screen, which were “How clearly did you perceive the shape?” with the anchors “unclear” and 
“clear”, and “how confident are you that your response was correct?”, the anchors being 
“unsure” and “sure”. Answers were collected via VARS. If the shape judgement had been 
wrong, the trial ended with “error” displayed on the screen for 1,000 ms. 
2.5.1.4. Design and procedure 
Exp. 2-3 involved one session of approximately 1 hour. Participants were instructed to 
prioritize accuracy over speed during the shape discrimination task. For verbal reports, it was 
ensured that participants understood that the stimulus-related rating referred to their 
experience of the shape, and the response-related rating referred to their confidence in having 
discriminated the stimulus shape correctly. Again, participants were instructed to give the two 
ratings as independently from each other as possible and to give their ratings as carefully and 
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as accurately as possible. At the beginning of the experiment, participants performed a 
training of 16 trials. Overall, the experiment comprised 12 blocks with 40 trials each. 
2.5.1.5. Analysis 
The analysis was the same as in Exp. 2-1 and 2-2. One participant was excluded from 
the analysis of psychometric functions because he/she gave the same subjective reports across 
all levels of difficulty, so no function fits could be obtained. 
2.5.2. Results 
2.5.2.1. Descriptive statistics 
The mean error frequency in Exp. 2-3 was .23 (SD = .05). On average, observers gave 
a stimulus-related rating of 41.1% (SD = 12.9) and a response-related rating of 52.2% (SD = 
14.0). 
2.5.2.2. Psychometric functions 
Paired t-tests performed on individual parameters suggested that the response-related 
ratings were associated with lower thresholds than stimulus-related ratings, t(14) = 2.0, p(one-
tailed) < .05, d = .42 (see Fig. 2-6a). In addition, we observed a marginal difference of lower 
asymptotes, t(14) = 2.1, p = .06, d = .52, but no difference between slopes, t(14) = 1.5, n. s., or 
upper asymptotes, t(14) = 0.8, n. s. 
 
Figure 2-6. Results of Exp. 2-3. Panel A: Mean thresholds derived from stimulus-related 
ratings and response-related ratings. Panel B: Type 2 sensitivity of stimulus-related ratings 
and response-related ratings  
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2.5.2.3. SDT type 2 analysis 
Analysis of the SDT type 2 sensitivity resulted in mean Aroc  of .77 (SD = .08) for 
stimulus-related ratings and mean Aroc of .78 (SD = .08) for response-related ratings. For the 
response criterion, Broc was -.93 (SD = 1.19) for stimulus-related ratings and -.39 (SD = .78) 
for response-related ratings. Paired t-tests suggested that there was no significant difference 
between Aroc, t(15) = .9, n. s. (see Fig. 2-6b), but the response criterion of response-related 
ratings was more liberal, t(15) = 2.6, p < .05, d = .61. 
2.5.2.4. Zero correlation criterion analysis 
Multiple t-tests suggested that both stimulus-related and response-related ratings were 
greater in correct trials than in incorrect trials at SOAs of 25.0 ms or greater. At shorter SOAs, 
no significant effects were observed (see Table 2-3). 
Table 2-3 
Multiple t-tests comparing ratings in correct and incorrect trials in Exp. 2-3, separately for 
each different scale 
SOA 
Stimulus-related ratings Response-related ratings 
t df pcor d t df pcor d 
8.3 0.4 15 n. s. 0.0 -0.4 15 n. s. 0.0 
16.7 1.8 15 n. s. 0.1 1.2 15 n. s. 0.1 
25.0 3.2 15 < .05 0.3 3.4 15 < .01 0.4 
33.3 6.1 15 < .001 0.9 6.4 15 < .001 1.1 
50.0 7.8 15 < .001 1.1 6.9 15 < .001 1.9 
66.7 4.5 11 < .01 0.7 4.9 11 < .001 1.5 
83.3 3.8 13 < .01 1.2 5.7 13 < .001 2.1 
116.7 3.1 6 <.05 1.4 5.5 6 < .001 2.3 
 
2.5.2.5. Within-trial regression 
The hierarchical linear regressions revealed that response-related ratings could be 
efficiently predicted by stimulus-related ratings. The regression coefficients was .79, SE = 
.01, t(7400) = 104.7, p < .001. 
2.5.3. Discussion 
Exp. 2-3 investigated whether a pattern of subjective reports similar to type II 
blindsight, i.e. high ratings of confidence in combination with low ratings of visual 
experience, can be observed in a masked shape discrimination task. In addition, we predicted 
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that stimulus-related ratings and response-related ratings showed different characteristics in 
terms of psychometric functions, SDT type 2 measures, and shared variance within trials. 
Regarding psychometric functions, we observed that the threshold of response-related 
ratings was significantly higher than the threshold of stimulus-related ratings, albeit the 
relative sensitivity to changes of the stimulation was comparable. With respect to the SDT 
type 2 analysis, we observed that the response criterion induced by response-related ratings 
was more liberal, but there was no reliable difference in sensitivity. In contrast to our 
prediction, while response-related ratings were associated with higher effect sizes than 
stimulus–related ratings at longer SOAs, the patterns of the zero correlation criteria at short 
SOAs were the same. 
In support of a type 2 blindsight-similar behaviour of normal participants, observers in 
Exp. 2-3 had a higher threshold for response-related ratings than for stimulus-related ratings, 
meaning they would report confidence in being correct about the discrimination task already 
at a level of stimulation where their reports of visual experience was still low. The magnitude 
of this effect was nearly the same as in the orientation discrimination task, implying that the 
offset of psychometric curves derived by reports about the stimulus and reports about the 
response is consistent across tasks. 
Concerning the classification of subjective measures of consciousness into two 
classes, the results of Exp. 2-3 are more divergent than those of Exp. 2-1. We observed 
differences between stimulus-related and response-related ratings in terms of thresholds and 
SDT type 2 criteria, indicating that observers are more conservative in reporting an 
experience of the stimulus than reporting confidence about a judgment. However, the 
difference between SDT sensitivity was not significant and the patterns of the zero correlation 
criteria were the same. Consequently, at least for shape discrimination tasks, it seems to 
depend on the research question whether the distinction between stimulus-related and 
response-related ratings is relevant: If the focus is on the correlation between subjective 
reports and objective performance (e.g. on zero correlation criteria), stimulus- and response-
related ratings converge to the same results. In cases where criteria are more important (e.g. if 
it is determined whether a stimulus is above or below a subjective threshold), stimulus- and 
response-related ratings might lead to opposite conclusions. 
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2.6. Experiment 2-4 
Exp. 2-4 was conducted to explore whether the lag of psychometric curves between 
wagering and the other response-related scales generalizes to shape discrimination. Observers 
reported whether a masked target stimulus was either a square or a circle, followed by 
subjective reports about how confident they felt about their discrimination response, whether 
they guessed or knew their discrimination response, or how much money they would place as 
wager that their response was correct. 
2.6.1. Methods 
2.6.1.1. Participants  
16 participants (6 male, 1 left-handed) participated in the Exp. 2-4. The age of the 
participants ranged between 20 and 40, with a median age of 25. All participants reported to 
have normal or corrected-to-normal vision, confirmed that that they did not suffer from 
epilepsy or seizures and gave written-informed consent. Participants received either €8 per 
hour or course credits in return for participation. 
2.6.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
The apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Exp. 2-3, expect that the refresh rate 
was set to 160 Hz. 
2.6.1.3. Trial structure 
The trial structure was the same as in the previous experiments, except that SOAs of 
6.25, 12.5, 18.75, 25.0, 31.25, 37.5, 50.0, 62.5, 75.0, 87.5, and 120.0 were used. After onset of 
the mask and a delay period of 600 ms, participants gave a two-alternative forced-choice 
judgement whether the global shape of the stimulus was a square or a circle. After the 
discrimination response was given, two out of the three possible response-related scales were 
presented on the screen. 
2.6.1.4. Design, procedure, and analysis 
Design, procedure, and analysis were the same as in Exp. 2-2. 
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2.6.2. Results 
2.6.2.1. Descriptive statistics 
The mean error frequency in Exp. 2-4 was .26 (SD = .08). On average, observers gave 
a confidence rating of 51.1% of the scale range (SD = 12.3), an attribution of choice rating of 
51.9% (SD = 10.6), and a wager of 49.1% (SD = 15.7). 
2.6.2.2. Psychometric functions 
Fig. 2-7a displays mean psychometric thresholds of each scale in Exp. 2-4. A 
comparison of the estimated parameters via a within-subject ANOVAs revealed no effects of 
scale type on thresholds, slopes, upper asymptotes, or lower asymptotes, all F’s < 1. 
 
Figure 2-7. . Results of Exp. 2-4. Panel A: Thresholds for confidence ratings, attribution of 
choice ratings, and wagering. Panel B: SDT type 2 sensitivities. 
 
2.6.2.3. SDT type 2 analysis 
The mean type 2 sensitivity as quantified by Aroc  was .72 for confidence (SD = .09) 
and attribution of choice (SD: = .08), and .71 for wagering (SD = .10). The main effect of 
scale type on Aroc was not significant, F < 1. The mean type 2 criterion (Broc) was .22 (SD = 
2.46) for confidence ratings, -.17 (SD = 1.81) for attribution of choice ratings, and .05 (SD = 
1.54) for wagering. There was no significant effect of scale type on Broc, F < 1, see Fig. 2-7b. 
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2.6.2.4. Zero correlation criterion analysis 
As shown by Table 2-4, ratings in correct trials were significantly larger than in 
incorrect trials for all three scales at the SOA of 31.25 ms, all pcor’s < .05. At shorter SOAs, 
all t-tests were not significant. 
2.6.2.5. Within-trial regression 
The hierarchical linear regressions suggested that ratings of each scale type could be 
predicted by ratings of the other scale types. The regression coefficients were for wagering 
predicting attribution of choice ratings .91, SE = .01, t(3813) = 119.6, p < .001, for wagering 
predicting confidence ratings .92, SE = .01, t(3813) = 131.5, p < .001, and for attribution of 
choice predicting confidence .91, SE = .01, t(3813) = 129.7, p < .001. 
Table 2-4 
Multiple t-tests comparing ratings in correct and incorrect trials in Exp. 2-4, separately for 
each different scale 
 Attribution of choice Wagering Confidence 
SOA df t pcor d df t pcor d df t pcor d 
6.3 15 1.1 n. s. 0.0 15 0.7 n. s. 0.1 15 -0.7 n. s. 0.0 
12.5 15 0.0 n. s. 0.1 15 -0.2 n. s. 0.0 15 0.2 n. s. 0.0 
18.8 15 0.7 n. s. 0.0 15 0.6 n. s. 0.1 15 0.6 n. s. 0.1 
25.0 15 2.2 n. s. 0.4 15 2.0 n. s. 0.5 15 1.9 n. s. 0.4 
31.3 14 6.6 < .001 1.7 14 4.4 <.01 1.3 14 5.9 < .001 1.3 
37.5 14 5.9 < .001 1.3 15 3.5 < .05 1.0 15 5.5 < .001 1.4 
50.0 14 7.2 < .001 2.1 15 5.5 < .001 1.6 14 5.8 < .001 1.6 
62.5 14 3.9 <.01 1.3 12 6.4 < .001 2.3 12 5.2 < .001 1.7 
75.0 10 3.6 <. 05 1.6 11 2.8 n. s. 1.3 10 2.1 n. s. 1.0 
87.5 4 2.2 n. s. 1.7 4 1.4 <.01 0.9 4 3.5 n. s. 1.9 
120.0 4 3.8 n. s.  1.7 4 10.5 n. s. 3.3 2 5.1 n. s. 2.8 
 
2.6.3. Discussion 
Exp. 2-4 investigated whether confidence ratings, attribution of choice ratings, and 
wagering form one coherent class of subjective measures of consciousness with respect to 
their psychometric functions, SDT type 2 characteristics, zero correlation criteria, and within-
trial regressions. Specifically, it was examined whether a lag in thresholds between wagering 
and the other two scales as observed in Exp. 2-2 also emerged at the masked shape 
discrimination task. 
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An analysis of psychometric functions showed no difference between curves fitted on 
wagering, attribution of choice, and confidence data in terms of slopes and thresholds, just as 
there were no differences in terms of type 2 sensitivities and type 2 criteria. The zero 
correlation criterion was rejected starting at the same SOA at all scales, and within-trial 
regressions showed that the three scales shared their variance almost completely. In 
accordance with the classification of subjective measures as either response-related ratings or 
stimulus-related ratings, the association between two different response-related ratings in Exp. 
2-4 seemed to be stronger than the association between a stimulus-related rating and a 
response-related rating in Exp. 2-3. 
Overall, the Exp. 2-1, 2-2, and 2-4 concurrently indicate that verbal reports that refer 
to the discrimination response are very similar in their patterns in terms of within-trial 
regressions, psychometric slopes, and SDT type 2 characteristics. The only indication of a 
difference between measures, a lag of the psychometric threshold of wagering with respect to 
the other two scales, was observed only in Exp. 2-2, but did not replicate in Exp. 2-4. Thus, 
our experiments provide converging evidence that attribution of choice ratings, confidence 
ratings, and wagering form one coherent category of subjective measures of consciousness. 
2.7. Experiment 2-5 
In Exp. 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4, sensory evidence was always manipulated by short 
presentation of the stimulus in conjunction with backwards masking. In Exp. 2-5, we 
investigated whether the discrepancy between subjective reports about the stimulus and 
subjective reports about the discrimination response can be replicated when sensory evidence 
is varied by another manipulation, i.e. the proportion of coherently moving dots of RDKs. 
After indicating the direction of motion of the coherently moving dots, observers delivered 
both a rating of the subjective clarity of motion and of confidence in the motion 
discrimination response.  
2.7.1. Methods 
2.7.1.1. Participants 
21 participants (4 male, 2 left-handed) participated in the experiment. The age of the 
participants ranged between 19 and 40, with a median age of 22. All participants reported to 
have normal or corrected-to-normal vision, confirmed that that they did not suffer from 
epilepsy or seizures and gave written-informed consent. 
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2.7.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was conducted in a sound-attenuated cabin, controlled by MATLAB 
and Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Stimuli were presented 
on a Diamond Pro 2070SB at refresh rate of 120 Hz driven by a Mac with OS X 10.7 as 
operating system at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm. The stimulus was a random 
dot kinematogram, consisting of small white squares (16.7 dots per square degree of visual 
angle, sized 2 x 2 pixels, luminance 78.5 cd/m
2
) in from of a black background (0.0 cd/m
2
), 
which appeared in a circular aperture (diameter: 5) centred at the fixation. A set of dots was 
shown for one video frame and then replotted three video frames later. When replotted, a 
subset of dots was offset from their original location to create apparent motion while the 
remaining dots were relocated randomly. The proportion of coherently moving dots was 
randomly chosen among 0.7, 1.3, 2.7, 5.3, 10.7, 21.3, or 42.7%. Dots moved horizontally to 
the left or to the right at a velocity of 4° per second. Participants responded to leftwards and 
rightwards motion by pressing the left and right arrow button on the keyboard. Subjective 
reports were collected in the same way as in the previous experiments. The stimulus-related 
rating was “How clearly did you see the coherent motion?” with the anchors “unclear” and 
“clear”; the response-related rating was “how confident are you that your response was 
correct?” with the anchors “unsure” and “sure”. 
2.7.1.3. Trial structure 
Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross at screen centre for 1,000 ms. 
Then a RDK was presented until participants gave a two-alternative forced-choice judgment 
about the direction of the random dot motion. Immediately afterwards, the first question 
appeared on the screen. Participants were always asked to deliver both a stimulus-related 
rating and a response-related rating after each single trial, with the sequence of the two ratings 
counterbalanced across participants. If the 2AFC orientation judgement had been erroneous, 
the trial ended with the display of “error” for 1,000 ms. 
2.7.1.4. Design and procedure  
Exp. 2-5 involved one session of 45 min on average. For the motion discrimination 
task, participants were instructed to prioritize accuracy over speed and to guess if they did not 
know the direction of motion. For subjective reports, it was ensured that participants 
understood that the stimulus-related rating referred to motion experience created by the 
coherently moving dots, and the response-related rating referred to their confidence in having 
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discriminated the motion direction correctly. Again, participants were instructed to give the 
two ratings as independently from each other as possible and to give their ratings as carefully 
and as accurately as possible. At the beginning of the experiment, participants performed a 
training block with 49 trials. The main experiment involved 7 blocks with 49 trials each. 
2.7.1.5. Analysis 
The analysis was the same as in previous experiments, except that it was performed 
with respect to levels of coherence rather than SOAs. 
2.7.2. Results 
2.7.2.1. Descriptive statistics 
The mean error rate in Exp. 2-5 was .22 (SD = .53). On average, observers gave a 
confidence rating of 59.7% of the scale range (SD = 11.0), and a stimulus-related rating of 
52.0% (SD = 12.6). 
2.7.2.2. Psychometric functions 
Two-tailed paired t-tests of the estimated parameters revealed that the offset of 
thresholds between stimulus-related ratings and response-related ratings was significant t(20) 
= 4.0, p < .001, d = .73 (see Fig. 2-8a); however, there was no difference between slopes, 
t(20) = 1.3, n. s., lower asymptotes, t(20) = 2.0, n. s., and upper asymptotes t(20) = 0.8, n. s. 
 
Figure 2-8. Results of Exp. 2-5. Left panel: Thresholds derived from response-related ratings 
and stimulus-related ratings. Right panel: Type 2 sensitivities of response-related ratings and 
stimulus-related ratings. Error bars indicate 1 SEM. 
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2.7.2.3. SDT type 2 analysis 
For SDT type 2 sensitivity, the mean Aroc  was .73 (SD = .05) for stimulus-related 
ratings, compared to .74 (SD = .03) for response-related ratings. Two-tailed paired t-tests 
suggested that the difference was significant, t(20) = 2.2, p < .05, d = .41 (see Fig. 2-8b). For 
the response criterion, Broc was -.63 (SD= .74) for stimulus-related ratings and 0.10 (SD = 
1.0) for ratings of the response. T-tests suggested that Broc was different between stimulus-
related and response-related ratings as well, t(20) = 5.0, p < .001, d = .82. 
2.7.2.4. Zero correlation criterion analysis 
Table 2-5 shows overviews t-tests performed between correct and erroneous trials at 
each level of coherence. Both stimulus- and response-related ratings were significantly 
different between correct and incorrect trials at the coherence of 2.7%. At a coherence of 1.3 
%, the effect of trial correctness on response-related ratings was marginally significant, t(20) 
= 1.3, p = .06, d = .2, but could not be observed for stimulus-related ratings, t(20) = 0.4, n. s. 
Table 2-5 
Multiple t-tests comparing ratings in correct and incorrect trials in Exp. 2-5, separately for 
each different scale 
Coherence 
Stimulus-related ratings Response-related ratings 
t df pcor d t df pcor d 
0.7 0.5 20 n. s. 0.0 1.7 20 n. s. 0.1 
1.3 0.4 20 n. s. 0.0 2.2 20 n. s. 0.2 
2.7 3.8 20 < .01 0.2 5.5 20 < .001 0.5 
5.3 4.1 20 <. 01 0.4 5.1 20 < .001 0.7 
10.7 3.3 17 < .05 1.2 4.7 17 < .01 1.4 
21.3 3.1 10 < .05 1.5 5.6 10 < .01 1.9 
42.7 0.9 4 n. s.  0.0 -0.4 4 n. s.  -0.2 
 
2.7.2.5. Within-trial regression 
The hierarchical linear regressions suggested that response-related ratings predicted 
stimulus-related ratings on a single-trial basis. The regression coefficient was .59, SE = .01, 
t(7175) = 71.2, p < .001. 
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2.7.3. Discussion 
Exp. 2-5 was conducted to test whether the observed discrepancy between stimulus-
related and response-related ratings is specific to masking experiments, or whether it 
generalizes to motion discrimination with random dot motion kinematograms as well. We 
observed that the threshold for stimulus-related ratings required a higher proportion of 
coherently moving dots than response-related ratings, although the relative sensitivities of 
both kinds of ratings were not substantially different. In addition, we found that response-
related ratings outperformed stimulus-related ratings in predicting trial accuracy, and was 
associated with a more liberal type 2 response criterion. Concerning the zero correlation 
criterion, response-related ratings were marginally greater in correct trials than in incorrect 
trials at a coherence level of 1.3%, while stimulus-related ratings were associated with trial 
accuracy at a coherence of at least 2.7%. The magnitude of this effect was greater for 
response-related ratings than for stimulus-related ratings for 6 out of 7 levels of coherence. 
The association between stimulus-related and response-related ratings was comparable to 
Exp. 2-1 and was considerably smaller than the association between confidence, wagering, 
and attribution of choice ratings in Exp. 2-2 and 2-4. Overall, the results of Exp. 2-5 support 
nicely the distinction between stimulus- and response-related ratings, which has thus been 
shown for masked orientation discrimination, shape discrimination, and random dot motion 
discrimination. 
2.8. General discussion 
The five experiments presented here addressed two research questions: First, we 
investigated whether reports of high confidence and low visual experience, as it is reported 
for type 2 blindsight, can be observed when healthy observers perform a masked orientation 
discrimination task. Second, we explored the hypothesis that subjective measures of 
consciousness can be sorted into two categories, depending on whether they refer to the 
stimulus or to the participant’s discrimination response.  
We compared ratings of the stimulus with ratings of the response in a masked 
orientation discrimination task (Exp. 2-1), a masked shape discrimination task (Exp. 2-3) and 
a motion discrimination task (Exp. 2-5). Concerning psychometric functions, the thresholds of 
response-related ratings were substantially lower than the thresholds of stimulus-related 
ratings in all three experiments, although the relative sensitivity to the quality of stimulation 
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as indexed by psychometric slopes was comparable. With respect to SDT type 2 
characteristics, response-related ratings were associated with a more liberal response criterion 
in all experiments and a greater sensitivity in two out of three experiments. Concerning the 
analysis of the zero correlation criterion, the results were more diverse: In Exp. 2-1 and 2-5, 
response-related ratings were associated with correct trials at a lower level of stimulation 
despite the fact that the psychometric functions of both types of ratings had the same lower 
asymptote in both experiments. By contrast, in Exp. 2-3, we observed no differences in the 
zero correlation criterion analysis at short SOAs. 
Confidence ratings, attribution of choice ratings, and wagering were compared during 
a masked discrimination task with respect to orientation (Exp. 2-2) and shape (Exp. 2-4). 
Regarding psychometric functions, wagering was associated with a lower threshold than the 
other two scales in Exp. 2-2, but no differences appeared in Exp. 2-4. All three scales had the 
same psychometric slopes, the same SDT type 2 sensitivity, and response criterion. In 
addition, the zero correlation criterion analysis revealed no systematic differences between the 
three scale types across different levels of stimulation. 
In all five experiments there was a considerable association between the two ratings 
that were required after each trial, indicating the patterns of the ratings are quite similar. 
However, beyond that similarity, response-related ratings were more efficient in predicting 
one of the other response-related ratings in Exp. 2-2 and 2-4 than predicting the stimulus-
related ratings in Exp. 2-1, 2-3, and 2-5, suggesting there is a proportion of variance not 
shared between the two types of measures. 
2.8.1. Type 2 blindsight in normal observers? 
The current experiments might contribute to the theoretical interpretation of type 2 
blindsight. In type 2 blindsight, patients report a feeling or some knowledge that something 
has happened in the visual field corresponding to the damaged V1 region (Sahraie et al., 
2002). It has been reported that these patients can be very confident about discrimination 
responses on stimuli presented in their blind visual field (Persaud et al., 2011; Sahraie et al., 
1998). It has been proposed that blindsight in these patients is best understood as degraded 
conscious vision rather than preserved unconscious vision (Overgaard, Fehl, Mouridsen, 
Bergholt, & Cleeremans, 2008; Zeki & Ffytche, 1998). In our data, the threshold for 
response-related ratings was lower than for stimulus-related ratings, meaning that participants 
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reported confidence in the accuracy of their discrimination judgements at a lower level of 
stimulus quality than they reported experience of the stimulus. In addition, in Exp. 2-1 and 2-
5, but not Exp. 2-3, response-related ratings predicted trial accuracy at a weaker level of 
stimulation than stimulus-related ratings did. Although the discrepancy between reported 
confidence and experience seems to be considerably stronger for blindsight patients, it seems 
as if our data shows at least qualitatively the same pattern, indicating that confidence at a low 
degree of visual experience is not special to blindsight type 2, but can occur in healthy 
observers as well. 
2.8.2. Stimulus vs. response-related ratings 
The traditional view of subjective measures of consciousness assumes that all 
subjective measures of consciousness form one coherent category (Seth et al., 2008). In the 
present study we observed a series of systematic differences between ratings of the stimulus 
and ratings of the response: The psychometric threshold for response-related ratings was 
lower than for stimulus-related ratings in all three experiments. With regards to SDT type 2 
characteristics, response-related ratings always imposed a more liberal response criterion and 
were associated with a higher sensitivity in two out of three experiments. We expected an 
advantage of response-related ratings in type 2 sensitivity over stimulus-related ratings 
because response-related ratings refer semantically to the accuracy of the trial. Moreover, 
wagering, confidence, and attribution of choice ratings were more strongly associated with 
other response-related scales within single trials than with stimulus-related ratings for both 
orientation discrimination in Exp. 2-1 and 2-2 and for shape discrimination in Exp. 2-3 and 2-
4. Thus, consistent with our classification of subjective measures as stimulus-related ratings 
or response-related ratings, both kinds of measures differed according to a variety of 
characteristics; these differences were replicable and generalized across several tasks. It is 
tempting to interpret stimulus ratings-related and response-related ratings as measurements of 
the strength of overlapping but not identical neural signals, although our data only supports a 
distinction at the level of measurements, not at the level of mechanisms. We have speculated 
that stimulus-related ratings might constitute a measurement of neural signals during sensory 
processing; while response-related ratings might be a measurement of neural signals during 
decision making. An alternative interpretation might explain the present findings by referring 
to only one kind of neural signal. According to this view, when participants rate the stimulus 
or the response, they are in fact rating the strength of the same underlying signals in both 
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cases. Subjective measures are different in how accurately participants are able to translate 
these neural signals into a point on the scale. If the translation of neural signals into stimulus-
related ratings was more prone to noise than the translation into response-related ratings, it 
could be explained why response-related ratings are associated with a higher SDT type 2 
sensitivity, and why trial accuracy could be predicted at lower levels of stimulus quality than 
stimulus-related ratings. However, as noise is unsystematic, this account would predict that 
the correlation of stimulus-related ratings with all other events would be corrupted by noise, 
not only the correlation with trial accuracy. Contrary to this prediction, we observed no 
substantial differences between stimulus- and response-related ratings with respect to the 
steepness of psychometric functions, which indexes the relative sensitivity of the subjective 
measures to changes of stimulus quality. This means that response-related ratings are only 
more closely related to the accuracy of discrimination responses than stimulus-related ratings, 
but there is no difference between stimulus- and response-related ratings in their relation to 
stimulus quality. Overall, this pattern of results is not consistent with the view that subjective 
measures are different only in their susceptibility to noise. It supports the view that the 
characteristics of subjective measures influence the events subjective measures refer to. 
2.8.3. A continuum of multiple thresholds? 
The discrepancy between stimulus- and response-related ratings reported in the present 
study implies that the ascription of how conscious a stimulus is depends on the type of 
subjective measure researchers adopt. In this respect, the present study relates to the classical 
distinction between subjective and objective thresholds of awareness (Cheesman & Merikle, 
1984; Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001). They assumed that while a stimulus of a certain 
strength is sufficient to reach the objective threshold and elicit a correct response, the strength 
of stimulation needs to be even stronger to reach the subjective threshold and elicit a verbal 
report, i. e. the objective threshold is lower than the subjective one. Our study suggests that 
there might be more than one subjective threshold; specifically, the threshold for confidence 
and attribution of choice ratings is below the threshold for reports of visual experience. Weak 
stimuli might result in a weak form of representation enabling participants to perform above 
chance, although at the same time they deny any experience of the stimulus and claim that 
their performance was due to guessing (low response- and low stimulus-related ratings). If the 
stimulation is stronger, a more stable or a different kind of representation emerges and 
participants report some confidence in being correct (response-related ratings increase), but 
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they still claim to have little experience of the stimulus (stimulus–related ratings lower than 
response-related ratings). Only with even greater stimulation performance, response-related 
ratings, and stimulus-related ratings indicate concurrently that the participant is conscious of 
the stimulus. In other words, our data suggest that the set of events when observers perform 
above chance is larger than the set of events when they report to be confident, which in turn is 
larger than the set of events when observers report to have visual experiences. Consequently, 
if a participant reports a visual experience it is very likely that s/he will also be able to 
discriminate the stimulus and report confidence in the discrimination response. The reverse is 
not the case: If a participant reports confidence in the discrimination response, there is still 
uncertainty whether s/he reports a clear visual experience as well. However, this hierarchical 
relationship between experience and confidence does not necessarily hold for other 
paradigms. For example, in iconic memory tasks, participants typically report to have seen all 
the items on display, although memory performance is restricted three to five items (Sperling, 
1960). To investigate the relationship between thresholds derived from stimulus-related 
ratings and response-related ratings, more studies employing different paradigms and 
different stimulus modalities are required. Therefore, we recommend always considering 
stimulus-related and response-related ratings in consciousness research. 
2.8.4. Relation to previous studies 
The results reported here are in line with a previous artificial grammar study which 
reported SDT type 2 sensitivity of confidence ratings to be greater than the sensitivity of 
awareness ratings (Wierzchoń et al., 2012). However, our results only partially replicate the 
results of prior visual studies (Sandberg et al., 2011, 2010). In a masked object discrimination 
task, Sandberg and colleagues reported, in line with our results, that the psychometric 
threshold for a stimulus-based rating scale, the PAS, was more conservative than for 
confidence. However, unlike in our results, PAS outperformed both confidence ratings and 
wagering in predicting discrimination performance. One methodological difference between 
their study and our studies is the employed stimulus-related rating. In the study by Sandberg 
and colleagues, participants rated their experience on the PAS, a four-point scale that 
distinguished between “no experience”, “brief glimpse”, “almost clear experiences”, and 
“clear experiences”. Critically, the choice “brief glimpses” is defined as “a feeling that 
something has been shown, but is not characterised by any content, and cannot be specified 
any further” (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). In the present study, participants rated their clarity 
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of visual experience of the task-relevant stimulus feature, e. g. the coherent motion. 
Supposing that an observer had an experience that matches the definition of a brief glimpse in 
the PAS- an experience without any content- in the present study, the observer would 
nevertheless veridically indicate a maximally unclear experience, because he or she would not 
have any experience of the task relevant stimulus feature. However, using the PAS, the 
participant would veridically report a brief glimpse. In other words, the PAS might measure a 
larger set of experiences than our stimulus-related ratings because it requires participants to 
report experiences without content as well, which could also be non-visual intuitions. 
However, this reasoning is entirely post-hoc; a valid comparison between the PAS and our 
scales would require a comparison of all scales based on the same paradigm and balanced 
briefing of participants. 
2.9. Conclusion 
In summary, the present experiments indicate that participants’ subjective reports 
when being asked to rate their perception of the stimulus vs. their discrimination response – 
although being similar in many ways – show reliable and important differences. Similar to 
type 2 blindsight patients, subjective ratings that referred to a discrimination response had 
lower thresholds than subjective measures which referred to the percept of the stimulus, i.e., 
observers reported confidence or knowledge about the correctness of their responses at a 
greater level of stimulus ambiguity than when they reported experience of the stimulus. 
Moreover, response-related ratings exhibited different SDT type 2 characteristics and 
different response-related scales were more strongly correlated with other response-related 
scales than with reports of experience. We suggest that consciousness research has to consider 
the use of a subjective measure that refers to the experience of the stimulus in addition to a 
measurement that assesses confidence in the discrimination response. 
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3. ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF 
CONFIDENCE AND EXPERIENCE
4
 
by Manuel Rausch, Agnieszka Wykowska, and Michael Zehetleitner
5
 
 
3.1. Abstract 
The quest for the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) is one of the biggest 
challenges to contemporary cognitive neuroscience. This quest is complicated by the fact that 
consciousness is a multidimensional construct where different dimensions imply different 
behavioural measurements. Our study is the first to examine the time courses of the neural 
correlates of two different types of subjective reports of key relevance to consciousness: 
reports of confidence in perceptual decisions and reports of visual experience of the stimulus. 
Our EEG results show that the early ERPs predicted if participants were going to report being 
confident in discrimination decisions, but were not yet predictive whether participants 
reported a clear experience over and above being confident. The strongest correlate of clear 
visual experiences was relatively late and only in close temporal proximity to the perceptual 
discrimination response. We conclude that subjective reports of visual experience and 
decisional confidence are associated with partially separate processes; and that research on 
NCC should differentiate between the different types of subjective reports. 
3.2. Introduction 
The quest for the neural correlates of human consciousness (NCC) is one of the most 
prominent and debated problems in cognitive neuroscience (Crick & Koch, 1990; Rees et al., 
2002). One reason why a solution to this problem is still pending is that competing concepts 
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of consciousness imply different behavioural markers according to which researchers should 
ascribe conscious awareness to a participant: Some theorists have defended a concept of 
consciousness where conscious experience may inform decision making but is still 
inaccessible to verbal report (Block, 2005; Lamme, 2006); consequently, decisions in 
objective tasks should be used to decide whether an observer was conscious of a stimulus or 
not (Hannula et al., 2005; Irvine, 2012; Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). According to a different 
view, participants’ reports about their experience are the key phenomena for an empirical 
science of consciousness (Dennett, 2003, 2007), hence they are the primary raw data that 
needs to be recorded (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dehaene, 2010). Finally, some theories 
proposed consciousness is associated with metacognitive processes (Carruthers, 2011; Lau & 
Rosenthal, 2011; Timmermans et al., 2012): according to these theories, confidence 
judgments are the most valid measure of conscious awareness (Dienes, 2004, 2008; Lau & 
Rosenthal, 2011). Given all these diverse concepts of consciousness, it seems necessary that 
an empirical science of consciousness assesses more than just one behavioural measure. Our 
study is to our knowledge the first study to compare the timing of the neural correlates of 
subjective reports visual experience in comparison to the neural correlates of confidence 
about the accuracy of task decisions. 
Using more than just one single behavioural marker of conscious awareness is 
informative only if different markers fail to converge to the same results. Indeed, there is 
empirical evidence that a distinction should be made between subjective reports about visual 
experience and decisional confidence: In a series of psychophysical experiments, the majority 
of observers reported feelings of confidence in perceptual discrimination judgments at a level 
of stimulation where they not yet report a visual experience of the task-relevant feature of the 
stimulus; only when the stimulation is stronger, they would report a visual experience in 
addition to feeling confident in being correct (see Chapter 2, Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013). 
Similarily, participants were shown to be able to detect their own errors even in absence of 
consicous visual experiences (Charles et al., 2013). Extreme dissociations between visual 
experience and decisional confidence have been reported with neuropsychological patients: 
After lesions to primary visual cortex, so-called blindsight patients report to be blind in the 
visual field contralateral to the impaired brain area, although they are able to discriminate 
visual stimuli presented in their seemingly blind visual field in forced-choice tasks with 
remarkable accuracy (Weiskrantz, 1986). Some blindsight patients report a considerable 
degree of confidence that judgments about a stimulus presented in their blind hemifield were 
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correct (Sahraie et al., 1998), and wager the same amount of money on judgments on stimuli 
in the blind as in the intact hemifield when performance is balanced (Persaud et al., 2011). 
Similarly, there is a case of an achromatic patient, who feels being colour-blind after occipital 
brain damage but performs well in colour discrimination tasks, and his confidence in being 
correct in the task strongly correlates with task performance (Carota & Calabrese, 2013). In 
spite of accurate discrimination performance and high levels of confidence, these patients 
report no experience of the task-relevant stimulus characteristics. In several of these 
experiments, decisional confidence was also more closely associated with task performance 
than visual experience (Rausch et al., 2015; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013), although others 
have reported the reverse relationship (Sandberg et al., 2010; Wierzchoń et al., 2014). 
These dissociations between subjective reports of experience and confidence raise the 
question what is the mechanism underlying these effects. Three non-exclusive hypotheses 
were proposed: independent access to different sets of stimulus features (Rausch et al., 2015), 
distinct metacognitive processes involved in decisional confidence (Charles, King, & 
Dehaene, 2014; Charles et al., 2013; Overgaard & Sandberg, 2012), and placement of 
different sets of criteria (Wierzchoń et al., 2012). Concerning the feature hypothesis, stimuli 
may be represented by a hierarchy of features, of which conscious reportability varies 
independently (Kouider et al., 2010). While confidence may be primarily based on the 
stimulus feature relevant for selecting a response to the objective task (Dienes, 2008), reports 
of visual experience may require participants to consider other stimulus features in addition to 
the task-relevant one, which is why the condition to report a visual experience is less 
frequently fulfilled that the condition to report decisional confidence (Rausch et al., 2015). 
Concerning the metacognitive hypothesis, two distinct metacognitive processes involved 
exclusively in decisional confidence have been suggested: First, both reports of experience 
and confidence may depend on participants’ conscious visual experiences, but decisional 
confidence requires an additional metacognitive process that relates performance in the 
current task (Overgaard & Sandberg, 2012). Second, a separate metacognitive system, which 
operates in parallel to conscious processing, may be involved in decisional confidence 
judgements (Charles et al., 2014, 2013). The final hypothesis asserts that the difference 
between experience and confidence can entirely be explained by participants applying 
different criteria to the same dimension of evidence, only reporting one’s experience imposes 
a more conservative reporting strategy than reporting one’s decisional confidence (Wierzchoń 
et al., 2012). 
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Importantly, the feature hypothesis and the metacognitive hypothesis can be 
disentangled by the time courses of the neural correlates of subjective reports regarding 
visual experience and decisional confidence: If experience and confidence depend on different 
sets of stimulus features, subjective reports of experience and confidence might be associated 
with different time courses of sensory neural activity. For example, the visual system is 
organized as a hierarchy, where neurons tuned to basic features provide input to neurons 
tuned to more complex features (Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999). 
Consequently, if participants consider features of different complexity for experience and 
confidence, the neural correlates of a subjective report requiring more complex features 
should be later in time. In contrast, if the effect of experience vs. confidence is due to 
additional metacognitive processes involved in decisional confidence only, the sensory 
correlates of experience and confidence should be same, and specific correlates of decisional 
confidence should occur only after the features of the stimulus have been extracted.  
The most convenient method to assess the time courses of neural correlates of 
experience and confidence is EEG – and specifically ERPs – due to their excellent temporal 
resolution (Luck, 2005). Importantly, the ERP correlates of visual awareness reported in 
previous studies can be classified depending on whether they presumably  relate to sensory or 
post-perceptual functions: The cognitive processes associated with earlier ERP correlates are 
widely assumed to be sensory in nature, e.g. amplification of the signal by attentional 
mechanisms for an early occipital positivity around 100 ms after presentation of a stimulus 
(Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010; Railo, Koivisto, & Revonsuo, 2011; Verleger, 2010), and 
construction of visual content (Railo et al., 2011), feature-based attention (Pitts et al., 2014), 
or object-based attention (Verleger, 2010) for a mid-range negative deflection recorded at 
posterior and temporal electrodes around 200 ms. In contrast, the hypotheses concerning a 
later ERP correlate, a positive deflection on centroparietal electrodes around 400 ms, all 
imply that visual content already exists at that point in time, e.g. broadcast of visual content 
within a global workspace (Del Cul et al., 2007; Lamy, Salti, & Bar-Haim, 2009; Sergent et 
al., 2005), update of working memory (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010), decision between task 
alternatives (Verleger, 2010), or confidence (Eimer & Mazza, 2005).  
As Table 3-1 shows, only few previous studies detected a correlate of subjective 
reports in the time range of the early positivity, while many studies found such a correlate at a 
medium latency, and all studies observed an effect at the late positivity. However, as none of 
 
62 
these studies assessed decisional confidence in addition to visual experience, it is unclear if 
these ERPs are associated with both visual experience and decisional confidence, or 
specifically with one of them.  
Table 3-1.  
Previous studies reporting ERP correlates of subjective reports of visual experience and 
decisional confidence using identical stimuli. 
Study Paradigm 
Content of 
subjective 
reports
6
 
Timing of detected ERP effect 
Early 
positivity 
Mid-range 
negativity 
Late 
positivity 
Pins and Ffytche (2003) 
low 
contrast 
Experience sig. sig. sig. 
Koivisto and Revonsuo 
(2003) 
change 
detection 
Experience n.s. sig. sig. 
Sergent et al. (2005) 
attentional 
blink 
Experience n.s. sig. sig. 
Eimer and Mazza (2005) 
change 
blindness 
Confidence n.s. n.s. sig. 
Pourtois, De Pretto, Hauert, 
and Vuilleumier (2006) 
change 
blindness 
Experience n.s. sig. sig. 
Del Cul et al. (2007) masking Experience n.s. n.s. sig. 
Schankin and Wascher 
(2007) 
change 
blindness 
Experience n.s. sig. sig. 
Koivisto et al. (2008) 
masking/ 
contrast 
Experience n.s. sig. sig. 
Lamy et al. (2009) masking Mixture n.s. n.s. sig. 
Genetti, Britz, Michel, and 
Pegna (2010) 
degraded 
stimuli 
Mixture sig. sig. sig. 
Salti, Bar-Haim, and Lamy, 
(2012) 
masking Mixture n.s. n.s. sig. 
 
In addition, the interpretation of the absence of significant effects in early time 
windows in these studies is limited by the nature of significance testing: When P-values are 
not significant, it is not legitimate to infer the effect does not exist without appropriate power 
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 We classify the content of subjective report as “visual experience” if participants were instructed to report if 
they had seen the stimulus, and as “confidence” if participants reported their subjective confidence in the 
discrimination decision of the trial being correct. „Mixture“ means that the subjective report was instructed in a 
way it referred to both the subjective experience of the stimulus as well as to the confidence. “Sig” indicates 
“significant” and means an effect in this time range was detected; “n.s.” stands for “not significant” and means 
that it is unknown whether there is an effect or not. 
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analysis (Dienes, 2011). Bayesian hypothesis testing exceeds P-values in so far as it allows to 
quantify the evidence for both presence and absence of an effect (Dienes, 2011; Rouder, 
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). The present study is to our knowledge the first 
study that assesses both the presence and the absence of early ERP correlates.  
To summarise, our study aimed at dissociating ERP correlates of experience of visual 
stimulus vs. ERP correlates of confidence about the discrimination decision and at 
investigating their time courses, in order to determine what is the plausible underlying 
mechanism of situations in which human observers report to be confident in their 
discrimination decision, but do not yet report an experience of the stimulus. We hypothesized 
that if visual experience depends on the extraction of additional stimulus features on top of 
those features relevant for decisional confidence, early and mid-range ERPs associated with 
decisional confidence and visual experience might follow different time courses. On the 
contrary, if the behavioural effects of experience and confidence as content of subjective 
reports were due to metacognitive processes alone, we expect identical ERP correlates of 
experience and confidence in the early and mid-latency time range, while decisional 
confidence should be more strongly associated with the late ERP positivity. 
To meet the aims of our study, we recorded EEG while observers performed a 2AFC 
masked orientation discrimination task. Participants delivered two subjective reports after 
each (objective) discrimination response, one of which was about their experience of the 
stimulus, and the other about their confidence in their orientation discrimination response (see 
Fig. 3-1). To increase the number of trials available for ERP averaging, participants’ 
subjective thresholds were determined in a screening session, and a stimulus at threshold was 
used for each individual participant throughout the whole EEG recording session. This 
procedure resulted in three different combinations of subjective reports while stimuli were 
physically identical: (i) participants reporting that they had a clear experience of the stimulus 
and simultaneously were confident about their discrimination decision, (ii) participants 
reporting unclear experience and nevertheless confidence about the discrimination response, 
and (iii) participants reporting unclear experience as well as admitting to have chosen the 
orientation response based on guessing. As participants reported to be confident regarding 
their discrimination response in (i) and (ii), but the level of reported experience was different 
between these trial categories, the comparison between (i) and (ii) can be used to investigate 
the correlates of participants reporting a clear visual experience over and above reporting to 
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be confident in a discrimination decision. Consequently, we refer to this comparison as 
experience contrast. Correspondingly, the comparison between (ii) and (iii) is informative of 
the correlates of participants reporting to be confident, and is thus referred to as confidence 
contrast. A sample to analyse combination (iv) - participants reporting a clear experience and 
low confidence - was not collected, because only few participants would report this 
combination (see Fig. 3-2 for results of the screening session).  
 
Figure 3-1. Trial structure. The order of the visual experience and confidence judgments was 
counterbalanced across participants.  
 
3.3. Experiment 
3.3.1. Material and Methods 
3.3.1.1. Participants 
20 participants took part in the EEG experiment. Mean age was 23.9 (SEM = .6) and 
all were right-handed. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no 
history of neuropsychological or psychiatric disorders and no psychoactive medication. 
Participants gave written informed consent and received either course credits or €8 per hour 
for participation. The experiment was conducted according to the principles expressed in the 
Declaration of Helsinki, and the study protocol was approved by the ethics committee of the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie.  
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3.3.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
The stimuli were presented on and CRT-monitor with 17 inch screen size and a 100 
Hz refresh rate, placed in a distance of approximately 75 cm in front of a participant, located 
in a sound-attenuated and electrically shielded cabin. The experiment was conducted using a 
PC with Windows XP, MATLAB and Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). The target 
stimulus was a square, which subtended 3° x 3° degrees of visual angle textured with either a 
horizontal or a vertical oriented sinusoidal grating (frequency: 1 cycle/deg, maximal 
luminance: 16.7 cd/m²; minimal luminance: 4.6 cd/m²), presented over a grey (16.7 cd/m²) 
background. The mask consisted of a rectangular box (4° side length) with a black (4.6 cd/m²) 
and white (85.8 cd/m²) chessboard pattern consisting 6 x 6 equal squares. One half of the 
participants responded to the orientation task by pressing “A” or “S” on the keyboard with 
their left hands and pressed either “K” or “L” for the first and “N” or “M” for the second 
subjective report with their right hands. The other half responded to the orientation task with 
their rights hands by pressing “K” and L” and pressed “A”, “S”, and “Y” and “X” to deliver 
their subjective reports. 
3.3.1.3. Trial structure 
As Fig. 3-1 shows, each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross at the 
screen centre for 1000 ms. Subsequently, the target stimulus was presented for a period of 
time until it was replaced by the mask. The mask onset was timed individually for each 
participant based on a threshold estimated during a separate screening session (see below). 
Both stimulus and mask were located at fixation. The mask remained on the screen until 
participants indicated by button press whether the orientation of the grating had been 
horizontal or vertical. To prevent premature responses, participants could not respond until 
600 ms after mask onset. Immediately afterwards, the first of the two questions was 
presented. The questions were “how clearly did you see the grating?” with the possible 
answers “unclear” vs. “clear”, and “did you guess or know your answer?” with the possible 
answers “guess” and “know”. Our previous study suggested that asking observers whether 
they attribute their own choice to guessing or to knowledge is equivalent to a confidence 
rating (see Chapter 2; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013). Subjects always responded to both 
questions after each trial, and which of the two questions was first was counterbalanced 
across subjects. If the response to the task had been erroneous, “error” was displayed on the 
screen for 1,000 ms after the last subjective report, before the next trial started.  
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3.3.1.4. Design and procedure 
The experiment involved a behavioural screening session as well as an EEG recording 
session. For both sessions, participants were instructed to report the orientation of the grating 
of the target stimulus as accurately as possible and to deliver the subsequent reports as 
carefully as possible. Prior to the main experiment, participants were instructed to fixate at the 
cross at the screen centre and to avoid blinking. First, participants performed 20 trials of 
training, and then 12 blocks of 72 trials each. After each block, the percentage of errors was 
displayed to provide participants with feedback about their accuracy. 
3.3.1.5. Screening session 
The screening session consisted of 9 blocks with 40 trials each, with the same task as 
in the maim experiment, except there were six different SOAs between target stimulus and 
mask of 20, 30, 50, 60, 80 and 100 ms. The screening session data was analysed by estimating 
psychophysical functions on subjective reports separately for each participant. For this 
purpose, we fitted psychometric functions quantifying the relationship between SOA and the 
probability of reporting a clear experience and to be confident about their response 
respectively using the R package gnlm (Lindsey, 2010). The psychometric function was 
defined by the formula 
𝑓(𝑥) =
1
1 +  𝑒
−(𝑥− 𝛼)
𝛽
 
where x is the logarithm of the SOA, β denotes the slope of the psychometric function, 
and α is its centre. The threshold was defined as the SOA where the probability of reporting a 
clear experience or being confident was 50%. Error trials were omitted from analysis. The 
results of the psychophysical function analysis are found in Fig. 3-2. As the present study was 
designed to investigate the ERP correlates of situations where participants report to be 
confident about the response but not yet report to have a clear experience of the stimulus, the 
EEG recording session was performed only with participants who had a higher threshold to 
report a clear experience of the stimulus than to be confident about the response (21 out of 
29). In addition, participants were excluded if their performance did not exceed change level 
(1 participant) and if their reports were too conservative so thresholds could not be 
determined with precision because one of the thresholds fell far outside the range of SOAs 
presented in the experiment (2 participants). Overall, 20 out of 29 participants of the 
screening session met the inclusion criteria. For those participants, one psychometric function 
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was fitted on the combined rating data of both verbal reports, of which the threshold was used 
as SOA in the EEG recording session. 
 
Figure 3-2. Relative frequency of participants with a higher threshold to report a clear 
experience than to report to be confident about the discrimination response (blue), of 
participants who apply lower thresholds for reports of experience than for confidence 
(orange), and of participants with the same thresholds for experience and for confidence 
(black). A Bayes factor confirmed that more participants apply more conservative thresholds 
for visual experience than for confidence than vice versa, BF10 = 8.28, posterior distribution 
of the probability of a lower threshold for confidence than for experience: mean = .70, 95% 
credible interval = [.54 .84]. 
 
3.3.1.6. EEG recordings 
The EEG was recorded at a digitization rate of 500 Hz from 64 Ag/AgCl active 
electrodes (ActiCAP, Brain Products, GmbH, Munich, Germany), positioned according to the 
International 10-10-system. Horizontal eye movement were monitored by means of electrodes 
placed 1 cm lateral to the outer canthi of the eyes, and vertical eye movements by electrodes 
placed below and above the left eye. The EEG signals were amplified by BrainAmp 
amplifiers (BrainProducts, Munich) with a high cut-off filter at 250 Hz and low cut-off filter 
at 0.1 Hz. All electrodes were referenced to Cz and re-referenced offline to the averaged 
activity across all electrodes. Electrode impedances were kept below 5 kΩ. 
3.3.1.7. Analysis 
All data sets, analysis scripts, and supplementary results are available for download at 
the Open Science Framework to facilitate reproduction of the present study and replication of 
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its results (Ince, Hatton, & Graham-Cumming, 2012; Morin et al., 2012; Simonsohn, 2013)
7
. 
EEG filtering, epoching, artefact rejection, and ERP averaging were performed using Brain 
Vision Analyzer software 1.05 (Brain Products GmBH, Munich); all other analyses were 
performed in R (R Core Team, 2014).  
3.3.1.7.1. EEG analysis 
First, the data was filtered off-line with a 40-Hz high cut-off filter (24 dB/Oct). 
Second, the EEG was epoched into segments either locked to the onset of the stimulus or to 
the discrimination response. The stimulus-locked segments lasted from 200 ms before 
stimulus onset until 600 ms poststimulus, with the interval between 200 ms pre-stimulus 
interval used for baseline correction. The response-locked segments were from 1300 ms prior 
to response until 50 ms after response, with the first 200 ms again used as baseline. Eye 
movement and blink detection was performed on F9, F10, and vEOG electrodes: Segments 
with an absolute voltage difference exceeding 80 μV or a voltage step between two sampling 
points exceeding 50 μV at one of these electrodes were excluded. In addition, we excluded 
channels with amplitudes exceeding ±80 μV, or an activity lower than 0.1 μV within intervals 
of 100 ms. Trials with incorrect responses were excluded. A separate ERP waveform was 
constructed for each of the three possible combinations of subjective reports, i.e. we 
compared (i) trials, in which subjects reported to have clearly seen the stimulus and were 
confident about discrimination response, (ii) trials, in which subjects reported their experience 
of the stimulus was rather unclear, but they were confident about discrimination response, and 
(iii) trials in which subjects reported their experience was unclear, and they performed the 
orientation response based on guessing. In four participants, the number of trials after artefact 
rejection was too low (< 5 trials) to compute stable ERPs, so these four participants were 
excluded from EEG analysis. To stay uncommitted about the timing of ERP correlates of 
subjective reports, the data was divided into a series of time windows of equal duration. For 
stimulus-locked ERPs, each window had a duration of 50 ms, and the first and last window 
began 100 ms and 300 ms after stimulus onset, respectively. For response-locked ERPs, each 
window had a duration of 100 ms, and the first and last window started 400 and 100 ms 
before the response. ERPs were quantified by the mean amplitude of each time window to 
avoid bias from varying signal-to-noise ratios at unequal numbers of trials between conditions 
(Luck, 2010). As the existing literature suggests an occipital topography of early effects, a 
                                                 
7
 Link to the full material: 
https://osf.io/ghfwj/?view_only=19c269713cfc425da5772850bca36f91 
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posterior-temporal topography of mid-range effects, and a central-parietal topography of late 
effects (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010; Railo et al., 2011), the analysis was performed on mean 
amplitudes from electrodes PO7, PO8, O1, O2, and Oz for the time windows between 100 
and 150 ms after stimulus onset, PO7, PO8, O1, O2, P7 and P8 for the time windows between 
150 ms and 350 ms, and P1, P2, Pz, CP1, CP2, CPz, C1, C2, and Cz for the response-locked 
time windows (cf. maps in Fig. 3-4 and Fig. 3-5). To determine the timing of the mid-range 
negative and late positive effect, we constructed differences waves for both the experience 
and confidence contrast. Onset and peak latency were determined using the Jackknife-based 
scoring method with the 25% and 50% area criterion in the time windows 150-350 ms 
poststimulus and 300-0 ms before response (Kiesel, Miller, Jolicoeur, & Brisson, 2008; Ulrich 
& Miller, 2001).  
3.3.1.7.2. Statistical analysis 
As both the presence as well as the absence of effects are relevant to the current study, 
we base our interpretation on Bayes factors, which provide a continuous measure of how the 
evidence supports the alternative hypothesis over the null hypothesis and vice versa (Dienes, 
2011; Rouder et al., 2009). Bayes factors were computed using the R library BayesFactor, 
where default priors are placed on standardized effect sizes (Morey & Rouder, 2014). 95% 
credible intervals, the intervals that include the true parameter with a probability of .95, were 
computed based on 10
6
 samples from posterior distributions. Despite the merits of Bayesian 
statistics over P-values, analogous conventional statistics are available at open science 
framework to improve comparability with previous studies. 
Type 2 sensitivity, the association between subjective reports and discrimination 
performance (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Galvin et al., 2003), was quantified by meta-da 
(Maniscalco & Lau, 2012) using a maximum likelihood procedure implemented in R (Rausch 
et al., 2015) and compared between experience and confidence by the Bayesian equivalent of 
a t-test (Rouder et al., 2009). Trials were participants made subjective reports more quickly 
than 200 ms after presentation of the scale were considered as premature response and were 
excluded from analysis. 
To examine effects on ERP amplitudes by Bayes factors, we fitted Bayesian linear 
regression models (Rouder & Morey, 2012) for each time window with mean amplitude as 
dependent variable. Each model involved the experience contrast, the confidence contrast, 
hemisphere, site (electrodes O1, O2, Oz: occipital, PO7; PO8: parieto-occipital, P1, P2, P3, 
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P4, P7, P8, Pz: parietal, CP1, CP2, CPz: central) and a random effect of participant as 
predictors. Experience and confidence contrasts were tested by dropping each of them out of 
the model and comparing model without experience or confidence against the full model. 
Consequently, each Bayes factor reflects the evidence that a specific contrast explains 
variance in ERP amplitudes over and above the other contrast, hemisphere, and site. The 
experience contrast was coded in a way that the estimated effect can be directly interpreted as 
the difference between trials when observers reported to be confident and to have a clear 
experience, and trials when observers reported they were confident but their experience was 
unclear. Likewise, the confidence contrast reflects the difference between trials when 
observers reported they had no clear experience and they guessed the response, and trials 
when observers reported they had no clear experience but they felt confident about the 
accuracy of the discrimination decision. 
For latencies of the experience and confidence contrasts, we computed Bayes factors 
by transforming t-values from standard statistics into Bayes factors. Analogous to the analysis 
of amplitudes, t-values were obtained by a linear regression model with the experience 
contrast, confidence contrast, hemisphere, site, and a random intercept effect of participant 
using the R libraries lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014) and lmerTest 
(Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2014). The t-values were corrected as ERP latencies 
were determined by the jackknife-based scoring method (Kiesel et al., 2008; Ulrich & Miller, 
2001).  
3.3.2. Results 
3.3.2.1. Behavioural results 
During the experiment, participants made on average 17.4 % errors (SEM = 3.2 %). 
Moreover, they reported to be confident about the discrimination response and to have a clear 
experience in 29.3 % of the trials (SEM = 5.1), to be confident without a clear experience in 
36.2 % of trials (SEM = 4.2), and to have guessed the orientation in combination with an 
unclear experience in 34.2 % of all trials (SEM = 5.1). The association between subjective 
reports and performance quantified by meta-da was greater for reports of decisional 
confidence (M = 1.5, SEM = .2) than reports of visual experience (M = 1.1, SEM = .2, see 
Fig. 3-3). The Bayesian analysis indicated strong evidence for different meta-d’s of 
experience and confidence, BF10 = 60.38, posterior distribution of the difference between 
confidence and experience: M = .39, 95% credible interval = [.18 .61].  
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Figure 3-3. Type 2 sensitivity measured by meta-da depending on if subjective reports were 
about decisional confidence or visual experience. The greater meta-da, the more efficiently 
subjective reports differentiate between correct and incorrect task responses. (a) Mean and 
standard errors of meta-da of decisional confidence (blue) and visual experience (orange) of 
participants of the screening experiment, as a function of stimulus-onset asynchrony. Bayes 
factors revealed effects of SOA, BF10 = 4.82 ∙ 10
52
, and experience vs. confidence, BF10 = 
24.81, but no interaction, BF10 = 0.02. (b) Posterior distribution of the effect of confidence vs. 
experience during the screening experiment assuming a default JZS prior (Morey & Rouder, 
2014). Mean of the posterior distribution: 0.27, 95% credible interval: [0.10 0.43]. Positive 
values indicate that Type 2 sensitivity of confidence is greater than of experience, and vice 
versa. (c) Meta-da  of confidence and experience in the main experiment. (d) Posterior 
distribution of the effect of confidence vs. experience during the main experiment.  
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3.3.2.2. ERP results 
3.3.2.2.1. Stimulus-locked ERPs 
As Fig. 3-4 shows, both contrasts were associated with a mid-latency negative shift 
over posterior electrodes, although a correlate of the contrast of confidence (light grey boxes, 
blue vs. black line) emerged somewhat earlier than of the contrast of experience (dark boxes, 
orange vs. blue line). In detail, for the earliest time windows between 100 and 150 ms after 
the stimulus onset, the Bayes factors indicated there was evidence for the null hypothesis (i.e. 
there is no difference in mean amplitudes) for both the experience contrast, BF10 = 0.24, as 
well as the confidence contrast, BF10 = 0.23. For the time windows between 150 and 200 and 
between 200 and 250 ms, the Bayes factor indicated positive support for an effect of 
confidence, BF10’s = 4.76 and 8.32, while the support for an effect of visual experience was 
only anecdotal and thus not conclusive, BF10’s = 0.68 and 2.11. Only at the following time 
windows between 250 and 300 ms as well as 300 – 350 ms, we observed evidence for an 
effect associated with the experience contrast, BF10’s = 15.04 and 4.54, and with the 
confidence contrast, BF10’s 28.02 and 17.28. Posterior means and 95% credible intervals for 
all experience and confidence contrasts can be found in Table 3-2.  
Table 3-2  
Means and credible intervals of the posterior distributions of the experience and confidence 
contrasts in μV for each time window.  
Time Window 
Experience contrast Confidence contrast 
M 
Credible 
interval M 
Credible 
interval 
2.5 97.5 2.5 97.5 
Stimulus-locked 
time windows 
100 - 150 0.13 -0.37 0.63 -0.11 -0.61 0.39 
150 - 200 -0.55 -1.23 0.13 -0.87 -1.56 -0.19 
200 - 250 -0.74 -1.41 -0.08 -0.93 -1.60 -0.26 
250 - 300 -1.08 -1.81 -0.36 -1.16 -1.88 -0.44 
300 - 350 -0.81 -1.45 -0.18 -0.97 -1.60 -0.34 
Response-locked 
time windows 
-400 - -300 0.35 -0.06 0.78 0.14 -0.27 0.55 
-300 - -200 1.06 0.62 1.50 0.83 0.39 1.27 
-200 - -100 1.06 0.62 1.50 0.79 0.35 1.23 
-100 - 0 0.87 0.44 1.30 0.63 0.20 1.06 
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Figure 3-4. Time course of stimulus-evoked electrophysiological activity. (a) Grand average 
ERPs plotted as a function of time and subjective reports. Left panel: occipital electrodes O1 
and O2. Right panel: temporal electrodes P7 and P8. Orange line: ERP average when 
participants reported clear experience and being confident. Blue line: ERP average when 
participants reported unclear experience despite being confident. Black line: ERP average 
when participants reported an unclear experience and were unconfident about the 
discrimination response. (b) Bayes factors of the experience contrast (orange) and confidence 
contrast (blue) in time windows of 50 ms each. (c) Posterior distribution of the difference in 
25% area latency between the experience contrast and confidence contrast. (d) Scalp 
distribution of a difference wave of the confidence contrast for the time windows 150-200, 
200-250, and 250-300 ms after stimulus onset. (e) corresponding voltage maps for the 
experience contrast. 
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The latency analysis revealed that the mean onset of the effect related to the 
confidence contrast averaged across electrodes was at 198.3 ms and the average peak was at 
251.8 ms, while the mean onset at the experience contrast was not until 237.5 ms with the 
peak at 265.9 ms. A Bayes factor analysis confirmed that the effects related to the experience 
and confidence contrast differed in onset, BF10 = 8.37 (see posterior distribution of the effect 
in Fig. 3-4c), but not in peak, BF10 = 0.33. 
3.3.2.2.2. Response-locked ERP 
As Fig. 3-5 shows, response-locked central and parietal ERPs were associated with 
subjective reports in the time between 250 ms and 100 ms before the response, although the 
experience effect (medium and dark grey boxes, orange vs. blue line) seemed to be greater in 
magnitude and more broadly distributed than of the confidence effect (black vs. blue line). In 
addition, Fig. 3-5a shows an early posterior effect of confidence maximal around 850 ms 
before the response, which may reflect the same effect as observed at stimulus-locked ERPs 
(light grey box, black vs. blue line, and Fig. 3-4d). The Bayesian analysis indicated support 
for the null hypothesis in the time windows 400-300 before the response for the confidence 
contrast, BF10 = 0.24, while the evidence for the experience contrast was not more than 
anecdotal in favour of the null hypothesis, BF10 = 0.83. In all three following time windows 
from 300 to 200 ms, from 200 to 100 ms, and from 100 ms until the response, the Bayes 
factors indicated there were effects related to both contrasts. For the confidence contrasts, the 
evidence in favour of an effect was very strong at 300-200 ms, strong at 200-100, and positive 
at 100-0, BF10’s = 177.46, 94.89, and 11.53. For the experience contrasts, the evidence was 
always very strong, BF10’s = 1.23 ∙ 10
4
, 1.07 ∙ 10
4
, and 484.70. 
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Figure 3-5. Time course of electrophysiological activity locked to the response. (a) Grand 
average ERPs of electrodes Pz and CPz plotted as a function of time and subjective reports. 
Orange line: ERP average when participants reported clear experience and being confident. 
Blue line: ERP average when participants reported unclear experience despite being 
confident. Black line: ERP average when participants reported an unclear experience and 
were unconfident about the discrimination response. (b) Bayes factors of the experience and 
confidence contrast in time windows of 100 ms each. (c) Scalp distribution of a difference 
wave of the confidence contrast for the time windows 900-800, 300-200, and 200-100 ms 
prior to the response. (d) corresponding voltage maps for the experience contrast. 
 
The latency analysis of the parietal effects of experience and confidence revealed that 
the onsets and peaks of both effects were almost simultaneous with respect to the response. 
25% area latency of the effect related to the experience contrast was 218 .3 ms prior to 
response, compared to 220.6 ms for the confidence contrast. 50% of the area was reached at 
155.0 ms before the response for the experience contrast and 154.1 ms before the response for 
the experience contrast. The Bayes factor confirmed there were no differences between 
experience and confidence contrasts in onset, BF10 = 0.26, and peak, BF10 = 0.33.  
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3.4. Discussion 
The present experiment was conducted to identify the mechanisms underlying 
subjective reports in situations when participants report being confident in discrimination 
decisions, but not yet report a clear experience of the stimulus. We predicted that if decisional 
confidence depends only on the stimulus feature relevant for the task response but visual 
experience requires additional stimulus features, ERPs associated with specifically experience 
and confidence might follow distinct time courses already at sensory time ranges. In contrast, 
if the behavioural differences between visual experience and decisional confidence were due 
to additional metacognitive processes specific to decisional confidence, sensory ERP 
correlates of experience and confidence should be the same, but decisional confidence should 
be more strongly associated with later ERPs. We observed that decisional confidence was 
more predictive for the accuracy of the task response than visual experience. ERPs suggested 
that both subjective reports of experience and decisional confidence were associated with a 
mid-latency negative shift over posterior electrodes; but the correlates of decisional 
confidence emerged about 40 ms earlier than those of visual experience. The strongest 
correlate of clear visual experience was not observed until about 200-150 ms before the 
objective discrimination response at centroparietal electrodes.  
3.4.1. Why is confidence earlier than experience? 
As perceptual decisions seem to logically depend on the outcome of stimulus 
perception, the neural correlates of subjective reports of experience are intuitively expected 
earlier in time than the neural correlates of decisional confidence. In contrast to this intuition, 
our study suggests the inverse temporal relation: ERPs associated with confidence occur 
earlier in time than those associated with a clear visual experience. 
The most plausible explanation for the temporal delay between the correlates of 
experience relative to confidence lies in the nature of sensory evidence participants take into 
account when they make a subjective report about a discrimination decision, in contrast to 
subjective reports about their visual experience (Rausch et al., 2015): When participants 
report their confidence in an orientation discrimination judgment, they have to evaluate only 
those stimulus characteristics relevant for task (Dienes, 2008), which is the orientation in the 
present study. However, when participants report their experience of the grating, they may 
take more stimulus characteristics into account in addition to its orientation, although these 
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features were not relevant for the response to the task, for example the luminance of the 
stimulus, or the strength of figure-ground separation. According to the partial awareness 
hypothesis, conscious access to different stimulus features may vary independently (Kouider 
et al., 2010). If conscious access to features varies independently, and the set of features 
required for visual experience is larger than the set of features for confidence, it can also be 
understood why the conditions to report a visual experience is less frequently fulfilled 
(Sahraie et al., 1998; Schlagbauer et al., 2012; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013): In some 
situations, participants may have conscious access to the task-relevant stimulus feature(s), and 
thus report confidence about the task, while the additional features required for reporting 
visual experience are not accessible, and thus they report to have no visual experience. In the 
very same situations, confidence would also predict trial accuracy even in absence of visual 
experience (Charles et al., 2013; Rausch et al., 2015). In addition, as the task-relevant feature 
in the current task was orientation, a fairly basic feature, the extraction of additional features 
may require a longer period of time after the visual system has already determined the 
orientation, which is why confidence about the accuracy of the orientation response can be 
predicted from sensory ERPs earlier in time than reports of visual experience.  
An explanation of the temporal delay between the correlates of experience and 
confidence based exclusively on metacognitive processes appears unlikely because this delay 
emerged already during a mid-latency negative shift. Although the cognitive functions 
associated with this ERP activity have not yet been fully identified, there is a consensus that it 
fulfils some sensory role (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010; Pitts et al., 2014; Verleger, 2010). 
However, distinct metacognitive processes are possibly engaged later on in evaluating the 
different sets of features relevant to experience and confidence (Charles et al., 2014, 2013; 
Overgaard & Sandberg, 2012).  
Concerning the hypothesis that participants only place more conservative criteria for 
experience than for confidence on the same dimension of sensory evidence (Wierzchoń et al., 
2012), the temporal delay between the correlates of experience and confidence could be 
explained if coarse evidence created in an early time range is sufficient for decisional 
confidence, and more refined evidence created later is required for visual experience. 
However, if identical evidence underlay subjective reports of experience and confidence, both 
should be equally efficient in predicting trial accuracy when criteria are controlled, which is 
not the case (Rausch et al., 2015; Sandberg et al., 2010; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013). 
 
78 
Overall, the differences between experience and confidence appear to be more fundamental 
than just placement of criteria. 
3.4.2. The timing of neural markers of consciousness 
The timing of neural markers of conscious awareness was proposed as a test of 
theories of the NCC (Lau, 2011), in particular if these neural markers occur rather early 
(during sensory processing) or late in time (i.e. after sensory processing). We observed that 
both subjective reports of experience and confidence can be predicted already from mid-range 
negative shift over posterior and temporal electrodes, suggesting that a substantial part of the 
neural processes that determine the contents of participants’ reports coincide already with 
sensory processes. This timing of ERP correlates is consistent with theories predicting that 
conscious experience is associated with activity in sensory cortex (Block, 2005; Lamme, 
2006; Zeki, 2003). This mid-range effect might reflect recurrent feedback along the visual 
ventral stream (Railo et al., 2011), which plays a key role as the substrate of consciousness in 
several theories (Block, 2005; Lamme, 2006). Other theories hold that consciousness depends 
on post-perceptual activity in parietal and frontal cortices (Baars, 2005; Dehaene & 
Changeux, 2011; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). In the context of ERPs, advocates of global 
workspace theory argued that conscious awareness is associated with distributed activity 
starting 300 ms after stimulus onset, while earlier ERP correlates reflect only task 
performance. Consequently, the absence of an association between subjective reports and 
earlier ERPs has been interpreted as evidence for global workspace theory (Del Cul et al., 
2007; Lamy et al., 2009). However, the sensory ERPs in the present study predicted verbal 
reports although stimulation was physically identical and only correct trials were taken into 
account. Nevertheless, the association between subjective reports and sensory ERPs can be 
accounted for by late theories of the NCC if it is assumed that the mid-range negativity 
reflects only the potential of the stimulus to become conscious, while conscious experience is 
instantiated only at later links of the causal chain that leads to a subjective report. As it is 
impossible to observe first-person experiences from a third-person-perspective (Jackson, 
1982; Nagel, 1974), it is unlikely that these views can ever be tested empirically. What the 
present data does demonstrate though is that a substantial proportion of the variability of 
reports is determined already at the time of sensory processing, highlighting the importance of 
mid-range sensory processes for creating the content of subjective reports.  
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3.4.3. Confidence and experience are not interchangeable 
In contrast to a prominent view in consciousness research (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; 
Seth et al., 2008), subjective reports do not form one coherent category of measurements of 
consciousness. The qualitatively different time course of the correlates of subjective reports of 
experience and confidence suggests in line with previous experiments that these two are not 
interchangeable (Charles et al., 2013; Sahraie et al., 1998; Schlagbauer et al., 2012; 
Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013): If participants were asked to report their visual experiences 
only, ERP correlates would be delayed compared to if participants were asked to report their 
confidence in their task responses. The temporal offset between the correlates of experience 
and confidence cannot be explained by the quality of the measurement: It might be argued 
that subjective reports of experience may be compromised with noise, thus explaining why 
reports of confidence detect effects in time ranges missed by reports of experience. However, 
as the degree of association always depends on the amount of noise in the measurement, it 
would follow that all associations of the noisy measurement with other variables were 
smaller. Consequently, if confidence reports were more reliable than reports of visual 
experience, the ERP effects of confidence would be greater than the ERP effect of visual 
experience in all time windows. On the contrary, reports of experience were at least as 
efficient as reports of confidence in predicting later ERPs. Overall, for a comprehensive 
theory of the NCC, we suggest consciousness research needs to investigate the neural 
correlates of confidence in relation to the neural correlates of experience.  
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4. VISUAL ANALOGUE AND DISCRETE SCALES AS 
MEASURES OF VISUAL EXPERIENCE
8
 
by Manuel Rausch and Michael Zehetleitner
9
 
4.1. Abstract 
Can participants make use of the large number of response alternatives of visual 
analogue scales (VAS) when reporting their subjective experience of motion? In a new 
paradigm, participants adjusted a comparison according to random dot kinematograms with 
the direction of motion varying between 0 and 360°. After each discrimination response, they 
reported how clearly they experienced the global motion either using a VAS or a discrete 
scale with four scale steps. We observed that both scales were internally consistent and were 
used gradually. The visual analogue scale was more efficient in predicting discrimination 
error but this effect was mediated by longer report times and was no longer observed when 
the VAS was discretized into four bins. These observations are consistent with the 
interpretation that VAS and discrete scales are associated with a comparable degree of type 2 
sensitivity, although the VAS provides a greater amount of information. 
4.2. Introduction 
The lack of an established measurement for conscious experience is a key challenge to 
the prosperity of an empirical science of consciousness (Chalmers, 1998). The choice of an 
adequate measure is delicate because different theoretical perspectives on consciousness can 
imply different measurements. Some theorists are critical about the use of subjective reports 
because they assume participants might have conscious experiences they are unable to report 
(Block, 2005; Eriksen, 1960; Lamme, 2006) or they do not report because their criterion is too 
conservative (Hannula et al., 2005). In contrast, proponents of higher-order thought theories 
                                                 
8
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often argue that subjective reports are more valid than objective measures because 
unconscious processes might drive objective performance as well (Dienes, 2004, 2008; Lau, 
2008b). However, as subjective experiences cannot be observed from the third-person point of 
view (Jackson, 1982; Nagel, 1974), it is impossible to test empirically whether subjective 
measures of consciousness leave out conscious experiences that observers are unable to 
report, or whether objective measures suggest falsely that performance in a task is conscious. 
However, some researchers decide a priori to adopt a perspective that requires the use of 
subjective reports, either because they endorse a higher-order perspective on consciousness 
(Carruthers, 2011; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Timmermans et al., 2012), or because they 
consider subjective reports themselves as the subject of their scientific investigations 
(Dennett, 2003, 2007); if they do so, the empirical question arises how a scale needs to be 
designed given the metacognitive abilities of humans to obtain as much information from 
participants as possible. 
4.2.1. The content of subjective scales 
Subjective scales designed to measure conscious experience are constituted out of at 
least two components: (i) the question participants are instructed to answer and (ii) the way 
participants deliver their subjective report. Concerning the question, we proposed a 
classification of subjective scales on the event in the world subjective reports refer to, 
specifically whether subjective reports refer to the stimulus or to the discrimination response 
(cf. Chapter 2 and 3, Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013). Examples for stimulus-related scales 
would be to ask participants how visible the stimulus was (Sergent & Dehaene, 2004), to rate 
clarity of the response defining feature (Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013), or to report both the 
experience of specific features as well as feelings of something being shown (Ramsøy & 
Overgaard, 2004). Response-related scales may ask participants to report how confident they 
are about the preceding objective task response (Peirce & Jastrow, 1885), whether they 
attribute their objective task response to guessing, intuition, memory, or knowledge (Dienes 
& Scott, 2005), how much money they would wager on the accuracy of the objective task 
response (Persaud et al., 2007), or whether they experienced a “feeling-of-warmth” with 
respect to the previous task response (Wierzchoń et al., 2012).  
Several studies compared subjective scales with different questions participants were 
asked to respond to: Dienes and Seth (2010) reported that wagering was biased by the 
participants’ risk-aversion, but there were no differences between confidence and wagering 
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after the possibility of loss had been eliminated from wagering. Sandberg, Timmermans, 
Overgaard, and Cleeremans (2010) observed in a masked object identification task that the 
perceptual awareness scale (PAS) predicted task performance more efficiently than 
confidence and wagering did. In an artificial grammar task, it was reported that confidence 
ratings predicted objective performance more efficiently than ratings of awareness of the 
artificial grammar rule (Wierzchoń et al., 2012). Szczepanowski, Traczyk, Wierzchoń, and 
Cleeremans (2013) reported that confidence ratings were more closely correlated with 
performance than ratings of subjective awareness and wagering, although a recent reanalysis 
of the data found no significant differences between subjective awareness and confidence 
(Sandberg et al., 2013). Finally, subjective reports of visual experience were less strongly 
correlated with objective performance in masked orientation discrimination tasks or random 
motion discrimination tasks, but no substantial differences were observed in a masked form 
discrimination task. In addition, confidence ratings were associated with more liberal 
thresholds than reports of visual experience across all three visual tasks, and confidence and 
wagering were more strongly correlated with each other than with reports of visual experience 
(Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013).  
Four different lines of interpretation for empirical differences between subjective 
scales with different questions have been suggested: First, it has been assumed (at least for the 
purpose of a comparison between measurements) that different kinds of subjective reports are 
equal except the sensitivity (Dienes & Seth, 2010) and the exhaustiveness of the scale 
(Sandberg et al., 2010). The second suggestion was that different scales might encourage 
participants to access their conscious contents in different ways: In introspective judgments, 
participants just directly report their conscious experiences a s they have them; in 
metacognitive judgments however, participant use their conscious experiences to make more 
complex cognitive judgments about processes engaged in the objective task (Overgaard & 
Sandberg, 2012). Third, it has been proposed that different subjective scales might alter the 
quality of conscious experience itself: Some scales such as wagering might be more 
motivating for the participants, making them more attentive, and thus cause participants to 
experience the stimulus more distinctively (Szczepanowski et al., 2013). Finally, it was 
suggested that different questions may relate to different processes during the task: Stimulus-
related reports may be informed by processes involved in stimulus representation, and 
response-related reports by processes involved in decision making (Chapter 2, Zehetleitner & 
Rausch, 2013).  
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4.2.2. Visual analogue vs. discrete scales 
The present study investigated the response format as the second component of 
subjective scales, specifically whether responses to the same question are more conveniently 
recorded by a discrete scale or a visual analogue scale (VAS). From the viewpoint of 
information theory (Shannon, 1948), subjective reports should be collected with a maximum 
number of scale steps because the maximal amount of information recorded by one report is 
bounded by number of options provided to the participant. Specifically, as the maximum 
information is computed as the binary logarithm of the number of options, a binary scale 
records the information of 1 bit in one trial, 4 scale points 2 bits, 8 scale points 3 bits, etc. The 
information conveyed by a VAS, where the response is selected along a continuum, would 
theoretically depend on the number of scale positions differentiated by the equipment 
(between 2
8
 and 2
16
 with custom joysticks), but is in practice limited by the number of 
positions that participants can differentiate on the continuum, which classical studies 
estimated to be at least 10 positions (Hake & Garner, 1951).  
From the viewpoint of signal detection theory (SDT) (Green & Swets, 1966; 
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Wickens, 2002), however, the use of a high number of scale 
steps is only feasible if two requirements are met:  
(i) Participants need to be able to maintain a sufficient number of criteria. 
(ii) Participants’ type 2 sensitivity (Galvin et al., 2003), i.e. their degree of access to their 
own task performance, should not be impaired by a great number of options.  
The recent literature has raised doubts about both requirements for high-precision 
usage of VASs: Overgaard, Rote, Mouridsen, and Ramsøy (2006) proposed that VASs tend to 
be used like binary judgments: As only the extreme ends of the scale are labelled, reports may 
be dragged towards the extremes, reducing the number of criteria participants effectively use 
to two. In addition, they argued as there are no definitions for each experience along the 
continuum of the VAS, VAS could confuse participants and result in less accurate reports.  
Only one study so far has empirically compared a VAS and discrete scale: Wierzchoń 
et al. (2012) compared subjective reports of rule awareness with four scale steps against a 
VAS of rule awareness in a 2AFC artificial grammar classification task and observed a 
tendency that the four-point scale predicted performance more efficiently than the VAS 
(irrespective of whether the VAS was binned into four scale steps or not), although the 
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statistics were not significant. Wierzchoń et al. (2012) also found that rule awareness 
measured by a VAS was worse than wagering and feeling-of-warmth both measured by a 
discrete scale, although there was no significant difference between discrete rule awareness 
and these two scales; however, these findings are hard to interpret because the content of the 
scales and the response format are confounded in these comparisons. In domains other than 
awareness, VASs have been demonstrated to be adequate measurements for state anxiety 
(Davey, Barratt, Butow, & Deeks, 2007), vertigo (Dannenbaum, Chilingaryan, & Fung, 
2011), quality of live (de Boer et al., 2004), group cohesiveness (Hornsey, Olsen, Barlow, & 
Oei, 2012), mood (Kontou, Thomas, & Lincoln, 2012), thermal perception (Leon, Koscheyev, 
& Stone, 2008), and depression (Rampling et al., 2012), indicated by a strong correlation with 
an established multi-item questionnaire or by a high reliability of VASs, suggesting that 
participants are in principle able to make meaningful reports using VASs (although it should 
be noted that these studies did not compare VASs and discrete scales directly). As VASs were 
shown to be adequate measurements for a considerable number of different psychological 
constructs, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a VAS might be a convenient measurement of 
visual experience as well. Apart from that, it was argued that a VAS may induce more careful 
responses because it signals to the participant that an exact response is important, while a 
discrete scale might convey the message that a rough answer is sufficient (Funke & Reips, 
2012).  
In summary, although VASs are in principle suited to record a large amount of 
information, it is an open empirical question whether participants are able to use a VAS with 
a sufficient number of criteria and without loss of type 2 sensitivity, so employing a VAS is 
feasible.  
4.2.3. Continuous vs. binary discrimination task 
While the study by Wierzchoń et al. (2012) contrasted subjective reports and objective 
performance in a 2AFC discrimination task, the recent development of continuous 
discrimination tasks (Bays & Husain, 2008; Zhang & Luck, 2008; Zokaei, Gorgoraptis, 
Bahrami, Bays, & Husain, 2011) offers the opportunity to conduct a more powerful test of the 
amount of information recorded by a VAS. For example, in a typical 2AFC task, participants 
might be instructed to report whether a previously presented bar is tilted towards left or right. 
The set of possible stimulus features is two (left or right) and so is the set of possible 
responses. This paradigm can be changed into a continuous discrimination task by allowing 
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the bar to have any of all possible orientation and asking the participant to indicate the 
orientation of the bar via a response set of the same cardinality. Errors, defined as the 
deviation of stimulus and response, are binary in a 2AFC paradigm: either the response 
corresponds to the stimulus (i.e., is “correct”), or it does not (i.e., is “incorrect”). For 
continuous tasks however, the deviance between stimulus and response is a continuous 
variable: When for instance the stimulus consists of a vertical bar, the response may deviate 
from the true orientation by any angle between 0° and 90°.  
The number of task response alternatives is relevant for comparing different scales 
because the information recorded by a scale depends on the entropy of metacognition, which 
in turn depends on the entropy of discrimination performance: When there are only two levels 
of accuracy, i.e. “correct” and “incorrect”, there will be a comparably small number of 
metacognitive states, and consequently, a smaller number of scale steps might perform well to 
categorize these states. In contrast, when participants are required to adjust a comparison 
continuously according to a specific stimulus feature, there is a large number of different 
possibilities how accurate discrimination performance can be, and thus a large number of 
possible metacognitive states. Consequently, a scale with a larger number of response 
alternatives might perform better than a discrete scale when the number of response 
alternatives is large.  
In general, performance in a continuous adjustment task can be described 
mathematically by a combination of a von Mises and a uniform distribution (Bays, Catalao, & 
Husain, 2009; Zokaei et al., 2011): If participants had to rely completely on guessing, their 
responses should be evenly distributed across the whole range of possible responses. 
However, if performance is better than chance, their responses would form a bell-shaped 
distribution centred at the correct response, with the spread of the distribution indicating the 
precision of the response. A continuous task for the purpose of the current study would be 
characterized by a continuous relationship between task difficulty and the precision parameter 
as well as the guessing parameter. Previous studies suggested that subjective reports are 
associated with both the precision parameter as well as the probability of guessing in working 
memory tasks (Rademaker, Tredway, & Tong, 2012), but to our knowledge, no study has so 
far introduced continuous tasks in the study of visual consciousness. 
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4.2.4. Criteria to evaluate subjective scales 
As the current experiments entails a comparison between scales with a different 
number of scale steps, special attention should be paid to the choice of operationally defined 
criteria to evaluate the scales. We propose to employ three criteria of comparison:  
(i) the correlation with discrimination performance  
(ii) the internal consistency 
(iii) the distribution of ratings.  
The correlation with discrimination performance as well as internal consistency come 
with two very different interpretations depending on whether the amount of information 
collected with one report is controlled or not. When VAS judgements are binned into the 
same number of scale steps as the discrete scale and thus the amount of information recorded 
by the two scales is balanced, the correlation of subjective reports with discrimination 
performance is indicative of type 2 sensitivity (Galvin et al., 2003), the ability to discriminate 
between correct and incorrect trials. This is the rationale of numerous previous studies 
(Dienes & Seth, 2010; Sandberg et al., 2010; Szczepanowski et al., 2013; Wierzchoń et al., 
2012) and is analogous to the term resolution in the confidence literature (Baranski & 
Petrusic, 1994). In contrast, under the assumption that the type 2 sensitivity of participants is 
comparable, a comparison between the association of the full VAS and objective performance 
on the one hand and the association between the discrete scale and performance shows 
whether the VAS is able differentiate between levels of performance that fall equally on the 
same scale step with the discrete scale and is thus indicative of the amount of information 
recorded by the scale.  
The second criterion we took into account was the internal consistency of subjective 
reports within experimental conditions: A scale should provide maximally stable estimates of 
averages of the subjective reports across a number of data points. Again, the comparison 
between the discretized VAS and a discrete scale shows whether one scale is corrupted from 
noise unrelated to the number of scale steps; while a comparison between the internal 
consistency of full VAS and discrete scales shows whether participants can make use of the 
additional resolution provided by the VAS, i.e. it examines whether VAS reports differentiate 
between trials that fall on the same scale step at the discrete scale.  
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Third, another characteristic of subjective scales that has been extensively discussed is 
the distribution of subjective reports when collected with different scales: Are subjective 
scales of consciousness used gradually or are they used in a binary fashion? While some 
scales might be designed in a way that all scale steps are used with relatively equal 
probability, other scales might induce binary responses (Overgaard et al., 2006). This 
empirical question is related to the theoretical proposals that consciousness is either 
dichotomous (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003) or a 
gradual phenomenon (Cleeremans, 2008, 2011). If stimulus consciousness varies binarily (i.e. 
stimuli are always either fully conscious or completely unconscious), an observers would only 
use the ends of the scale, resulting in a U-shaped distribution of ratings. If stimuli however 
can be more or less conscious, all points of the scale are potentially used, when stimulus 
strength increases, resulting in a uniform distribution when averaged across stimulus strength. 
However, in order to investigate the issue whether consciousness varies gradually or binarily, 
a scale is required where participants in principle use the intermediate scale steps as well; 
otherwise a U-shaped distribution would be observed no matter whether consciousness in a 
specific task in fact gradual or dichotomous (Sergent & Dehaene, 2004).  
4.2.5. Rationale of the present study 
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether participants can make use of 
the high resolution offered by VASs when measuring visual experience of motion. To address 
this issue, we compared a VAS and a discrete scale with respect to the criteria discussed in 
4.2.4. As stimuli, we presented random dot kinematograms (RDKs), because RDKs allow for 
a fine-grained manipulation of task difficulty on a metric scale (by manipulating the 
percentage of coherently moving dots). For the objective task, we assessed objective 
performance as a continuous variable rather than just correct or false, a procedure that ensured 
a binary use of subjective reports was not due to binary task performance. To obtain a 
continuous measurement of task performance, we asked participants to report the orientation 
of motion by adjusting a clock-hand to point into the direction of the perceived motion, and 
measured the discrimination error as the angle between clock-handle and direction of motion. 
For the subjective scales, we asked participants always to report their degree of experience of 
the coherent motion, which was the same instruction as we used in the previous experiments 
(Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013), and different from the established Perceptual Awareness Scale 
(PAS, Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004) in that no instruction to report feelings of something 
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being shown was given. The experiment was designed to investigate the following three 
hypotheses: 
(i) If the participants are able to make use of the additional resolution provided by VASs, 
the full VAS should predict the discrimination error more efficiently than the discrete 
scale. In addition, the internal consistency of the full VAS should be better, because 
the larger amount of data transmitted by each single subjective report would allow for 
more reproducible statistics based on the same number of trials.  
(ii) If VAS reduced the type 2 sensitivity of subjective reports, we would expect that the 
discrete scale would be more efficient in predicting discrimination error and would 
produce more consistent estimates than the discretized VAS.  
(iii) If participants are biased by the anchors of the VAS in a way that reports are given 
binarily, the ratings on the VAS but not on the discrete scale should form a U-shaped 
distribution. In addition, the discrete scale should outperform both the full and the 
discretized VAS in predicting discrimination error. 
4.3. Experiment 
4.3.1. Material and Methods 
4.3.1.1. Participants 
20 participants (5 male, 1 left-handed) took part in the experiment. The age of the 
participants ranged between 19 and 32 years, with a median age of 24. All participants 
reported to have normal or corrected-to-normal vision, confirmed that that they did not suffer 
from epilepsy or seizures and gave written-informed consent 
4.3.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was performed with a Mac with OS X 10.7 as operating system and a 
Diamond Pro 2070 SB (Mitsubishi) monitor with 24 inch screen size. Stimuli were presented 
at a refresh rate of 120 Hz controlled by MATLAB and Psychtoolbox 3.0.10 (Brainard, 1997; 
Pelli, 1997); code adapted from http://www.shadlenlab.columbia.edu/Code/VCRDM). The 
stimuli were random dot kinematograms, consisting of on average 150 small white squares 
(sized 2 x 2 pixels, luminance 85.0 cd/m
2
) in from of a black background (1.3 cd/m
2
), which 
appeared in a circular aperture (diameter: 5°) centred at the fixation. A set of dots was shown 
for one video frame and then replotted three video frames later. When replotted, a subset of 
dots was offset from their original location to create apparent motion while the remaining dots 
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were relocated randomly. The proportion of coherently moving dots was randomly chosen 
among 1.6, 3.1, 6.2, 12.5, 25, and 50%. The direction of movement was randomly chosen out 
of each possible direction. To record the orientation judgment, 12 circles (diameter: 0.2°, 2.2 
cd/m
2
) were displayed on the screen, forming one large circle centred at the screen with a 
diameter of 10°. Participants indicated the direction of motion and their rating on the VAS by 
a Cyborg V1 joystick (Cyborg Gaming, UK). The clock-hand consisted of a bar (length: 5°, 
width: 0.1°, 2.2 cd/m
2
) and a circular head (diameter: 0.2°, 2.2 cd/m
2
).  
4.3.1.3. Trial structure 
The trial structure is shown in Fig. 4-1. Each trial began with the presentation of a 
fixation cross at screen centre for 1,000 ms. Then a RDK was presented for 2,000 ms. Next, 
the circle around the screen centre appeared. As the participants started to move the joystick, 
the clock-hand appeared, pointing to the direction the joystick was moved to. The circle 
continued to be displayed on the screen until participants had pulled and released the trigger 
of joystick. Next, the subjective scale appeared, with either the four response categories from 
the discrete scale or the VAS. If the error of the orientation judgment had been larger than 
45°, the trial ended with the display of “please indicate the direction more carefully” for 1,000 
ms.  
 
Figure ´4-1. Experimental procedure.  
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4.3.1.4. Procedure 
The experiment lasted 1 hour on average. Participants were instructed perform the 
motion discrimination task as carefully as possible, with accuracy being more important than 
speed. For the subjective reports, participants were told that the subjective scale referred to 
the global motion experience created by the coherently moving dots. Again, participants were 
instructed to their ratings as carefully and as accurately as possible.  
Participants indicated the direction of motion by using the joystick to move a bar that 
looked like a clock-hand. When the participants had moved the clock-hand in the direction 
they saw the dots moving, they confirmed their response by pulling the trigger of the joystick. 
The clock-hand consisted of a bar (length: 5°, width: 0.1°) and a circular head (diameter: 
0.2°). To collect the subjective report, the question “how clearly did you see the coherent 
motion?” was displayed on the screen. In case of VAS, a continuous scale was shown 
underneath the question, with the ends labelled as “not at all”, and “clear”. Participants moved 
an index on the continuous scale by moving the joystick horizontally, and confirmed a 
position on the scale by pulling the trigger. In case of four point scales, the same question was 
displayed on the screen, but underneath the question, four response categories were shown, 
which were “not at all”, “weak”, “almost clear”, and “clear”. Participants responded to the 
discrete scales by pressing the keys 1, 2, 3, and 4 on the keyboard. At the beginning of the 
experiment, participants performed a training block with 24 trials. The main experiment 
involved 10 blocks with 45 trials each. During training, VAS and discrete scale trials were 
randomly intermixed each of the six possible coherences was presented six times in a from-
easy-to-difficult order. During the main experiment, the two subjective scales alternated after 
each block and the levels of coherence varied randomly between trials.  
4.3.1.5. Analysis 
All analysis were performed in R 2.15.2 (R Core Team, 2012). For both the 
distribution analysis as well as the regression analysis, fast responses (defined as faster than 
200 ms) and slow responses (defined as 2.5 standard deviations slower than the individual 
average) to the discrimination task or to the scale were omitted. Other exclusion criteria such 
as 2 or 3 standard deviations gave essentially the same results.  
4.3.1.5.1. Distribution analysis of the discrimination responses 
Discrimination responses were analysed by fitting a combination of a von Mises 
distribution and a uniform distribution to the data (Bays et al., 2009; Zokaei et al., 2011). The 
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uniform distribution models the distribution of responses in trials when participants relied on 
guessing, because when participants guessed, each orientation between 0 and 360 ° was 
equally probable. The von Mises (circular Gaussian) distribution centred at the true motion 
direction represents the distribution of responses in trials where participants were not 
guessing. The better participants performed the orientation judgment, the less responses 
jittered around the true motion direction; therefore, the concentration parameter of the von 
Mises distribution can be interpreted as the precision of orientation judgments. The model is 
described by the following equation: 
𝜃 = (1 − 𝛾)𝜙𝐾(𝜃 − 𝜃) + 𝛾
1
2𝜋
 
where  is the stimulus motion direction, 𝜃 is the motion direction indicated by the 
participant,  is the proportion of trials when participants were guessing,  denotes the von 
Mises distribution with mean of zero and the concentration parameter K. Fitting was 
performed on the aggregated data across all participants and scales but separately for each 
level of coherence using maximum likelihood estimation and confidence intervals around 
each parameter were estimated using 10,000 bootstrap samples. Pooling over participants and 
scales was necessary to obtain a sufficient number of trials for the fitting algorithms to reach 
convergence. The purpose of this analysis was a manipulation check if performance in the 
current task was continuous or binary. As the hypotheses tested in the current study equally 
apply to metacognition of the precision as well as the guessing aspect of performance, it was 
legitimate to analyse the relationship between subjective reports and performance without 
differentiating between guessing and precision (see section 4.3.1.5.2.)  
4.3.1.5.2. Relationship between scales and discrimination error 
The relationship between the two scales and discrimination error was analysed by 
means of mixed model regression analysis based on the cumulative proportional odds model 
as implemented in the R library ordinal (Christensen, 2013), the ordinal equivalent to the 
analysis in previous studies (Sandberg et al., 2013, 2010; Wierzchoń et al., 2012). The 
dependent variable, the discrimination error, was determined by the absolute difference 
between the true motion direction and the reported motion and binned into 12 equal bins 
between 0 and 90° and a thirteenth bins for errors larger than 90° to allow computation of a 
proportional odds model. Non-parametric statistics were used to account for the fact that the 
discrimination error was bounded and strongly skewed. Inter-subject variance was modelled 
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by a random effect on the intercept. Scale (VAS vs. discrete scale), coherence (1.6 vs. 3.1 vs. 
6.2 vs. 12.5 vs. 25.0 vs. 50.0) and subjective report and all interactions were treated as fixed 
effects. Significance of each fixed term was assessed by likelihood ratio tests between the full 
model and a model where the term was dropped. Confidence intervals were obtained from the 
likelihood root statistic. Subjective reports given by VAS and discrete scales were 
standardized separately. To investigate the effects of number of scale steps, two separate 
models were computed, one with the full VAS included as predictor, and one model where 
the VAS was binned into four equal partitions. We interpret a comparison between the 
discretized VAS and the discrete scale as indicative of type 2 sensitivity (i. e. the degree to 
which participants can access to their own performance) because when the VAS reports are 
binned to four, the amount of information in discretized VAS and discrete scale are the same, 
although we acknowledge that ordinal statistics do not provide any means of control over the 
influence of discrimination bias (Masson & Rotello, 2009). Given that type 2 sensitivity of 
VAS and discrete scale are the same, a comparison between the full VAS and the discrete 
scale is indicative of whether participants apply more criteria in the VAS than in the discrete 
scale and thus the full VAS discriminates between levels of performance that fall on the same 
scale step with the discrete scale. In addition, we analysed the effects of feedback and 
reporting time by computing two additional models comparing full VAS and the discretized 
scale with feedback and report time as additional fixed effect, respectively.  
4.3.1.5.3. Internal consistency 
Internal consistency was assessed by computing Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) 
separately for each level of coherence using the R library ltm (Rizopoulos, 2006). Confidence 
intervals were estimated around Cronbach’s alpha values based on 10,000 Bootstrap samples. 
4.3.1.5.4. Distribution of subjective reports 
To analyse the distribution of subjective reports, the ratings of VAS was again binned 
into four categories each covering a fourth of the scale range. The frequency of each bin was 
then compared against frequency of the corresponding response alternative of the discrete 
scales using an ANOVA with the factors rating category, coherence, and scale type (VAS vs. 
discrete scale). When sphericity did not hold, we adjusted the degrees of freedom according to 
the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. To resolve interactions, post-hoc t-tests were conducted 
comparing the frequency of each VAS bin with the corresponding response category of the 
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discrete scale separately for each level of coherence. P-values were adjusted by the Holm-
correction to account for multiple comparisons.  
4.3.2. Results 
4.3.2.1. Discrimination performance 
The mean discrimination error was 55.6° (SEM = 2.2) when participants were using 
the VAS and 56.3° (SEM = 2.2) when the discrete scale was used and ranged from 87.7° 
(SEM = 1.7) for the lowest to 13.7° (SEM = 1.6) for the highest level of coherence. The 
relative frequencies of orientation responses and the estimated distributions are shown in Fig. 
4-2. The estimated parameters as well as bootstrapped confidence intervals are shown in Fig. 
4-3. 
 
Figure 4-2. Distribution analysis of discrimination responses. Dots indicate the relative 
frequency of orientation responses with 0 as the true motion direction with different levels of 
coherence in each panel. Lines indicate the distribution of responses estimated from the fitted 
guessing and precision parameters. The grey highlighted area indicates the degree of accuracy 
between -45° and 45° where no error feedback was given.  
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Figure 4-3. Estimated parameters from the distribution analysis plotted as a function of 
Coherence. Left Panel: Guessing probability. Right Panel: Precision. The grey areas indicate 
95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
 
The probability of guessing trials ranged between .94 at the lowest and .05 at the 
highest level of coherence. Confidence intervals indicated the guessing probability 
continuously decreased across all levels of coherence. The precision ranged between 5.2 at a 
Coherence of 3.1% and 28.5 at the maximum level of coherence. Confidence intervals 
suggested that there was a continuous increase of precision starting at a coherence of 6.2%, 
while the estimation of the precision parameter was not reliable for coherence levels of 1.3% 
and 2.6% (due to the low number of non-guessing trials).  
4.3.2.2. Relationship between discrimination error and subjective reports 
The regression weights and confidence intervals of the ordinal mixed model regression 
comparing the full VAS against the discrete scale as predictors of discrimination error can be 
found in Table 4-1. Likelihood ratio tests suggested significant main effects of subjective 
report [χ
2
(1) = 195.0, p < .001] and coherence [χ
2
(5) = 1522.0, p < .001], no effect of scale 
[χ
2
(1) = 2.1, n. s.], significant interactions between subjective reports and scale [χ
2
(1) = 4.3, p 
< .05] and between subjective reports and coherence [χ
2
(5) = 50.2, p < .001], and no three-
way interaction [χ
2
(5) = 6.8, n. s.]. A regression model fitted on VAS ratings only revealed a 
regression coefficient for subjective reports of -.44 with a 95 % confidence interval of [-.52 -
.36]. For the discrete scale, the same analysis revealed a coefficient of -.32 within a 
confidence interval of [-.40 -.24].  
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Table 4-1 
Results of the mixed-effects ordinal regression model with discrimination error as dependent 
variable 
Predictor β 
95 % CI Likeli-
hood 
ratio 
df p 
lower upper 
Subjective report -0.38 -0.43 -0.32 195.0 1 < .001 
Coherence level 
   
1522.0 1 < .001 
- 1.6% vs. 50% 1.28 1.17 1.40 
 
  
- 3.1% vs. 50% 1.06 0.95 1.18 
 
  
- 6.2% vs. 50% 0.68 0.58 0.79 
 
  
- 12.5% vs. 50% -0.39 -0.48 -0.29 
 
  
- 25% vs. 50% -1.16 -1.27 -1.05 
   
Scale type -0.01 -0.06 0.04 2.1 1 n. s. 
Subjective report * coherence level 
   
50.2 5 < .001 
- Subjective report * 1.6% vs. 50% 0.26 0.14 0.38 
   
- Subjective report * 3.1% vs. 50% 0.21 0.09 0.33 
   
- Subjective report * 6.2% vs. 50% 0.01 -0.10 0.13 
   
- Subjective report * 12.5% vs. 50% -0.26 -0.37 -0.16 
   
- Subjective report * 25% vs. 50% -0.15 -0.26 -0.04 
   
Subjective report * scale type 0.06 0.01 0.11 4.3 1 < .05 
Coherence level * scale type 
   
10.3 5 n. s. 
- 1.6% vs. 50% * scale type 0.10 -0.02 0.21 
   
- 3.1% vs. 50% * scale type 0.06 -0.06 0.17 
   
- 6.2% vs. 50% * scale type 0.10 -0.01 0.20 
   
- 12.5% vs. 50% * scale type -0.05 -0.15 0.04 
   
- 25% vs. 50% * scale type -0.03 -0.14 0.07 
   
Subjective report * Coherence level *  
scale type -0.06 
  
6.8 5 n. s. 
- Subjective report * 1.6% vs. 50% * 
scale type -0.02 -0.14 0.10    
- Subjective report * 3.1% vs. 50% * 
scale type 0.01 -0.11 0.12    
- Subjective report * 6.2% vs. 50% * 
scale type -0.09 -0.21 0.02    
- Subjective report * 12.5% vs. 50% * 
scale type -0.06 -0.17 0.04    
- Subjective report * 25% vs. 50% * 
scale type 0.08 -0.03 0.19    
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Discrimination error as a function of coherence, scale, and subjective report (with 
discretized VAS ratings) are depicted in Fig. 4-4. The ordinal regression model comparing the 
discretized VAS and the discrete scale revealed significant main effects subjective report 
[χ
2
(1) = 178.6, p < .001] and coherence [χ
2
(5) = 1586.2, p < .001], no effect of scale [χ
2
(1) = 
2.4, n. s.], a significant interaction between subjective reports and coherence [χ
2
(5) = 47.4, p < 
.05], but no interaction between subjective report and scale [χ
2
(1) = 1.5, n. s.], and no three-
way interaction [χ
2
(5) = 6.8, n. s.].  
 
Figure 4-4. Discrimination error as a function of subjective reports, scale, and levels of 
coherence. The ratings on the visual analogue scale were discretized into four bins based on 
individual quartiles. A discrimination error of 90° indicates chance performance.  
 
The frequency of feedback, which was provided after discrimination responses with an 
error greater than 45°, did not substantially differ between VAS trials (M = 40.3, SEM = 1.7) 
and discrete scale trials (M = 41.0, SEM = 2.1) [t(19) = .7, n. s.]. Including feedback on the 
previous trial into the ordinal regression analysis as an additional predictor revealed no effect 
of feedback [χ
2
(1) = 0.1, n. s.], no interaction between subjective reports and feedback, [χ
2
(5) 
= 0.8, n. s.], between scale and feedback [χ
2
(1) = 2.1, n. s.], or between scale, subjective 
reports, and feedback [χ
2
(1) = 2.1, n. s.]. Importantly, the interaction between scale and 
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subjective report was still significant when feedback was included into the analysis [χ
2
(1) = 
3.9, p < .05].  
For the VAS, the mean report time, i.e. the time between the orientation judgment and 
the subjective report, was 1329 ms (SEM = 95.6), compared to 944 ms (SEM = 73.3) with the 
discrete scale. As can be seen from Figure 4-5, ordinal regression slopes increased with report 
time for the VAS, while no such a relation was apparent for the discrete scale. The regression 
model with report time as additional predictor revealed a significant main effect of report time 
[χ
2
(1) = 4.0, p < .05], no interaction between report time and scale [χ
2
(1) = 0.1, n. s.], and 
between subjective report and time [χ
2
(1) = 1.1, n. s]. There was however a three-way 
interaction between subjective reports, scale, and report time [χ
2
(1) = 5.5, p < .05]. When 
response times were included into the model, the interaction between subjective reports and 
scale was no longer significant, [χ
2
 (1) = 2.7, n. s]. Separate analyses of the impact of the 
report time on discrete scales and VAS revealed that the predictive efficiency of subjective 
reports made with the VAS interacted with rating time [χ
2
(1) = 6.1, p < .05], while subjective 
reports on the discrete scale were not influenced by rating time [χ
2
(1) = 0.4, n. s]. Overall, this 
pattern indicates that the differences in predictive power for discrimination error between the 
VAS and the discrete scale are mediated by longer report times.  
 
Figure 4-5. Ordered logistic regression slope of discrimination error predicted by subjective 
report depending on report time, i. e. time between objective task response and subjective 
report, and scale. To allow fitting separate regression models, report time is discretized into 
four bins based on the .25, .5, and .75 quantile.  
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4.3.2.3. Internal Consistency of subjective reports 
Cronbach’s alphas ranged between .83 and .93 for the discrete scale, between .84 and 
.93 for the discretized VAS, and .85 and .93 for full VAS (see Table 4-3). There was a 
numeric trend that alphas were larger for both the full and the discretized VAS than for the 
discrete scale at four out of six levels of coherence, but confidence intervals indicated the only 
substantial difference between the two scales was at a coherence of 6.2%, where the internal 
consistency of the VAS was greater. The internal consistency of the discretized VAS was 
always within the confidence intervals around the full VAS.  
Table 4-3 
Cronbach’s alpha of VAS and discrete scales separately each level of coherence.  
 Full VAS Discretized VAS discrete scale 
Coheren
ce 
alpha CI 2.5 CI 97.5 alpha CI 2.5 CI 97.5 alpha CI 2.5 CI 97.5 
1.6 .91 .82 .95 .87 .77 .92 .85 .68 .91 
3.1 .91 .81 .95 .89 .78 .93 .86 .73 .91 
6.2 .92 .87 .95 .91 .85 .94 .83 .63 .88 
12.5 .85 .67 .91 .84 .67 .90 .85 .69 .90 
25.0 .93 .80 .96 .92 .79 .96 .90 .76 .95 
50.0 .93 .83 .96 .92 .83 .96 .93 .83 .96 
 
4.3.2.4. Distribution of subjective reports  
The mean subjective experience reported on the VAS was 49.2% of the scale range 
(SEM = 2.2) and 2.3 (SEM = 0.1) on the discrete scale ranging between 1 and 4 (which 
corresponds to a mean of 41.3% of the scale range and a standard error of 2.2 %). As can be 
seen from Fig. 4-6, the second scale step of the discrete scale was the dominant response even 
at a coherence of 1.3% when performance was effectively at chance. The ANOVA on 
response frequencies revealed a significant main effect of rating category [F(2.0,38.8) = 5.3, p 
< .001], significant interactions between scale and rating category [F(3,57) = 17.4, p < .001], 
and between rating category and coherence [F(3.6,68.0) = 53.4, p < .001], as well as a three-
way interaction between coherence, scale type, and rating category [F(5.3,99.9) = 7.2, p < 
.001]. Post-hoc tests assessing whether the frequency of responses was different between the 
discrete scale and the VAS separately for each level of coherence and each response category 
are shown in Table 4-2. While there was no significant difference between reports of no 
experience on the discrete scale and the corresponding scale part of the VAS at each 
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coherence, reports of weak experiences occurred more often with the discrete scale than with 
the VAS at 5 out of 6 coherences, reports of almost clear experiences were more frequently 
reported with the VAS at lower coherences, and reports of clear experiences were more often 
with the VAS at a coherence of 25%. 
 
Figure 4-6. Frequency of each scale step of the discrete scales and the frequency of the 
corresponding scale parts of the VAS. Black bars indicate the VAS and grey bars the discrete 
scale. Error bars indicate 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
The present experiment investigated whether participants are able to use the high 
number of response alternatives provided by visual analogue scales appropriately when 
reporting visual experience of motion. We hypothesized that if a VAS allowed to retrieve a 
larger amount of information from participants’ reports than discrete scales, the full VAS 
should be more efficient in predicting the discrimination error, and should be more internally 
consistent. Second, if a VAS reduced the type 2 sensitivity of subjective reports, we would 
expect that the discretized VAS should be less efficient in predicting the discrimination error 
than the discrete scale. Finally, if participants tended to use VASs in a binary way, ratings on 
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the VAS should form a U-shaped distribution, and the discrete scale should correlate more 
closely with discrimination error no matter whether the VAS is discretized or not.  
Concerning the relationship between subjective reports and discrimination error, the 
full VAS predicted discrimination error more efficiently than the discrete scale, while there 
were no substantial differences between the discretized VAS and the discrete scale. The 
difference between the full VAS and the discrete scale was mediated by the response time to 
the scale. The analysis of internal consistency revealed no substantial differences for five out 
of six coherences, while both the full and the discretized VAS were more consistent at a 
coherence of 6.2%. Concerning the distribution of subjective reports, we observed that the 
VAS and the four-point scale were both not used in an all-or-nothing fashion, although 
participants had a tendency to report weak experiences in the discrete scale while they would 
report almost clear and clear experiences in the VAS. 
4.4.1. The amount of information in VAS and discrete scales 
According to a standard interpretation of differences between scales measuring 
subjective awareness, subjective reports are created by the same mechanisms, and differences 
between scales occur due to different qualities of the scale. A key aspect of the quality of the 
scale is the amount of information transmitted by each rating. According to information 
theory (Shannon, 1948), subjective reports collected by VAS should provide a larger amount 
of information that discrete scales, because 4 scale steps allow to record 2 bits of information, 
while the number of bits collected by a continuous scale is limited only by the number of 
positions participants are able to differentiate, and was estimated to be at least 10 positions 
(Hake & Garner, 1951), i.e. at least 3.32 bits. Consistent with the predictions from 
information theory, the full VAS was more closely correlated to the discrimination error than 
the discrete scale. We did not detect any substantial differences between the discrete scale and 
the discretized VAS in terms of type 2 sensitivity, suggesting that the additional alternatives 
participants have to consider when using a VAS did not add substantial amounts of noise to 
the subjective reports. Concerning internal consistency, there were no substantial differences 
between the two scales in five out of six coherences, although the VAS was more reliable at a 
coherence of 6.2%. Overall, it seems that a VAS indeed provides a larger amount of 
information than discrete scales, although the amount of information recorded by discrete 
scales is sufficient to provide reliable estimates as well.  
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4.4.2. The impact of report time 
The difference between reports on the full VAS and on discrete scale in predicting 
discrimination error was mediated by the time of rating: While VAS ratings became more and 
more efficient in predicting trial accuracy with time, we observed no such a relation for the 
discrete scale. The first interpretation to these results is that a VAS provides a larger number 
of response alternatives, and selecting one out of this multitude of options could be more 
difficult and thus require a longer period of time. Second, it should be noted that also the 
motor response required by a VAS is more time-consuming than a simple button press: The 
association of the rating-accuracy relationship and report time at the VAS could also reflect 
the additional time demand of using a joystick and a decrease of rating precision when 
participants did not invest enough time to operate the joystick carefully. Third, an alternative 
explanation to these findings may be based on the dynamics of decision making: While 
standard SDT models of subjective reports assume that the evidence used for subjective 
reports is fixed at the time when observers respond to the task (Kepecs et al., 2008; Ko & 
Lau, 2012; Vickers, 1979), others have proposed that subjective reports are based on evidence 
participants continue accumulating after the objective decision is made (Pleskac & 
Busemeyer, 2010). Given that VAS judgements were associated with prolonged time 
participants needed to give a subjective report, post-decisional accumulation of evidence 
might be an alternative explanation why ordinal regression slopes are higher with VAS than 
with a discrete scale, because the additional 400 ms that it takes to make a judgement on the 
VAS might give participants more time to accumulate evidence. However, we observed a 
large overlap in the report times between the two scales in the current experiment where VAS 
regression slopes were larger although the time of the report was the same. In addition, while 
ordinal regression slopes seemed to increase almost linearly for the VAS, we found no 
indication of post-decisional accumulation for the discrete scale at all. What is possible is that 
participants keep accumulating sensory evidence after the decision when using the VAS only, 
either because they need the additional evidence to make fine-grained VAS ratings, or 
because they might be more motivated when using a VAS (Funke & Reips, 2012). The 
(cognitive and motor) cost of precise reporting and on-going accumulation accounts cannot be 
distinguished on grounds of the current data set. Given that a previous study failed to find any 
association with report time for both the VAS and discrete scales (Wierzchoń et al., 2012), 
future studies may be necessary to investigate the dynamics of metacognition.  
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4.4.3. Are visual analogue scales used binarily? 
VAS received criticism because the continuum in combination with the labelled scale 
ends might result in a bimodal distribution of subjective reports, with scale extremes being 
chosen more frequently than the centre of the scale (Overgaard et al., 2006). First, we 
observed that intermediate scale steps were chosen frequently for both scales. Second, there 
was no difference between the frequency of the smallest scale step of the discrete scale and 
the lowest quarter of the VAS, indicating that VAS and discrete scales both applied the same 
minimal criteria for subjective reports. However, the second smallest scale step of the discrete 
scale (labelled as “weak”) was more often chosen than the corresponding part of the VAS, 
while stronger experiences were more frequently reported with the VAS than with the discrete 
scales. There might be several explanations why more distinct experiences are more 
frequently reported with the VAS: First, participants could be biased by the labelled extremes 
of the scale (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). Second, participants might suffer more strongly 
from an error of central tendency when they respond to discrete scales, and therefore the 
second scale step was the dominant response in the discrete scale. Finally, it is also possible 
participants are more motivated when using the VAS, being more attentive, and therefore 
have in fact clearer experiences (Szczepanowski et al., 2013). Concerning the impact of 
motivation, the two scales were associated with a comparable discrimination error, suggesting 
that the scale did not alter the way participants performed the task in general. Concerning a 
potential bias towards extremes, it should be noted that intermediate positions on the VAS 
were the most frequent responses for medium levels of coherence, suggesting that participants 
do use the centre of the scale when they consider it to be appropriate. In contrast, the second 
scale step of the discrete scale was the dominant response even at the lowest level of 
coherence when discrimination accuracy was effectively at chance, suggesting that the error 
of central tendency might be a factor in the distribution of discrete scales. The distribution of 
VAS is more plausible in a way that low ratings are dominant at low levels of coherence, 
intermediate ratings at medium coherences, and high ratings at high levels of coherences.  
4.4.4. Discussion of methodology 
It should be noted that the current experiment differs from previous studies addressing 
the topic of subjective reports in several ways. As this task is new to the field of 
metacognition, future studies are desirable to explore whether the findings obtained with this 
method are corroborated in more standard experiments. Most importantly, we quantified 
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discrimination error as a continuous variable rather than binary in the current study. In 
general, such an approach seems promising for the field of consciousness research because 
some theories of consciousness make specific predictions whether consciousness is gradual 
(Cleeremans, 2008, 2011) or dichotomous (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene et al., 
2003), and recording performance in a non-binary way ensures that binary task performance 
does not artificially cause binary metacognition. Unfortunately, up to know, there is no 
proposal for a SDT-grounded measure of type 2 sensitivity equivalent to the measures 
applicable for binary tasks, so our analysis of type 2 sensitivity by ordinal regression does not 
provide the same control of response bias and confidence thresholds than it is possible for 
binary tasks. For the purpose of the current study, these potential confounds do not change the 
interpretation of the data because they would either affect the discrete scale, the full VAS, and 
the discretized VAS in the same way (response bias), or would affect the full VAS and the 
discretized VAS to the same degree (confidence thresholds), so it cannot be explained why 
only the full but not the discretized VAS provides more predictive power. Future studies 
however need to carefully consider the conceptual advantages of continuous tasks against the 
methodological disadvantages of the analysis methods available.  
It may also be objected that the current task was not as continuous as it could have 
been, since all responses at above chance performance were concentrated between 45 and -45 
degrees (where no error feedback was given), and thus the feedback might have motivated 
participants to perform at least as accurate as +/- 45 degrees. However, the precision of 
orientation judgements increased almost linearly although participants no longer received 
feedback, indicating participants did not perform the task in a binary fashion. As feedback 
might also have altered performance and type 2 sensitivity in the current task, parameters and 
coefficients estimated from the current experiment should not be naïvely expected to be the 
same in standard subliminal perception tasks where error feedback is suspended after a 
training period or is completely missing. Nevertheless, we did not observe any evidence that 
feedback on the previous trial influenced any contrast of interest for purpose of the current 
experiment, suggesting that feedback did not have a major impact on performance in the 
current study.  
4.4.5. Equivalent conscious access? 
Another interpretation of differences between various subjective scales is that different 
scales might encourage participants to use different mechanisms of conscious access to report 
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their conscious experiences (Overgaard & Sandberg, 2012). Indeed, it is plausible to assume 
that subjective reports in VASs and discrete scales are accomplished in parts by different 
processes. Discrete scales rely strongly on verbal categorization, because observers need to 
have a concept of each of the scale steps, while VAS need only an abstract understanding of 
the dimension as a whole. In contrast, VAS may depend on visuo-motor coordination, 
because participants need to translate their experience into spatial coordinates and have to 
move the joystick accordingly. This might be an explanation for the effects in the current 
study, although a previous study reported that five scale points cannot convey more 
information about subjective experiences than four scale points (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). 
The number of scale steps participants can make use of in labelled scales depends on the 
participants’ ability to categorize their percepts verbally, which might be limited to four. 
VASs do not depend to the same degree on verbal categorization; therefore, the amount of 
information transmitted by a VAS can be greater.  
4.4.6. Conceptual reasons to prefer VASs or discrete scales 
Finally, deciding between VASs and discrete scales is not a question that can be 
addressed entirely by empirical methods, but needs to be informed conceptually as well. First, 
a VAS is only feasible if the subjective reports can be given along one dimension. However, 
the study of visual awareness may require the assessment of several qualitative different 
patterns of subjective experience: For instance, it has been suggested that observers report 
“feelings that something has been shown” or “experiences without any content” (Ramsøy & 
Overgaard, 2004) or even to be confident about the discrimination judgement (Zehetleitner & 
Rausch, 2013) at low levels of stimulation, and report that they had an experience of a 
specific stimulus quality only at higher levels of stimulation. These discontinuities in the 
pattern of subjective reports along the unaware/aware continuum cannot be measured by one 
single VAS, so other measures are required if the full set of experiences during visual 
perception is of theoretical interest to a specific study. For example, an established measure 
that captures qualitatively different experiences is the Perceptual Awareness Scale (Ramsøy & 
Overgaard, 2004), where participants are asked to differentiate between the absence of an 
experience, experiences without any content, almost clear experiences of a specific stimulus 
feature, and full clarity of the specific stimulus feature. Alternatively, different dimensions 
can be assessed by combining two VASs with different content in one trial (Zehetleitner & 
Rausch, 2013).  
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Second, some theorists strongly focus the connection between consciousness and 
language (Vygotsky, 1962), and such a view might imply verbally categorized scale steps to 
be more valid than a continuous scale. However, other concepts of consciousness endorse a 
view where perceptual consciousness is not easily verbalized, and such a view may prefer 
VASs as they rely less heavily on verbal categorization. 
4.5. Conclusion 
We present data that both visual analogue scales as well as discrete scales are reliable 
measures of subjective reports of global motion experience. We found no evidence that the 
type 2 sensitivity is decreased or the pattern of reports is binary when participants are 
provided with a large number of scale steps. The data is consistent with the interpretation that 
participants are able to maintain a sufficient large number of meaningful criteria so that a 
VAS retrieves a larger amount of information than a discrete scale with four scale steps, 
provided that participants take their time to make the more subtle judgements. At least when 
the number of response alternatives of the objective discrimination task is large, subjective 
reports of motion experience may be recorded more conveniently by a VAS than by a discrete 
scale with the same content.  
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5. TYPE 2 SENSITVITY OF DECISIONAL CONFIDENCE 
AND VISUAL EXPERIENCE
10
 
by Manuel Rausch, Hermann J. Müller, and Michael Zehetleitner
11
 
5.1. Abstract 
Previous studies provided contradicting results regarding type 2 sensitivity
12
 estimated 
from subjective reports of confidence in comparison to subjective reports of visual 
experience. We investigated whether this effect of content of subjective reports is influenced 
by the statistical method to quantify type 2 sensitivity. Comparing logistic regression and 
meta-d in a masked orientation task, a masked shape task, and a random-dot motion task, we 
observed type 2 sensitivity of reports regarding decisional confidence was greater than of 
reports about visual experience irrespective of mathematical procedures. However, the 
relationship between subjective reports and the logistic transform of accuracy was often not 
linear, implying that logistic regression is not a consistent measure of type 2 sensitivity. We 
argue that a science of consciousness would benefit from the assessment of both visual 
experience and decisional confidence, and recommend meta-da as measure of type 2 
sensitivity for future studies.  
5.2. Introduction 
Empirical approaches to human consciousness crucially rely on measures to determine 
whether or not an observer is conscious of a stimulus (Chalmers, 1998). Many researchers 
prefer objective measures, where conscious awareness is ascribed based on performance in a 
discrimination task (Eriksen, 1960; Hannula et al., 2005; Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). 
                                                 
10
 A version of this chapter has been published as Rausch, M., Müller, H. J., & Zehetleitner, 
M. (2015). Metacognitive sensitivity of subjective reports of decisional confidence and visual 
experience. Consciousness and Cognition, 35, 192-205. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2015.02.011 
11
 Manuel Rausch conceived the research questions and conducted the analysis; Manuel 
Rausch, Hermann J. Müller, and Michael Zehetleitner co-wrote the manuscript.  
12
 In the version published in Consciousness and Cognition, the terms metacognitive 
sensitivity and metacognitive bias, synonyms of type 2 sensitivity and type 2 bias, were used 
throughout the whole text. However, this was changed to maintain consistency of terms 
throughout the different Chapters of this Thesis.  
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However, at least two popular theoretical perspectives imply that conscious awareness ought 
to be measured by subjective reports: First, according to higher-order theories, perception of a 
stimulus is conscious only if it is associated with a higher-order representation, i.e. a 
representation of oneself as perceiving the stimulus (Carruthers, 2011; Lau & Rosenthal, 
2011; Timmermans et al., 2012). While discrimination performance is not necessarily 
accompanied by a corresponding higher-order representation, a subjective report does require 
some higher-order knowledge (participants need to know that they are aware of the stimulus 
in order to report that they are aware) and are thus considered more valid measures of 
conscious awareness than discrimination performance (Dienes, 2004, 2008). Second, 
according to the perspective of heterophenomenology, participants’ verbal reports about their 
subjective experience are themselves objects of study in consciousness research (Dennett, 
2003, 2007) and are thus the appropriate raw data that needs to be recorded and explained 
(Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dehaene, 2010). 
5.2.1. Visual experience and confidence as content of subjective reports 
A consequence of these theoretical reasons for using subjective measures of conscious 
awareness is the need of appropriate scales to record subjective reports. One characteristic of 
subjective reports that requires special consideration is the content of subjective report, i.e. 
what the subjective report is about. The contents queried in visual awareness experiments fall 
into two categories depending on whether participants are asked to make a report about their 
experience of the stimulus, or about the accuracy of a discrimination task response 
(Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013). We will refer to the first kind of content as “visual 
experience”, and the second kind as “confidence”. Examples for scales with visual experience 
as content of subjective reports are ratings how visible the stimulus was (Sergent & Dehaene, 
2004) or how clear a specific stimulus feature was experienced (Rausch & Zehetleitner, 
2014). Examples for the discrimination response as content are reports of how confident 
participants were about the preceding task response (Peirce & Jastrow, 1885), or whether the 
last task response was made by guessing or based on knowledge (Zehetleitner & Rausch, 
2013).  
Aiming to identify the best scale to measure conscious awareness empirically, a series 
of previous studies has compared subjective reports collected with different scales (Dienes & 
Seth, 2010; Rausch & Zehetleitner, 2014; Sandberg et al., 2011, 2010; Szczepanowski et al., 
2013; Wierzchoń et al., 2012, 2014). As subjective scales are often used to determine whether 
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performance in a specific task is conscious or unconscious, the scales were compared by 
examining the correlation between subjective reports and task accuracy: On the assumption 
that the correlation between reports and accuracy is mediated by conscious processes, if one 
scale was found to predict accuracy better than the other scales, it was concluded that this 
scale is more sensitive in detecting conscious processes (that the other scales miss) and is thus 
closer to being an exhaustive measure of conscious awareness (Overgaard & Sandberg, 2012). 
This reasoning rests on the assumption that the scales under comparison are equally valid 
from a conceptual point of view, but some are more suitable research instruments than others. 
In contrast to the assumption that all scales are a priori valid measurements of 
conscious experience, we have proposed that which content of subjective reports is 
appropriate depends on the set of conscious experiences relevant to a specific research 
question (Rausch & Zehetleitner, 2014). The reason is that participants might already 
experience some conscious intuition about being correct in a discrimination task while not yet 
consciously seeing the stimulus feature relevant for the task judgment (see Chapter 2; 
Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013). A similar dissociation between knowledge about the accuracy 
of task decisions and the knowledge underlying those task decisions was shown for artificial 
grammar tasks (Dienes & Scott, 2005). These observations suggest that studies investigating 
the neural correlates of a specific visual content (such as the redness of an apple) may 
encounter false positives if they rely on confidence judgments because confidence may not 
necessarily require a conscious visual experience of the relevant stimulus feature. On the 
other hand, if the full set of experiences during visual perception is of theoretical interest to a 
specific study, the use of a scale that measures only visual experience of one specific feature 
leaves out subjective feelings of confidence (Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013), and possibly other 
qualitatively different experiences along the unawareness/awareness continuum, such as 
awareness of an event without a phenomenology of seeing, as reported by some blindsight 
patients (Sahraie et al., 2002), or experiences without any content (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 
2004). Finally, if a study investigates whether performance in a specific task is conscious, 
confidence ratings are a convenient choice since participants should consider all their 
conscious experiences relevant for their performance in this case (Dienes, 2008). Overall, 
should reliable differences between subjective scales with different contents exist, then 
researchers would have to decide which set of conscious experiences is relevant to their 
particular research questions, and choose a measure accordingly. 
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5.2.2. Type 2 signal detection theory 
As subjective reports entail making a decision for one out of the several response 
alternatives offered by the scale, it is legitimate to apply theories of decision making to 
subjective reports. One of the most prominent theories of decision making under uncertainty 
is signal detection theory (SDT) (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; 
Wickens, 2002). According to SDT, when observers decide which out of two possible event 
types occurred, their perceptual systems create sensory evidence delineating the two response 
options. As there is noise in the system, the sensory evidence is not constant, but a random 
sample out of a distribution for each of the two event types. Participants select a response by 
comparing the sensory evidence with a response criterion, choosing one option if the sensory 
evidence is greater than the criterion and the other option otherwise. SDT allows 
distinguishing between two aspects of decision making: sensitivity and bias. The more 
sensitive an observers is, the smaller is the overlap between the two distributions of evidence 
created by the two events. Bias towards one response options however depends on the 
position of the response criterion (see Fig. 5-1a). 
SDT tasks can be classified based on the events participants have to discriminate: In 
type 1 tasks, the standard application of SDT, participants differentiate between two different 
kinds of stimulation (e.g. two distinct stimuli, or the presence or absence of the stimulus). 
However, SDT can also be applied to type 2 tasks, where the task is to differentiate correct 
and incorrect responses to a type 1 task (Galvin et al., 2003). Type 2 tasks allow the 
assessment of sensitivity and bias just as in type 1 tasks (see Fig. 5-1b): Type 2 sensitivity, the 
sensitivity in type 2 tasks, is defined as the extent to which the observers’ type 2 responses 
differentiate between correct and incorrect type 1 responses (also called metacognitive 
sensitivity). Type 2 bias indicates how liberal or conservative participants’ type 2 responses 
are with respect to their task performance (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Galvin et al., 2003). 
Quantifying type 2 sensitivity is challenging because type 2 sensitivity depends on type 1 
sensitivity and bias and standard models predict heavily skewed distributions of evidence for 
type 2 decisions (Barrett, Dienes, & Seth, 2013; Galvin et al., 2003). Nevertheless, type 2 
SDT analysis is both conceptually and practically useful for the study of subjective reports 
because it allows a separation of observers’ degree of insight into their own performance in 
the task from observers’ response strategies. 
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Figure 5-1. Signal detection theory. (a) Distributions of evidence created by the two stimuli A 
and B in a type 1 task, i.e. the observers’ task is to decide which one of the two stimuli has 
been presented. When the type 1 evidence is greater than the response criterion, observers 
respond “B”, and “A” otherwise. (b) Distributions of evidence created by correct and 
incorrect trials in a type 2 task, i.e. the observers’ task is to decide if the preceding judgment 
was correct. Note that the decision process is analogous to a type 1 task except the 
distributions of evidence created by correct and incorrect trials are expected to deviate 
strongly from the normal distribution. 
 
5.2.3. Empirical studies on confidence and visual experience 
Is there an effect of experience and confidence as content of subjective reports on type 
2 sensitivity and bias? Concerning type 2 bias, there is a considerable amount of evidence that 
participants apply different criteria when they make a report concerning their subjective 
confidence in being correct in a discrimination judgment, compared to when they report their 
visual experience of the task-relevant stimulus feature. Extreme examples for dissociations 
between visual experience and confidence stem from neuropsychological patients. For 
instance, Carota and Calabrese (2013) described a patient with achromatopsia after bilateral 
occipital damage, who claims to be entirely colour-blind, but is still able to make accurate 
colour discriminations and reports being confident about these colour judgments. A similar 
pattern has been documented in blindsight type 2, which, unlike classical blindsight, is 
characterized by awareness of some event, but without the phenomenology of normal seeing 
(Sahraie et al., 2002). Patient G.Y. reported being confident in discrimination judgments 
without experiencing the stimuli visually (Sahraie et al., 1998) and even wagered the same 
amount of money for the blind as for the intact hemifield when discrimination difficulty was 
matched (Persaud et al., 2011). In normal observers, decisional confidence is associated with 
more liberal criteria across a wide range of visual tasks, such as a stimulus localization task 
(Schlagbauer et al., 2012), a masked orientation discrimination task, a masked shape 
 
111 
discrimination task, and a random-dot motion discrimination task (see Chapter 2 and 3; 
Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013). 
For type 2 sensitivity, the evidence for a distinction between experience and 
confidence is less consistent. The only neuropsychological study informative of type 2 
sensitivity reported that blindsight patient G.Y.’s area under the receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC) is larger when it is estimated from confidence judgments as compared to 
visual awareness at low stimulus intensities (Sahraie et al., 1998). In normal observers, 
subjective reports of perceptual experience outperformed confidence ratings in predicting trial 
accuracy in a masked object discrimination task (Sandberg et al., 2010) as well as a masked 
face discrimination task (Wierzchoń et al., 2014); however, subjective reports of decisional 
confidence were more efficient in predicting trial accuracy in a masked orientation 
discrimination task and a random-dot motion discrimination task (see sections 2.3 and 2.7; 
Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013); and no substantial differences were found in a masked 
discrimination task of affective face expressions (Sandberg et al., 2013; Szczepanowski et al., 
2013) and a masked shape discrimination task (section 2.3; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013).  
These discrepant results of previous studies raise the question what are the factors that 
determine when visual experience and when confidence is associated with greater type 2 
sensitivity. One candidate factor may be the method used to quantify type 2 sensitivity: Those 
two studies that found type 2 sensitivity of visual experience to be higher than that of 
decisional confidence were both based on logistic regression analysis (Sandberg et al., 2010; 
Wierzchoń et al., 2014). By contrast, Szczepanowski et al. (2013) and Zehetleitner and 
Rausch (2013), who used type 2 ROC analysis to quantify type 2 sensitivity (Fleming et al., 
2010), observed that type 2 sensitivity of confidence was substantially greater than type 2 
sensitivity of experience or at least confidence tended to be associated with a greater type 2 
sensitivity. Since the measure of type 2 sensitivity is closely associated with the effects of the 
scale across previous studies, the question arises if the effect of confidence versus experience 
is entirely dependent on which measure is applied. 
5.2.4. Meta-da as measure of type 2 sensitivity 
The development of meta-da, a relatively new approach to quantifying type 2 
sensitivity (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012), offers the possibility assess meta-da with improved 
control (Fleming & Lau, 2014). The conceptual idea of meta-da is to express type 2 sensitivity 
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in terms of sensitivity of a type 1 SDT model (see Fig. 5-2). In such a model, participants are 
assumed to make objective discrimination responses and subjective reports based on identical 
sensory evidence. Subjective reports and task decisions are considered to form one continuum 
of responses such as “I’m sure it’s A”, “I guess A”, “I guess B”, “I’m sure it’s B”. 
Participants select one response out of the continuum based on comparisons of one value of 
sensory evidence, which is a random sample out of different distributions generated by A and 
B, with criteria that delineate the different response options. If participants had the same 
amount of evidence for subjective reports as they have for the task response, the distance 
between the two distributions should be same no matter whether it is estimated from A versus 
B decisions alone, or from A versus B decisions plus subjective reports. Thus, meta-da 
indicates the distance between the two distributions of evidence available for subjective 
responses. If meta-da is smaller than da, the distance between distributions of evidence 
estimated from “objective“ decisions alone, this would means that there is less sensory 
evidence for subjective reports than for task responses and that, accordingly, type 2 sensitivity 
is suboptimal. An introduction into the mathematics of meta-da is provided by (Barrett et al., 
2013).  
 
Figure 5-2. Signal detection model underlying meta-da. Meta-da is computed assuming 
metacognition is ideal, i.e. the same evidence is available for subjective reports than for 
discrimination judgments. The model is the same as a standard SDT model for a type 1 task, 
except that discrimination decisions and subjective reports are assumed to form one 
dimension of response options, i.e. “It is A for sure”, “I’m guessing A”, I’m guessing B”, “It 
is B for sure”, delineated by several response criteria. 
 
Meta-da and type 2 ROC analysis have both advantages and disadvantages: On the one 
hand, type 2 ROC analysis has the advantage of being free of assumptions about the 
underlying distributions of evidence, while meta-da requires making assumptions about the 
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shape of these distributions, which may be incorrect (Fleming & Lau, 2014). On the other 
hand, meta- da provides two advantages over type 2 ROC analysis: First, meta-da accounts for 
bias regarding the two task alternatives. Second, meta-da can be used to easily compare type 2 
sensitivity to objective task performance because meta-da is expressed in the same signal-to-
noise units as the standard da from signal detection theory (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Maniscalco 
& Lau, 2012). However, no study to date has compared different subjective reports of visual 
experience and decisional confidence in terms of meta-da. 
5.2.5. Logistic regression as measure of type 2 sensitivity 
Despite the merits of type 2 SDT analysis, the majority of previous studies comparing 
subjective reports have quantified the relation between trial accuracy and subjective reports 
by logistic regression (Sandberg et al., 2013, 2010; Wierzchoń et al., 2012, 2014). Logistic 
regression, a special case of generalized linear regression models, is a method to quantify the 
relationship between a binary outcome variable and one or several predictors. Linear 
regression methods assume a linear relationship between outcome and predictor: To obtain 
such a linear relationship, the outcome variable is transformed into the logarithm of the odds 
of the two possible outcome events. In case of type 2 sensitivity, the correctness of the trial 
serves as binary outcome variable, and subjective report as linear predictor. Thus, the 
subjective report is used to predict the logarithm of the odds of the trial being correct to being 
incorrect (see Fig. 5-3). The more efficient subjective reports differentiate between different 
levels of accuracy, the steeper the slope of the resulting regression line is. Thus, the slopes of 
logistic regression are interpreted as measure of type 2 sensitivity.  
On the one hand, logistic regression provides several advantages over other methods 
to analyse non-linear data: First, it is possible to include random effects to account for 
hierarchical clusters in the data, such as blocks nested within participants nested within 
experiments (Bolker et al., 2009; Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). Second, logistic mixed-model 
regression can be applied when the data is unbalanced (Bolker et al., 2009), that is, when the 
number of observations varies between conditions or even if there are empty cells in the 
design matrix. This is particularly useful for studies of metacognition because the number of 
errors may vary greatly among participants and conditions in the same experiment.  
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Figure 5-3. Quantifying the relationship between trial accuracy and subjective reports by 
logistic regression. (a) Data of a hypothetical experiment. Task accuracy in % correct is 
plotted as a function of subjective report. Lines indicate two separate conditions. (b) Same 
data with accuracy transformed into the odds of being correct to incorrect and plotted on log-
scale. Logistic regression is based on fitting a linear function on such transformed data. The 
more subjective reports differentiate between different levels of accuracy, the steeper the 
slopes of the regression line will be. Note that such a linear relationship is unlikely to occur in 
real data. 
 
On the other hand, the assumption of a linear relationship between subjective reports 
and transformed accuracy logistic regression relies upon is unlikely to hold. First, the data 
provided by rating scales is inherently categorical, not continuous, and linear models are 
inappropriate in particular for rating scales with small numbers of categories (Christensen & 
Brockhoff, 2013). In contrast, ratings on a visual analogue scale (VAS) may be at least 
approximately equidistant (Reips & Funke, 2008). Second, even if scale steps were 
equidistant, a non-linear relationship between the transformed accuracy and subjective reports 
might be expected in all tasks where participants have to select one out of a finite number of 
options: If there is a chance p of guessing correctly, the transformed odds of being correct 
cannot vary between -∞ and ∞; instead, it will asymptotically approach a lower bound at the 
logarithm of 𝑝 (1 − 𝑝)⁄ . A non-linear relationship between subjective reports and transformed 
accuracy would have two implications:  
(i) The interpretation of logistic regression slopes as indices of type 2 sensitivity would 
be ambiguous because the slope of the regression would vary across different parts of 
the scale, being close to zero for the lower part of the scale, and increasing only at the 
upper part.  
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(ii) Logistic regression might underestimate the type 2 sensitivity of scales imposing 
liberal criteria for lower scale steps, because the more liberal criteria are, the larger 
will be the part of the scale where the transformed accuracy cannot decrease any 
further due to the lower bound imposed by the guessing probability. 
5.2.6. Rationale of the present study 
In present paper, we investigate two issues: First, we examined whether an analysis of 
meta-da and logistic regression would reveal the same effect of visual experience versus 
decisional confidence (as contents of subjective reports) on type 2 sensitivity as suggested by 
previous type 2 ROC analyses. Second, we investigated whether the assumption of a linear 
relationship between subjective reports and transformed accuracy, which is required if logistic 
regression is used as an index of type 2 sensitivity, is justified.  
Specifically, we predicted that if the method of assessing type 2 sensitivity is indeed 
the reason for the discrepancy of results observed in previous studies, logistic regression 
coefficients of reports of visual experience should be greater than those of decisional 
confidence. If the effect of confidence associated with a larger area under the type 2 ROC 
curve than visual experience as observed previously reflected a stable pattern of the data, then 
type 2 sensitivity of confidence should be greater no matter if quantified by meta-da or logistic 
regression. In addition, if the assumption of a linear relationship between subjective reports 
and transformed accuracy is well-founded, then no non-linear trends should be observed. In 
contrast, if there was a bias to logistic regression due to a lower bound to the transformed 
accuracy, we would expect positive quadratic trends between subjective reports and 
transformed accuracy, and the quadratic trends should be more pronounced for decisional 
confidence as confidence is associated with more liberal criteria. 
To address these issues, we performed a reanalysis of three previously published 
experiments, a masked orientation discrimination task, a masked shape discrimination task, 
and a random-dot motion discrimination task (three experiments of Chapter 2; Zehetleitner & 
Rausch, 2013). In each of these experiments, participants submitted three responses on each 
trial: A 2-AFC discrimination judgment was followed by a report of the visual experience of 
the task-relevant stimulus feature along with a report of subjective confidence in being correct 
on the just performed discrimination judgment. For each of experiment, we analysed type 2 
sensitivity based on logistic regression analysis as well as meta-da. 
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5.3. Reanalysis 
5.3.1. Material and Methods 
In the present paper, we reanalysed Experiment 2-1, Experiment 2-3, and Experiment 
2-5 of Chapter 2 (Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013). A detailed description of the methodology 
can be found there. Experiments 2-2 and 2-4 were not considered for reanalysis because these 
experiments did not require participants to report their visual experience.  
5.3.1.1. Experimental tasks 
The experiments involved a masked orientation discrimination task (N = 20), a masked 
shape discrimination task (N = 16), and a motion discrimination task (N = 21). All three 
experiments had an identical trial structure (see Fig. 5-4). First, participants were presented 
with a stimulus always at fixation. For the masked orientation task, the stimulus was a 
sinusoidal grating oriented either horizontally or vertically, followed by a checkerboard mask 
after a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 70, 90, or 140 ms. For the 
masked shape task, the stimulus was either a circle or a square filled with the same sinusoidal 
grating as in the orientation task, succeeded by the checkerboard mask after SOAs of 8.3, 
16.7, 25.0, 33.3, 50.0, 66.7, 83.3, or 116.7 ms. For the motion discrimination task, the 
stimulus was a random dot kinematogram, with 0.7, 1.3, 2.7, 5.3, 10.7, 21.3, or 42.7 % of the 
dots coherently moving to either the left or the right, and the remaining dots relocated 
randomly. Participants had to make a non-speeded two-alternative forced-choice by key press 
about the stimulus they just had been presented with: For the masked orientation task, they 
indicated whether the sinusoidal grating had been horizontal or vertical; for the masked shape 
task, they reported whether the stimulus had been a square or a circle; and for the motion 
discrimination task, they indicated whether the dots had moved towards the left or the right. 
After each discrimination response, participants made two subjective reports, one regarding 
their visual experience of the stimulus, and one regarding their confidence in being correct in 
the discrimination task. For that, each question was displayed on the screen, which was: 
“How clearly did you see the grating/shape/coherent motion?” or “How confident are you that 
your response was correct?” In the orientation task, participants were asked not only to report 
their confidence, but additionally, in one third of the blocks , to wager money on the outcome 
of the judgment, and, in another third, to indicate whether their response was more due to 
guessing or to knowledge. The sequence of questions was balanced within participants in the 
orientation task, and across participants in the other two tasks. Participants delivered 
 
117 
subjective reports using a joystick and a VAS, which means that participants selected a 
position along a continuous line between two end points by moving a cursor. The end points 
were labelled as “unclear” and “clear” for the experience scale and “unconfident” and 
“confident” for the confidence scale, i.e. observers indicated their experience or confidence by 
the selected cursor position on the continuous scale (see Fig. 5-4). If the discrimination 
judgment was erroneous, the trial ended by displaying the word “error” for 1,000 ms on the 
monitor. There was no feedback with respect to the subjective report. 
 
Figure 5-4. Trial sequence for (a) the masked orientation task, (b) the masked shape 
discrimination task, and (c) the random-dot motion discrimination task. 
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5.3.1.2. Analysis 
All analysis were conducted in the free software R 3.0.2 (R Core Team, 2014). Trials 
of the masked orientation task on which participants did not report their subjective confidence 
in being correct were excluded from the analysis.  
5.3.1.2.1. Logistic regression 
Logistic mixed regression analysis was performed using the R library lme4 (Bates, 
Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014; Bates, Maechler, et al., 2014), with error as dependent 
variable and stimulus quality (logarithm of SOA for the orientation and the shape 
discrimination task, logarithm of coherence for the motion task), first report, second report, 
scale (confidence first vs. experience first), as well as all possible two-way and three-way 
interactions as fixed effects, and a random effect on the intercept. All numerical predictors 
were centred and scaled. Statistical significance was assessed via likelihood ratio tests 
conducted by dropping the effect to be tested out of a model containing all effects of the same 
order. Contrasts were coded in a way that the regression coefficients of scale can be directly 
interpreted as difference between experience and confidence. Confidence intervals were 
estimated around fixed effects from the local curvature of the likelihood surface. To resolve 
the interaction between scale, stimulus quality, and subjective reports, we performed 
likelihood ratio tests comparing models that only included main effects of report and scale 
against models with an interaction between report and scale, separately for each level of 
stimulus quality, with p-values adjusted according to the Bonferroni method to account for 
multiple comparisons. 
5.3.1.2.2. Meta-da 
Meta-da was computed using an implementation of the maximum likelihood procedure 
described by Maniscalco and Lau (2012) in the free software R (code is found in section 5.7.), 
assuming normal distributions of evidence with non-equal variances. First, the continuous 
VAS rating data was divided into 13 equal bins. Then, meta-da was computed separately for 
each participant and each condition and then subjected to a mixed linear regression model 
with the fixed factors scale (experience vs. confidence), time (first vs. second report), and 
stimulus quality and a random effect on the intercept (again based on the R library lme4). We 
used mixed linear regression models instead of ANOVAs because the factors time and scale 
varied within participants, but were not crossed in the shape discrimination and the motion 
discrimination experiments. Contrasts were coded in a way that the regression coefficients of 
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scale and time can directly be interpreted as difference in meta-d between conditions. 
Confidence intervals around fixed effects were estimated from 10,000 parametric bootstrap 
samples. Significance was assessed by Wald t-tests using degrees of freedom estimated by 
Satterthwaite’s approximation implemented in the R library lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al., 
2014). To resolve interactions between stimulus quality and scale, separate t-tests were 
computed for each level of stimulus quality, with p-values corrected using the Bonferroni 
method. We repeated this analysis assuming two other distributions of evidence, the logistic 
distribution and the distribution of the smallest extremes, which gave essentially the same 
pattern of results as we obtained with the normal distribution.  
5.3.1.2.3. Association between reports and stimulus quality 
To assess the relationship between reports and stimulus quality, we computed non-
parametric Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma correlation coefficients separately for each 
participant and for visual experience and confidence. Paired t-tests were conducted to test for 
a difference between scales.  
5.3.2. Results 
5.3.2.1. Logistic regression 
The complete results of the mixed logistic regression models can be seen in Table 5-1. 
We found significant interactions between the first report and scale in the masked shape task 
and the motion task, as well as between the second report and scale in all three experiments. 
Only for the first report in the masked orientation task, no significant interaction was detected. 
The sign of the coefficients of each interaction term between scale and report indicated 
concurrently that subjective reports of decisional confidence were more efficient in predicting 
trial accuracy than the reports of visual experience. While there were no three-way 
interactions of ratings, scale, and stimulus quality in the masked orientation task and in the 
motion task, we observed significant interactions between rating, stimulus quality and scale in 
the masked shape task. To resolve these three-way interactions, we tested the interaction 
between scale and rating with separate logistic regression models for each level of stimulus 
quality of the masked shape task, observing significant interactions at the SOAs of 50, 66, and 
116.7 ms, χ²(2) = 22.7, pcor < .001, χ²(2) = 13.1, pcor < .05, and χ²(2) = 12.1, pcor < .05, 
respectively. 
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Table 5-1 
Results of a logistic mixed model regression for accuracy across experiments 
Experiment Effect B 
95% CI 
χ² p 
Lower Upper 
Masked 
orientation 
task 
First report 0.71 0.52 0.90 60.1 <.001 
Second report 0.37 0.17 0.57 20.4 <.001 
SOA 0.71 0.54 0.89 60.3 <.001 
Scale -0.42 -0.70 -0.14 7.1 <.01 
First report * second report 0.23 0.04 0.41 2.1 n.s. 
First report * SOA 0.38 0.17 0.58 3.6 n.s. 
First report * scale
13
 0.21 -0.20 0.62 3.4 n.s. 
Second report * SOA 0.35 0.15 0.55 6.7 <.01 
Second report * scale -0.93 -1.35 -0.51 13.3 <.001 
SOA * scale -0.19 -0.53 0.15 0.1 n.s. 
First report * second report * 
SOA 
0.33 0.16 0.51 13.3 <.001 
First report * second report * 
scale 
-0.41 -0.77 -0.04 3.9 <.05 
First report * SOA * scale 0.06 -0.35 0.47 0.8 n.s. 
Second report * SOA * scale -0.42 -0.83 -0.01 2.9 n.s. 
Masked shape 
task 
First report 0.71 0.50 0.92 44.3 <.001 
Second report 0.36 0.15 0.57 31.4 <.001 
SOA 0.85 0.72 0.98 310.5 <.001 
Scale 0.54 0.16 0.93 2.4 n.s. 
First report * second report 0.22 0.06 0.37 3.5 n.s. 
First report * SOA 0.42 0.21 0.63 5.9 < .05 
First report * scale 1.05 0.63 1.46 12.8 <.001 
Second report * SOA 0.26 0.07 0.45 23.0 <.001 
Second report * scale -0.72 -1.14 -0.31 6.4 < .05 
First report * second report * 
SOA 
0.21 0.06 0.36 8.7 <.01 
First report * second report * 
scale 
0.14 -0.18 0.45 0.6 n.s. 
First report * SOA * scale 1.02 0.60 1.44 27.5 <.001 
Second report * SOA * scale -0.63 -1.00 -0.25 10.8 <.001 
                                                 
13
 Note that the effect of scale codes if the report of confidence was collected before the report 
of experience or vice versa. Consequently, a positive coefficient of the first report * scale 
interaction effect indicates that confidence predicted accuracy more efficiently than 
experience, whereas a positive coefficient of the second report * scale indicates just the 
reverse pattern.  
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Motion 
discrimination 
task  
First report 0.44 0.25 0.63 20.3 <.001 
Second report 0.38 0.21 0.56 28.3 <.001 
Coherence 1.15 1.02 1.27 518.4 <.001 
Scale -0.08 -0.49 0.34 1.0 n.s. 
First report * second report 0.03 -0.09 0.15 0.0 n.s. 
First report * coherence 0.17 -0.01 0.35 3.0 n.s. 
First report * scale 0.29 -0.08 0.66 7.2 <.01 
Second report * coherence 0.38 0.21 0.56 23.9 <.001 
Second report * scale -0.59 -0.95 -0.24 12.6 <.001 
First report * second report * 
coherence 
0.04 -0.08 0.15 0.3 n.s. 
First report * second report * 
scale 
0.03 -0.21 0.27 0.1 n.s. 
First report * coherence * scale -0.15 -0.50 0.20 1.0 n.s. 
Second report * coherence * 
scale 
-0.19 -0.53 0.16 1.1 n.s. 
 
 
Figure 5-5. Relationship between subjective report and the odds of being correct, separately 
for scale, experiment, and time of the report. Upper row: First subjective report within one 
trial, Lower row: Second subjective report within one trial. Lines indicate the prediction from 
logistic regression models including quadratic effects. 
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The relationships between subjective report and transformed accuracy are depicted 
separately for scale, experiment, and time of the report in Fig. 5-5. For the masked orientation 
task, we detected no substantial quadratic trend at the first report, χ²(1) = 0.6, n.s., but we did 
at the second, χ²(1) = 22.5, p < .001. For the masked shape task, there was a significant 
quadratic trend at the first report, χ²(1) = 18.0, p < .001, but not at the second, χ²(1) = 1.1, n.s. 
For the motion discrimination task, we again detected no significant quadratic trend at the 
first report, χ²(1) = 0.1, n.s., while there was one at the second report, χ²(1) = 18.2, p < .001.  
Significant interactions between quadratic trends and scale were only detected for the 
masked shape task, first report: χ²(1) = 11.1, p < .001, second report: χ²(1) = 6.2, p < .05. 
Separate models for only experience and confidence revealed a significant quadratic trend for 
confidence only, χ²(1) = 45.5, p < .001, but not for experience, χ²(1) = 2.0, n.s. 
5.3.2.2. Meta-da 
 
Figure 5-6. Meta-da as a function of stimulus quality, separately for each task in separate 
panels and scales as separate lines. 
 
As can be seen from Fig. 5-6, meta-da scores estimated from confidence ratings were 
greater than meta-da scores for experience in all three experiments. In the masked orientation 
experiment and the motion experiment, this effect emerged already at very low stimulus 
quality (i.e., short SOAs), where meta-da of experience was still at chance level; in the 
masked shape task, by contrast, the effect became evident only at longer SOAs.  
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The results of the mixed linear regression models can be seen in Table 5-2. We found 
substantial negative effects of scale in all three experiments, indicating that meta-da scores 
computed from visual experience were indeed always smaller than meta-da scores of 
decisional confidence. Substantial effects of time or an interaction between time and any of 
the other variables were not detected. However, we observed significant interactions between 
stimulus quality and scale in the masked orientation and the masked shape experiment, but 
not in the motion experiment.  
Table 5-2 
Results of a linear mixed regression model for meta-da across experiments 
Experiment Effect B 
95% CI 
|t| df p 
Lower Upper 
Masked 
orientation 
task 
Scale -0.62 -0.75 -0.49 9.3 772.9 <.001 
SOA 0.82 0.75 0.88 24.7 772.9 <.001 
Time 0.01 -0.12 0.14 0.2 772.9 n.s. 
Scale * SOA -0.30 -0.43 -0.17 4.5 772.9 <.001 
Scale * Time 0.24 -0.02 0.50 1.8 772.9 n.s. 
SOA * Time -0.10 -0.23 0.03 1.6 772.9 n.s. 
Scale * SOA * Time 0.20 -0.06 0.46 1.5 772.9 n.s. 
Masked shape 
task 
Scale -0.42 -0.60 -0.23 4.4 234.0 <.001 
SOA 0.99 0.90 1.08 20.7 234.0 <.001 
Time 0.00 -0.19 0.19 0.0 234.0 n.s. 
Scale * SOA -0.47 -0.66 -0.28 4.9 234.0 <.001 
Scale * Time 0.16 -0.77 1.10 0.3 14.0 n.s. 
SOA * Time -0.01 -0.20 0.18 0.1 234.0 n.s. 
Scale * SOA * Time -0.26 -0.63 0.12 1.4 234.0 n.s. 
Motion 
discrimination 
task 
Scale -0.28 -0.46 -0.11 3.1 267.0 <.01 
Coherence 1.13 1.04 1.21 25.1 267.0 <.001 
Time -0.03 -0.20 0.15 0.3 267.0 n.s. 
Scale * Coherence -0.10 -0.27 0.08 1.1 267.0 n.s. 
Scale * Time 0.21 -0.46 0.86 0.6 19.0 n.s. 
Coherence * Time -0.05 -0.23 0.12 0.6 267.0 n.s. 
Scale * Coherence * 
Time 
0.16 -0.20 0.51 0.9 267.0 n.s. 
 
Post-hoc tests comparing meta-da between experience and confidence separately at 
each SOA revealed that for the orientation task, meta-da of confidence was greater than that of 
experience for each SOA longer than 50 ms, all t(19)’s > 2.2, all pcor‘s < .05. For the masked 
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shape experiments, we found meta-da of confidence to be above meta-da of experience at the 
SOA of 50 ms, t(15) = 3.7, pcor < .05, as well as the SOA of 116.7 ms, t(15) = 5.0, pcor < .01.  
5.3.2.3. Correlation between reports and stimulus quality 
The mean gamma correlation coefficient between reports and stimulation strength 
were .68 for experience and .69 for confidence in the masked orientation task, both .62 in the 
masked form task, and .59 and .60, respectively, in the motion task. None of these differences 
were significant, all t’s > .7, n. s. 
5.4. Discussion 
The analysis presented here was conducted to examine two issues:  
(i) Does the effect of visual experience versus decisional confidence (as contents of 
subjective reports) on type 2 sensitivity depend on the method used to quantify type 2 
sensitivity?  
(ii) Is logistic regression biased owing to a non-linear relationship between transformed 
accuracy and subjective reports? 
Concerning the effect of content, meta-da indicated that type 2 sensitivity of decisional 
confidence was greater than of visual experience in all three tasks. Consistent with the 
hypothesis that the effect of experience versus confidence is largely independent of the 
method to quantify type 2 sensitivity, we detected the same effect in five out of six tests using 
logistic regression analysis. The correlation between subjective reports of visual experience 
and quality of stimulation was the same as the correlation between confidence and the quality 
of stimulation, indicating that none of the two scales was compromised by a large amount of 
noise.  
Concerning the relationship between transformed accuracy and subjective reports, 
logistic regression revealed at least one quadratic trend out of the two subjective reports in 
each experiment, indicating that the interpretation of logistic regression slopes as type 2 
sensitivity is often ambiguous and may be confounded by response criteria settings. While the 
quadratic trend in the masked shape task was primarily driven by decisional confidence, we 
observed no differences between experience and confidence in terms of non-linear trends in 
the other two experiments.  
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5.4.1. Why confidence outperforms experience in predicting accuracy 
There are three potential explanations why subjective reports of confidence are 
different from subjective reports of visual experience:  
(i) independent conscious access of different stimulus features14 
(ii) distinct metacognitive mechanisms (Overgaard & Sandberg, 2012),  
(iii) placement of different criteria (Wierzchoń et al., 2012, 2014)  
The first account is closely linked to the theoretical proposal that a stimulus is 
represented by a hierarchy of features, and conscious access to the different features of a 
stimulus can vary independently (Kouider et al., 2010). According to this theory, partial 
awareness is a state where some features are consciously accessible while other features 
cannot be accessed. Decisional confidence may depend to a large degree on conscious access 
of the relevant feature to the discrimination decision (Dienes, 2008). If additional task-
irrelevant features of the stimulus contribute to the quality of visual experience to a greater 
extent than they do to confidence judgments, this would explain why confidence judgments 
are more strongly associated with task accuracy. At the same time, conscious access of both 
task-relevant and task-irrelevant features varies as a function of physical stimulus quality; 
consequently, a state of partial awareness would also explain why the correlations of 
confidence and visual experience with task difficulty are the same. Finally, if decisional 
confidence requires conscious access to only that feature which is task-relevant, but visual 
experience requires conscious access to other features in addition to the task-relevant one, the 
condition for reporting confidence may be met more frequently than the condition for 
reporting a visual experience, thus explaining why reports of visual experience are associated 
with more restrictive criteria (Carota & Calabrese, 2013; Sahraie et al., 1998; Schlagbauer et 
al., 2012; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013).  
The second explanation for varying type 2 sensitivity between different scales posits 
different metacognitive mechanisms underlying the making of subjective reports: Overgaard 
and Sandberg (2012) suggested that subjective reports of experience rely on introspection, an 
online inspection of ongoing mental states, whereas confidence judgments are mediated by 
                                                 
14
 This argument can not only be framed in terms of conscious access, but also in terms of higher order thought 
theory, see section 6.1.3. 
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additional more complex metacognitive processes requiring insight into the decision 
processes during the objective task. Based on the second assumption that insight into one’s 
decision making is more error-prone than pure introspection, Overgaard and Sandberg (2012) 
predicted that type 2 sensitivity of visual experience is greater than that of decisional 
confidence. However, the pattern we observed was just reversed, indicating that reporting 
one’s confidence is not more difficult than reporting one’s visual experience. If reporting 
one’s visual experience was then a more difficult task than reporting one’s confidence, it 
would be expected that experience is compromised by a higher level of unsystematic noise in 
general. However, unsystematic noise would also decrease the correlation with the quality of 
stimulation, but we observed no indication of such an effect. Overall, we did not find any 
evidence that either subjective reports of experience or confidence are more difficult to make. 
Nevertheless, our data do not rule out the possibility that subjective reports of experience and 
confidence are mediated by independent but similarly effective metacognitive processes.  
According to the third account for differences between scales, each scale is composed 
of different criteria along the awareness spectrum; thus, each step of each scale estimates a 
slightly different level of awareness (Wierzchoń et al., 2012, 2014). If the differences between 
scales were only due to type 2 bias, rather than type 2 sensitivity, there should be no effect of 
different scales if subjective criteria are controlled for. However, we find meta-da of 
confidence to be greater than meta-da of experience across all three experiments, indicating 
that the difference between experience and confidence is not due to type 2 bias alone.  
5.4.2. What factors contribute to the variability across studies? 
The starting point for our reanalysis was the observation that the patterns of results in 
previous studies were closely associated with the method employed to quantify type 2 
sensitivity: While type 2 sensitivities of decisional confidence were greater than those of 
visual experience in several studies (Sahraie et al., 1998; Szczepanowski et al., 2013; 
Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013), two other studies both using logistic regression analysis found 
the opposite pattern (Sandberg et al., 2010; Wierzchoń et al., 2014). Our comparison between 
logistic regression and meta-da as measures of type 2 sensitivity revealed that the overall 
pattern of type 2 sensitivity of confidence compared to experience was largely independent of 
the method used to assess type 2 sensitivity. Consequently, the question what factors 
determine whether subjective reports of experience or confidence are associated with greater 
type 2 sensitivity is still open: The first and most obvious possibility is that the variability 
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across studies is due to the different stimuli. While those studies that reported greater type 2 
of confidence employed tasks with fairly simple stimulus features such as motion and 
orientation, studies reporting the reversed pattern used either an object identification task or a 
masked face discrimination task. It is possible that confidence is associated with greater type 
2 sensitivity than visual experience for very basic stimulus features only, while the effect is 
reversed with more complex stimuli. A second possibility relates to the different techniques of 
how subjective reports were recorded: While Sandberg et al. (2010) and Wierzchoń et al. 
(2014) provided participants with four labelled scale steps, participants in our own 
experiments operated a joystick to select a position on a VAS. It is possible that recording 
techniques interfere with the content of the subjective scales, for example, if participants are 
unable to report their visual experience in the same fine-grained manner as their decisional 
confidence. A previous study did not detect any effect of recoding technique on type 2 
sensitivity of motion experience (Chapter 4, Rausch & Zehetleitner, 2014), but to our 
knowledge, no study so far has addressed this issue with respect to decisional confidence. A 
third possibility lies in the precise content of the scale assessing visual experience: While the 
scale in our study measured visual experience of the task-relevant feature, previous studies 
frequently used the perceptual awareness scale, which  measures visual experiences of the 
task-relevant feature in conjunction with “brief glimpses”, defined as “experiences without 
any content that cannot be defined any further” (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). Thus, the 
surplus of type 2 sensitivity of visual experience could be driven entirely by experiences 
without content (see Chapter 2 and 4 for more detailed discussions; Rausch & Zehetleitner, 
2014; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013). Finally, although logistic regression and meta-da 
converged in our data, it is still possible that these methods would create conflicting results if 
applied to other data sets. Overall, further experiments would appear necessary to explore 
which of these options can explain the variability of previous studies concerning type 2 
sensitivity of experience and confidence. 
5.4.3. How should we quantify type 2 sensitivity? 
Comparisons between previous studies on type 2 sensitivity are limited due to the fact 
that there are several competing measures such as logistic regression, type 2 ROC analysis 
(Fleming et al., 2010), and meta-da (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Our reanalysis based on 
logistic regression and meta-da revealed a consistent effect of confidence versus experience as 
content of subjective reports across all three tasks, although a previous analysis based on type 
2 ROC curves failed to detect an effect in the masked shape task (Zehetleitner & Rausch, 
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2013). Since the results of the present reanalysis are consistent across all three tasks and both 
methods, the most likely reason why we failed to find an effect in the previous 2 ROC 
analysis is lack of statistical power. Meta-da may be more powerful than type 2 ROC analysis 
due to the control of discrimination response biases or because it is possible to apply 
adjustments for extreme proportions (Hautus, 1995). Logistic regression analysis may benefit 
from the analysis being conducted on a single trial basis.  
However, we observed two downsides to the use of logistic regression, owing to the 
fact that the relationship between subjective reports and the transformed accuracy was not 
linear, but often approached a lower bound instead. First, the slope of the regression curve 
changed over the range of the scale, tending towards zero at lower parts of the scale and 
increasing only at higher parts of the scale. As a consequence, there is no single logistic 
regression slope in each condition, and thus the interpretation of logistic regression slopes in 
terms of type 2 sensitivity is ambiguous. Second, logistic regression may have a bias towards 
greater slopes with more conservative reports because the more liberal a scale is, the larger 
will be the part of the scale where the transformed accuracy is within the asymptotic range of 
performance; the more conservative a scale is, the larger will be the part of the scale where 
transformed accuracy increases. Indeed, in the masked shape task, we observed that the non-
linear trend was confined to decisional confidence, the more liberal scale, and was absent in 
subjective reports of visual experience, which are known to be more conservative.  
As control of subjective criteria is a critical feature of measures of type 2 sensitivity 
(Barrett et al., 2013), and given that meta-da also controls discrimination bias and may 
provide increased statistical power, we recommend meta-da for all future studies where it can 
be applied.  
5.5. Conclusion 
We report that logistic regression and meta-da consistently indicated that subjective 
reports of confidence are more efficient in predicting trial accuracy than subjective reports of 
visual experience. Our data is consistent with the interpretation that participants consider 
stimulus features irrelevant to the current discrimination decision in addition to task-relevant 
ones for making subjective reports about their visual experience. We suggest that the choice 
of a scale to measure visual awareness should be based on theoretical considerations of 
exactly what are the conscious contents relevant for a particular research question. As we 
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observed multiple non-linear relationships between subjective reports and the logit transform 
of accuracy, logistic regression is not a consistent and possibly biased measure of type 2 
sensitivity, which is why we recommend meta-da for future studies.  
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5.7. Appendix: Code to compute meta-da in R 
### Code to compute meta-d' in R #### 
################################ 
 
# computeMetaD computes meta-d' based method described by Maniscalco, B., & Lau, H. (2012).  
# A signal detection theoretic approach for estimating metacognitive sensitivity from confidence 
ratings.  
# Consciousness and Cognition, 21, 420-430. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.09.021 
  
# Arguments: 
#   ratings: a factor with levels corresponding to the rating categories,  
#            ordered from low to high 
#   stimulus: a factor, levels corresponding to stimulus identities 
#   correct: a vector with 1 indicating correct responses and 0 incorrect responses 
#   distr: What distributions of the evidence should be assumed. Default "norm",  
#          uses the normal distribution, 
#          "logis" assumes the logistic distribution, and "gumbel" the distribution of smallest extremes  
#   contraintsMetaD: a two-element vector with minimal and maximal value allowed for meta-d' 
#   varEqual: a logical value indicating if equal variances should be assumed 
#   addConstant:  a logical value indicating if a constant of .5 devided by the number of rating 
#                 categories should be added to each cell 
#   nInnerIterations, nOuterIterations: number of inner and outer iterations  
#                                       passed to contrOptim 
# 
# Returns: a list with the elements 
#   metaDPrime: estimated sensitivity from rating data 
#   dPrime: estimated sensitivity from objective discrimination responses 
#   logLikelihood: log of the likelihood of the best fit 
 
computeMetaD <- function(ratings, stimulus, correct,  
                         distr = "norm",  
                         constrainMetaD = c(-20,20), 
                         varEqual = FALSE, addConstant = TRUE, 
                         nInnerIterations = 1000, nOuterIterations = 1000){ 
   
  if(!is.factor(ratings)) stop ("ratings should be a factor!") 
  if(!is.factor(stimulus )|| length(levels(stimulus)) != 2) { 
    stop("stimulus should be a factor with 2 levels") 
  } 
  if(!all(correct %in% c(0,1))) stop("correct should be 1 or 0") 
   
  pfun <- switch(distr, norm = pnorm, logis = plogis,  
                 gumbel = function(x, location, scale) exp(-exp((location-x)/scale))) 
  qfun <- switch(distr, norm = qnorm, logis = qlogis,  
                 gumbel = function(x) -log(-log(x)))  
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nRatings <-  length(levels(ratings)) 
  nCriteria <- nRatings * 2 - 1 
  abs_corrects <-  table(ratings[correct == 1], stimulus[correct == 1])  
  abs_errors   <-  table(ratings[correct == 0], stimulus[correct == 0]) 
 
  if (addConstant){ 
    abs_corrects <- abs_corrects + .5/nRatings 
    abs_errors   <- abs_errors + .5/nRatings 
  }   
 
  nC_rS1 <- rev(as.vector(abs_corrects[, 1])) 
  nI_rS1 <- rev(as.vector(abs_errors[, 2])) 
  nC_rS2 <- as.vector(abs_corrects[, 2]) 
  nI_rS2 <- as.vector(abs_errors[, 1]) 
   
  abs_S1 <- c(rev(abs_errors[,2]),abs_corrects[,2]) 
  ratingHrs <- qfun(1 - cumsum(abs_S1)/sum(abs_S1)) 
  abs_S2 <-  c(rev(abs_corrects[,1]), abs_errors[,1] ) 
  ratingFrs <-  qfun(1 - cumsum(abs_S2)/sum(abs_S2)) 
  finits <- is.finite(ratingHrs) & is.finite(ratingFrs) 
  ratingHrs <- as.vector(ratingHrs[finits]) 
  ratingFrs <- as.vector(ratingFrs[finits]) 
 
  if (varEqual) { s <- 1 
  } else s <- as.vector(lm(ratingHrs ~ ratingFrs)$coefficients[2]) 
 
  meta_d1 <- (1/s) * ratingHrs[nRatings] - ratingFrs[nRatings] 
  cs_1 <- (-1/(1+s)) * (ratingHrs + ratingFrs) 
  initials <- c(meta_d1, cs_1) 
 
  A <- matrix(0, nrow=nCriteria+1, ncol = nCriteria+1) 
  A[1, 1] <- 1 
  A[2, 1] <- -1 
  diag(A[3:(nCriteria+1),2:nCriteria]) <- -1 
  diag(A[3:(nCriteria+1),3:(nCriteria+1)]) <- 1 
  b <- c(min(constrainMetaD),-1* max( constrainMetaD),rep(0, nCriteria-1)) 
 
  fit <- constrOptim(theta = initials, f = negLogLik, grad = NULL, ui = A, ci = b, 
                     outer.iterations = nOuterIterations,  
                     control = list(maxit = nInnerIterations), 
                     nC_rS1 = nC_rS1, nI_rS1 = nI_rS1, nC_rS2 = nC_rS2, nI_rS2 = nI_rS2, 
                     nRatings = nRatings, s = s, pfun = pfun) 
                      
  result <- list(dPrime = meta_d1 * s * sqrt(2/(1 + s^2)),  
                 metaDPrime = fit$par[1] * s * sqrt(2/(1 + s^2)), 
                 logLikelihood = -fit$value)  
 
  return(result) 
} 
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negLogLik <- function(parameters, nC_rS1, nI_rS1, nC_rS2, nI_rS2, nRatings, s, pfun) { 
  t1c <- parameters[nRatings+1] 
  S1mu <- -parameters[1]/2 
  S1sd <- 1 
  S2mu <- parameters[1]/2 
  S2sd <- 1/s 
  t2c1x <-  c(-Inf, parameters[2:length(parameters)],Inf) 
  prC_rS1 <- (pfun(t2c1x[2:(nRatings+1)],S1mu,S1sd) -  
              pfun(t2c1x[1:nRatings],S1mu,S1sd)) / pfun(t1c,S1mu,S1sd) 
  prI_rS1 <- (pfun(t2c1x[2:(nRatings+1)],S2mu,S2sd) -  
              pfun(t2c1x[1:nRatings],S2mu,S2sd)) / pfun(t1c,S2mu,S2sd) 
  prC_rS2 <- ((1- pfun(t2c1x[(nRatings+1):(nRatings*2)],S2mu,S2sd)) -  
             (1- pfun(t2c1x[(nRatings+2):(nRatings*2+1)],S2mu,S2sd))) / 
             (1 - pfun(t1c,S2mu,S2sd)) 
  prI_rS2 <- ((1- pfun(t2c1x[(nRatings+1):(nRatings*2)],S1mu,S1sd)) -  
             (1- pfun(t2c1x[(nRatings+2):(nRatings*2+1)],S1mu,S1sd))) / 
             (1 - pfun(t1c,S1mu,S1sd)) 
   
  logL <-  -sum(nC_rS1*log(prC_rS1),nI_rS1*log(prI_rS1),nC_rS2*log(prC_rS2),nI_rS2*log(prI_rS2)) 
 
  return(logL) 
} 
 
 
### Examples 
 
stimulus <- factor(rep(c("A", "B"), 10)) 
ratings <- factor(c(rep(1:3,4), rep(3,times=8))) 
correct <- c(rep(0,4), rep(1,6), rep(0,2), rep(1,8)) 
 
computeMetaD(stimulus = stimulus, ratings = ratings, correct = correct) 
computeMetaD(stimulus = stimulus, ratings = ratings, correct = correct, distr = "logis") 
computeMetaD(stimulus = stimulus, ratings = ratings, correct = correct, distr = "gumbel") 
 
 
computeMetaD(stimulus = stimulus, ratings = ratings, correct = correct,  
             constrainMetaD = c(0,5)) 
computeMetaD(stimulus = stimulus, ratings = ratings, correct = correct,  
             varEqual = TRUE) 
computeMetaD(stimulus = stimulus, ratings = ratings, correct = correct,  
             addConstant = FALSE)  
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6. FINAL DISCUSSION 
The present series of experiments addressed the research question how subjective 
measures of conscious awareness need to be designed to provide valid and reliable data for 
consciousness research. 
Regarding the content of subjective measures, a series of psychophysical experiments 
suggested that subjective measures about the accuracy of a discrimination response are 
different from measures about visual experience: First, measures related to the discrimination 
response were found to impose more liberal criteria. Second, they were associated with 
greater type 2 sensitivity. Third, different subjective measures about the accuracy of a 
discrimination response correlated more strongly with each other than each of them correlated 
with a subjective measure of visual experience (Chapter 2 and 5; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 
2013; Rausch, Müller, & Zehetleitner, 2015). Finally, the earliest sensory ERP correlates of 
verbal reports were predictive of the fact whether participants reported that they made a 
discrimination response based on knowledge rather than guessing, but were not yet predictive 
whether participants reported a clear experience over and above that knowledge. The 
strongest correlate of visual experience closely preceded participants’ response to the 
discrimination task (Chapter 3).  
With respect to granularity, subjective measures of the experience of motion contained 
more information when participants selected a position on a visual analogue scale compared 
to a scale with four discrete labelled categories. The greater amount of information rendered 
subjective measures more predictive of task accuracy and improved coefficients of internal 
consistency. In addition, there was no evidence that participants’ type 2 sensitivity was 
impaired by the greater number of response options offered by a visual analogue scale 
(Chapter 4, Rausch & Zehetleitner, 2014)  
Finally, regarding the statistical procedure to quantify the relation between subjective 
measures and task accuracy, logistic regression was found to be a suboptimal method due to 
non-linear relationships between subjective reports and the transformed task accuracy. 
However, meta-da, a measure derived from signal detection theory, provided the most 
consistent results across studies (Chapter 5, Rausch, Müller, & Zehetleitner, 2015).  
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6.1. The content of subjective measures 
It is widely assumed in the field of consciousness research subjective reports of visual 
experience and decisional confidence are equally valid, and thus typically used and/or 
interpreted as interchangeable (Ko & Lau, 2012; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Seth et al., 2008). 
The present data challenges this wide-spread assumption: Participants first report confidence 
about being correct in a discrimination task; only at greater strength of stimulation, they 
would report to experience the stimulus visually.  
Is a dissociation between stimulus-related and response-related subjective measures 
consistent with the existing theories of consciousness? Although the advocates of phenomenal 
consciousness, global workspace theory, and higher-order theories have not discussed 
potential disagreements between subjective measures, it should be considered if such a 
distinction can be easily integrated in each of these frameworks, and if not, which 
assumptions need to be adjusted.  
6.1.1. Theoretical implications for phenomenal consciousness 
In the framework of phenomenal consciousness, the distinction between stimulus-
related and response-related measures may be explained as participants experiencing an 
intuition of being correct in the task without experiencing the stimulus visually. Phenomenal 
consciousness involves the experiential properties of sensations, feelings, perceptions, 
thoughts, wants, and emotions (Block, 2002). These experiences can be assorted into two 
categories (Bischof, 1965): One set of phenomenology appears to arise from the observer’s 
own mind, e.g. thoughts and emotions, and may be called ostensibly mental experiences. 
Ostensibly physical experiences in contrast appear to stem from the physical world, for 
instance from an external stimulus, or the observer’s body. One possibility is that the 
phenomenology of participants that report confidence in the task but no experience of the 
stimulus is the ostensibly mental feeling-of-knowing. Participants have the experience that 
they know what the stimulus feature is, but the stimulus does not create visual 
phenomenology. Feeling-of-knowing has been originally described in the context of meta-
memory (Koriat, 2007; Nelson & Narens, 1990), but visual perception may be able to 
generate feelings-of-knowing as well (Mangan, 2001). A second possibility is that the 
experience is ostensibly physical. So-called blindsight patients sometimes report residual 
phenomenology characterized by the awareness of the event, but without the phenomenology 
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of normal seeing (Sahraie et al., 2002; Zeki & Ffytche, 1998). Normal observers may have a 
similar experience if the stimuli are just at the threshold of conscious perception (Ramsøy & 
Overgaard, 2004).  
While on a principal level, the concept of phenomenal consciousness has sufficient 
degrees of freedom to describe the distinction between stimulus-related and response-related 
subjective measures, there is one specific hypothesis about phenomenal consciousness that 
appears at first glance to be at odds with the current data. According to the overflow 
hypothesis, the contents of short-term sensory buffers are associated with phenomenal 
experience (Block, 2011). This short-term sensory buffer stores all visual objects for a short 
period of time, until it is overridden by the next stimulation. However, participants are only 
able to make correct discrimination judgments about 4 ± 1 objects, as cognitive access to the 
contents of sensory buffers is limited by the capacity of working memory (Sligte, Scholte, & 
Lamme, 2008; Vandenbroucke et al., 2011). As the capacity of the conscious sensory buffer is 
much larger than the capacity of working memory, the overflow hypothesis explains why 
participants are only able to make correct task responses about a small number of display 
items, although they report an experience of a rich phenomenal world (Block, 2011). 
The standard and widely debated case is that phenomenal consciousness exceeds 
cognitive access. However, in present data, the relation between visual consciousness and 
access appears to be the other way round. Participants report to be confident more often than 
they report visual experience. Conscious access is a requirement for all subjective measures, 
as they require that neural systems engaged in decision making and language need to receive 
inputs from perceptual processes. However, although participants had conscious access when 
they reported they felt confident about task response, they reported no conscious visual 
experience. A similar pattern was reported by a patient suffering from achromatopsia (Carota 
& Calabrese, 2013): After bilateral temporal-occipital lesions, that patient reports to be 
colour-blind although he performs accurately in a colour recognition task. A potential 
explanation why the relation between phenomenal consciousness and conscious access varies 
is the number of items in the display: Visual short-term memory always used arrays of 
multiple stimuli. In contrast, the present studies always presented one stimulus at the screen at 
fixation. Consequently, phenomenal conscious may overflow cognitive access only for stimuli 
outside of the focus of attention, while at the focus of attention, conscious access occurs more 
frequently than phenomenal experience.  
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6.1.2. Theoretical implications for global workspace theory 
Can the global workspace theory account for the distinction between stimulus and 
response-related subjective measures? An important flavour of global workspace theory 
conceives consciousness as an all-or-nothing phenomenon (Dehaene et al., 2003): Conscious 
access depends on a cerebral “ignition” where neural activity spreads from sensory cortical 
areas to frontal and parietal areas, making perceptual contents available to multiple cognitive 
functions. If global ignition does not occur, perceptual contents are not available for report 
(Dehaene et al., 2006). As this most radical form of global workspace theory permits only two 
states - either the observer is fully conscious of the stimulus or the observer is unconscious - 
global workspace theory predicts that all measures depending on behaviour that requires 
global access are generally in good agreement (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). A dichotomous 
model of conscious awareness appears unable to explain the intermediate state where 
participants report some confidence in being correct in the discrimination task about the 
stimulus, but they report no experience of the stimulus (Carota & Calabrese, 2013; Charles et 
al., 2013; Sahraie et al., 1998; Schlagbauer et al., 2012; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013).  
However, more complex flavours of global workspace theory are better able to 
accommodate the experience/confidence distinction. According to the partial awareness 
hypothesis (Kouider et al., 2010), a stimulus is represented by a hierarchy of features, with 
low-level features at the bottom and increasingly complex features at the top. Separate 
features can be consciously accessed independently from the other features. Partial awareness 
is a state where some of the features of a stimulus are consciously accessible but others 
features are missing. If participants are in a state of partial awareness, conscious access to the 
task-relevant stimulus feature may be sufficient for reporting confidence about the 
discrimination response (Dienes, 2004, 2008). In contrast, a report about visual experience 
may require conscious access to a greater number of stimulus features. After all, a striking 
feature of consciousness is the so-called unity of experiences. Humans do not experience 
colour, shape, location, etc. of a stimulus as separate. Instead, the conscious experience of the 
separate features of a stimulus seems to be integrated to one visual object (Bayne & 
Chalmers, 2003). The partial awareness hypothesis elegantly explains further details of the 
present results: If task-irrelevant stimulus features contribute exclusively or to a greater 
degree to subjective measures about the stimulus, they would not as efficient in predicting 
trial accuracy as subjective measures about task accuracy. However, as task-relevant and task-
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irrelevant features depend on stimulus quality, the correlation between stimulus quality and 
subjective measures of both contents would be the same. Finally, involvement of different 
sets of features is consistent with different neural correlates during sensory processing.  
A second possibility to incorporate the dissociation between stimulus and response-
related subjective measures in the global workspace framework is in terms of unconscious 
evidence accumulation. According to this model, subliminal stimuli possess sufficient energy 
to evoke a feed-forward wave of activation in specialized processors, but insufficient energy 
to trigger global neural activity necessary for conscious access (Dehaene et al., 2006; 
Dehaene, 2010). This unconscious feedforward sweep may even reach higher areas, thereby 
leading to above chance performance as well as error detection in the absence of 
consciousness (Charles et al., 2014, 2013). If response-related subjective measures are in parts 
generated by unconscious evidence accumulation, it may account for dissociations between 
subjective measures as well. However, two aspects of the data fit better to the partial 
awareness hypothesis: First, the number of different judgments participants performed in 
absence of reported visual experience makes it plausible that certain stimulus characteristics 
were globally available and consciously accessed. Participants were able to discriminate the 
stimulus above chance, to estimate their confidence in having made a correct discrimination 
response, to wager imaginary money on the correctness of the discrimination response, and to 
attribute the reason for their choice on guessing or on knowledge. Moreover, subjective 
measures always imply some involvement of language areas, since participants need to align 
the labels of the scale steps with their degree of confidence in being correct. This variety of 
different judgments in absence of reported visual experience implies that the neural activation 
is not encapsulated in a single specialized processing module. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled 
out that the unconscious evidence is encapsulated in multiple specialized modules without 
triggering a global workspace. However, this model implies that a great number of judgments 
can be performed without involvement of the global workspace, raising the question if there 
are any judgments at all for which the global workspace is necessary. Second, the timing of 
the ERP correlates of subjective and response-related subjective measures are not consistent 
with the hypothesis that confidence without reported experience is driven by feedforward 
processing with lower energy: Lower stimulus energy typically delays the most prominent 
ERP correlate, i.e. the mid-range negativity (Railo et al., 2011). However, the experiment of 
Chapter 3 suggested that the correlates specific to decisional confidence preceded the 
correlates of visual experience in the present study. Moreover, an ERP index of global 
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availability, the late positivity, was associated with both visual experience and confidence 
(although the correlation of visual experience and the late positivity was admittedly 
particularly strong).  
6.1.3. Theoretical implications for higher-order theories of consciousness 
In the framework of higher-order theories of consciousness (Carruthers, 2011; Lau & 
Rosenthal, 2011; Timmermans, Schilbach, Pasquali, & Cleeremans, 2012), stimulus-related 
subjective measures indicate whether participants possess a higher order mental state about 
the stimulus, while response-related subjective measures demonstrate higher order mental 
states about task accuracy. Consequently, the dissociation between stimulus-related and 
response-related subjective measures indicates that there can be higher-order states about the 
response without higher-order states about perception. Participants know that they respond 
correctly, but they do not know that they have seen the stimulus.  
Are higher-order states about task responses without higher-order states about the 
stimulus consistent with higher order theories of consciousness? At first glance, it may seem 
they are not: Higher order theories strongly emphasize the link between consciousness and 
metacognition (Rosenthal, 2000). Under the assumption that stimulus-related measures do not 
depend on metacognition, confidence in decision making without experience of the stimulus 
undermine the strong link between consciousness and metacognition and thus one of the core 
tenets of higher-order theories (Charles et al., 2014, 2013). However, the assumption that 
stimulus-related measures do not depend on metacognition is controversial. First, it can be 
argued that both stimulus- and response-related measures both require metacognitive 
processes with the only difference that subjective measures about the stimulus require 
metacognition of stimulus perception, not task performance (see 2.2.3; Zehetleitner & 
Rausch, 2013). Consistent with this, stimulus-related measures are associated with neural 
activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) – a brain region closely related to 
metacognition (Fleming & Dolan, 2012; Fleming et al., 2010) – as suggested by functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (Lau & Passingham, 2006) and theta-burst transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010). Second, there is 
evidence that the decision processes that selects the response to the discrimination task is 
involved making a report on a stimulus-related measure, too: Both stimulus-related and 
response-related subjective measures can be modulated by the discrimination decision 
irrespective of the time the judgment is made (Wierzchoń et al., 2014). In addition, the 
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present EEG study suggested that ERP correlates of stimulus-related measures are most 
pronounced around the time the decision is made. Overall, the position that confidence in 
absence of experience indicates consciousness without metacognition seems hard to defend.  
What mechanism can account for the occurrence of higher-order states about the 
accuracy of task responses without higher-order states about perception? The first two 
proposals both assume that response-related subjective measures require additional 
metacognitive processes. First, the metacognitive process specific to response-related 
subjective measures may be an unconscious error monitoring system (Charles et al., 2014, 
2013). This error monitoring process could be informed by perceptual processes too weak to 
trigger higher-order thoughts about the stimulus, thus explaining why participants report 
confidence in being correct but do not report a visual experience of the stimulus. The present 
data is fully compatible with error monitoring exclusively involved in response-related 
measures. However, the timing of the neural correlates of stimulus- and response-related 
measures begin to diverge already during sensory processing, suggesting that at least some 
differential features of stimulus- and response-related measures arise earlier than 
metacognitive processes occur.  
The second proposal suggests that stimulus-related measures are generated by a simple 
metacognitive process of monitoring one’s experience. Response-related subjective measures 
are thought to stem from a more complex metacognitive process that relates the output of the 
first metacognitive process to one’s accuracy in the task (Overgaard & Sandberg, 2012). This 
theory predicts that higher order thoughts about the task response are conditioned on higher-
order thoughts about the stimulus. While this view was developed to explain the data of a 
previous study (Sandberg et al., 2010), the present data is not consistent with this view. In the 
present data, response-related measures are not conditioned on stimulus-related subjective 
measures; in all four experiments, response-related measures were associated with more 
liberal thresholds for report than stimulus-related measures. In addition, the predictive power 
of response-related subjective measures was more efficient in terms of discrimination task 
correctness as well as early ERP correlates, suggesting that response-related measures do not 
require a more complex judgment than stimulus-related measures do.  
The final possibility is a variant of the partial awareness hypothesis framed within a 
higher order framework (see above): Partial awareness is a state where some features of the 
stimulus are globally accessible while others remain inaccessible (Kouider et al., 2010). 
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Global access allows a great variety of cognitive systems to make use of the perceptual 
information (Baars, 2002; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). Metacognition could be one of the 
cognitive functions that depend on global access. Consequently, in a state of partial awareness 
where the task-relevant feature is accessible, participants may be able to form a higher order 
thought about task accuracy and thus report being confident. However, other features of the 
stimulus may be inaccessible and so participants lack a higher order thought about the 
stimulus and report no experience accordingly. Such a higher-order framing of the partial 
awareness hypothesis has the same explanatory power as the original partial awareness 
hypothesis with respect to psychophysical thresholds, type 2 sensitivity, correlations between 
subjective measures and stimulus quality, and timing of ERP correlates (see 6.1.2).  
Overall, higher-order theories can be reconciled with dissociations between stimulus- 
and response-related measures if one accepts (i) that stimulus-related measures are dependent 
on metacognition, and (ii) that higher-order mental states about the task response are not 
conditioned on higher-order mental states about the stimulus.  
6.1.4. Methodological implications 
The methodological implications of the distinction between stimulus-related and 
response-related subjective measures are straight-forward: As stimulus-related and response-
related measures are associated with different behaviours in visual psychophysics and distinct 
ERP correlates, both categories of subjective measures should no longer be treated as 
interchangeable (as previously argued by Charles et al., 2013; Rausch, Müller, & Zehetleitner, 
2015; Sahraie et al., 1998; Schlagbauer et al., 2012; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013). First, as a 
consequence for future studies, researchers need to consider more carefully which conscious 
contents are relevant for their specific research question, and choose the content of their 
subjective measure accordingly. Some studies investigate the visual experience of a specific 
stimulus feature, e.g. studies measuring the neural correlate of experiencing “red” when 
seeing a red apple. In this case, participants should report their conscious experience of this 
particular feature. If participants were asked about their confidence in a task instead, there 
would be a risk that participants had just an intuition of being correct without visual 
experience, resulting in false positives. In contrast, if a study is about all conscious contents 
underlying performance in a specific task, participants should make a report that refers to the 
task response as the use of stimulus-related measures may lead to misses in this case (Dienes, 
2004, 2008). If all conscious contents are relevant to a specific study, researchers may want to 
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consider if it is feasible to use both a stimulus-related and a response-related subjective 
measure. Second, for the interpretation of earlier studies of the NCC, it should be carefully 
considered if their results constitute correlates of stimulus-related measures, of response-
related measures, or shared correlates of the two. Unfortunately, studies on the NCC are often 
not explicit about the precise content of the rating scale used as measure of conscious 
awareness. Based on the results of the present work, subjective measures about accuracy of 
task responses can be expected to favour correlates in earlier time ranges, while subjective 
measures about visual experience may reinforce comparably late neural correlates.  
A series of previous research has compared different subjective measures with the 
objective of empirically identifying the “best” scale to measure conscious experience (Dienes 
& Seth, 2010; Rausch & Zehetleitner, 2014; Sandberg et al., 2010; Szczepanowski et al., 
2013; Wierzchoń et al., 2012, 2014). This research program rests on the assumption that 
subjective measures under comparison are equally valid from a conceptual point of view, but 
some scales correlate more strongly with task performance and thus should be used as 
measure of conscious awareness (see 1.5.1.; Rausch, Müller, & Zehetleitner, 2015; Rausch & 
Zehetleitner, 2014). In the light of the present work, empirical studies identifying the best 
scale should come only after conceptual considerations what the relevant conscious contents 
are for a specific research question. When the conscious contents have been determined based 
on the research question, empirical studies are important to optimize other properties of the 
scale, e.g. the number of response options.  
6.2. The granularity of subjective measures 
6.2.1. Theoretical implications 
The granularity of conscious awareness is of great theoretical interest because some 
theories make specific predictions whether conscious awareness is gradual or dichotomous. 
On the one hand, neural global workspace theory predicts that consciousness is an all-or-
nothing phenomenon because it depends on a global ignition of spreading neural activity over 
widely distributed brain areas (Dehaene et al., 2003, 2006). Consequently, U-shaped 
distributions of subjective reports were considered as evidence for the global workspace 
theory. Such a sharp transition between unconscious and conscious perception was observed 
in word detection tasks during the attentional blink (Nieuwenhuis & de Kleijn, 2011; Sergent 
& Dehaene, 2004) as well as masked number discrimination tasks (Del Cul et al., 2007; 
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Windey, Gevers, & Cleeremans, 2013). On the other hand, according to the radical plasticity 
thesis, a variant of higher-order theories, conscious awareness depends on 
metarepresentations of gradually varying signal strength (Cleeremans, 2008, 2011). 
Consistent with this view, others have reported gradual transition between unconscious and 
conscious perception in masked shape discrimination tasks (Sandberg et al., 2011, 2010), 
masked colour discrimination task (Windey et al., 2013), or even in character identification 
during the attentional blink (Nieuwenhuis & de Kleijn, 2011). The present study adds random 
dot kinematograms to the list of stimuli where subjective reports of visual experience follow a 
more gradual trend (see Chapter 4, Rausch & Zehetleitner, 2014).  
How can global workspace theory account for reports of gradually varying conscious 
experience? An explanation is again provided by the partial awareness hypothesis (Kouider et 
al., 2010): A stimulus is represented by an assemblage of different features, which can be 
consciously accessed independently of each other. As proposed by the global workspace 
model, conscious access to each single feature is all-or-none. The representation of the whole 
stimulus can be more or less complete, thus creating stronger and weaker experiences of the 
stimulus. However, the present data is not consistent with the all-or-none predictions of this 
model. First, the distribution analysis of discrimination responses suggested that among the 
trials where performance was not at chance, the precision of discrimination judgments still 
varied as a function of stimulus quality, suggesting that performance in the discrimination 
task was not binary. Second, subjective reports of motion experience recorded on a visual 
analogue scale were more predictive of the discrimination error than those reports of motion 
experience recorded on a four discrete category scale. If conscious awareness of the task-
relevant stimulus feature varied in a dichotomous manner, measuring conscious experience of 
this feature with increased granularity should not increase the correlation with task 
performance since two distinct states can be represented by both scales without loss of 
information. As the correlation with the discrimination error increases with the granularity of 
the scale, it means that the scale is able to pick up more than two levels of the quality of 
experience of the task-relevant stimulus feature. Overall, the present studies are not consistent 
with all theories that predict that consciousness of all stimulus features is necessarily 
dichotomous.  
As a consequence of the evidence for gradual conscious perception, a modification of 
the partial awareness hypothesis seems appropriate. A recent suggestion was that the 
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gradualness of conscious perception depends on the level of processing of the stimulus 
(Windey et al., 2013; Windey, Vermeiren, Atas, & Cleeremans, 2014). According to standard 
assumptions about the visual system, processing of a stimulus forms a hierarchy, where 
processes engaged with more basis features of the stimulus provide input to processes 
extracting more complex features (Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999). Low-level processing of a 
stimulus, which endows the observer with single features of the stimulus such as colour and 
orientation, may vary gradually. In contrast, high-level processing, required for instance to 
determine the meaning of words, could be competed in an all-or-none fashion (Windey & 
Cleeremans, 2015).  
6.2.2. Methodological implications for research on conscious awareness 
The present analysis suggested that it can be advantageous to record subjective 
measures of visual experience using scales with high resolution. The advantage of subjective 
measures with higher resolution is that fine-grained measurements maximize the amount of 
information obtained by a fixed number of trials. However, increasing the resolution of 
subjective measures will only be feasible if a more fine-grained scale does not distort the 
measurements. The existing literature is critical about the possibility of obtaining high 
resolution measurements by visual analogue scales (VAS). The numerous concerns raised 
against VAS can be summarized into two main issues (Overgaard et al., 2006): 
(i) Participants may be unable to distinguish between the numerous response alternatives 
offered by a VAS.  
(ii) Participants’ reports could be attracted by the scale ends, creating a more sharp 
transition between conscious and unconscious perception than there actually is.  
Concerning the first issue, the present study suggested that using more precision in the 
scale increases the correlation with discrimination task performance and improves internal 
consistency, which is only possible if participants are able to use at least more than four 
positions on the VAS. Concerning the second issue, the distribution of reports collected by the 
VAS was not U-shaped; instead, for the intermediate levels of motion coherence, the 
distribution was centred at the middle parts of the scale. As can be seen in Fig. 4-6, the major 
difference between the distributions of VAS and the discrete scale was that participants 
preferred “weak experience” on the discrete scale and “clearer than the central position” on 
the VAS. Admittedly, there was also a non-significant tendency that participants reported no 
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experience at all slightly more often on a VAS than on a discrete scale. Should this effect be 
corroborated in the future, it could reflect misses of conscious experiences by the VAS, but it 
could also indicate false positives by the discrete scale. Independently of the explanation of 
this effect, it is certainly too small to mask a gradual transition of unconscious to conscious 
perception. Consequently, the benefits of using visual analogue scales outweigh the potential 
risks of using a discrete scale for future studies.  
6.2.3. Methodological implications for research on subjective measures 
Empirical studies investigating the number of categories of subjective measures need a 
method to validate the observed gradualness of the transition from unconscious to conscious 
perception. While many existing studies considered the frequent use of central scale steps as a 
beneficial feature of subjective measures (Overgaard et al., 2006; Sandberg et al., 2010, 2011; 
Wierzchoń et al., 2012, 2014), the present study indicates that central scale steps could also be 
overused: The second scale step of the discrete scale was the dominant response at four out of 
six levels of coherence, including the most difficult stimuli where performance was at chance. 
In this case, reports of weak experiences mainly reflect noise in the system, not signal. A 
more uniform distribution of reported visual experience may well indicate a smooth transition 
from unconscious to conscious perception, but a second possibility is that the gradual 
distribution reflects a greater amount of noise. After all, unsystematic noise always increases 
the variance of the distribution: A subjective measure that differs from another subjective 
measure only in the number of unsystematic noise picked up by the measure will create a 
more uniform distribution; if the scale picks up noise with infinite variance, the result would 
be a perfectly uniform distribution. The same is true for the second method to establish the 
gradualness scale, psychometric function analysis. A less steep slope of the psychometric 
function was interpreted as a smooth transition between unconscious and conscious 
perception (Sandberg et al., 2011; Windey et al., 2013). However, a flatter curve can also 
indicate a great amount of noise. After all, the slope of a psychometric function can also be 
interpreted as the relative sensitivity of the scale to changes of the quality of stimulation, with 
greater slopes being more sensitive (Gescheider, 1997). 
In summary, research on subjective measures lacks a method to differentiate gradual 
conscious perception from noise. A potential solution to this problem is provided by type 2 
sensitivity (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Galvin et al., 2003): If a more fine-grained subjective 
measure correlates more closely with task accuracy than a subjective measure with identical 
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content but a smaller number of categories, it suggests that participants were able to make use 
of the additional categories. In contrast, if the correlation is the same, it shows that the 
additional information in the fine-grained scale does not share variance with objective task 
performance, and thus the task-relevant conscious experience cannot be measured on the more 
fine-grained level. Overall, the gradualness of subjective measures is a topic where using the 
association with task performance as a reference frame appears to be beneficial (see section 
1.5.3; Fleming & Lau, 2014).  
A potential drawback of using type 2 sensitivity as reference frame is that signal 
detection theory derived measures are not available for every paradigm. Signal detection 
theory provides mathematical tools to differentiate between the observers’ sensitivity to 
distinguish between signal and noise and participants’ response criteria (Green & Swets, 
1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Wickens, 2002). While type 2 ROC curves and meta-da 
are two convenient measures of type 2 sensitivity in all tasks where participants are required 
to select one out of two options (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Fleming et al., 2010; Maniscalco & 
Lau, 2012), there is no method to distinguish between sensitivity and criteria when the 
number of task options is greater than two. Nevertheless, continuous tasks are appealing for 
research on the gradualness of conscious awareness because they ensure that a low number of 
conscious states cannot be caused by a binary task (see 4.2.3., Rausch & Zehetleitner, 2014). 
Cumulative logistic regression was used in Chapter 4, but this approach is likely to be subject 
to the same problems as standard logistic regression (cf. 5.4.3., Rausch et al., 2015). As the 
bias can be expected to be roughly the same between the full resolution VAS and the 
discretized VAS, the effects found in the present study cannot be explained by bias alone. 
Nevertheless, future studies will need to carefully outweigh the prospects of using a 
continuous task against the drawbacks of being unable to properly control discrimination 
error.  
6.3. Quantifying the relation between subjective measures and task 
accuracy 
6.3.1. Logistic regression as measure of type 2 sensitivity 
Previous studies quantifying the relation between subjective measures and task 
performance seem to follow two different approaches: some studies explicitly applied a 
measure of SDT (Charles et al., 2013; Fleming et al., 2010; Scott, Dienes, Barrett, Bor, & 
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Seth, 2014; Szczepanowski et al., 2013; Vandenbroucke et al., 2014; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 
2013), and the others used flavours of generalized linear regression models (Rausch & 
Zehetleitner, 2014; Sandberg et al., 2013, 2010; Wierzchoń et al., 2012, 2014). However, the 
distinction between the two approaches is only superficial: It can be shown that each 
generalized linear regression model is identical to always one specific SDT model (Brockhoff 
& Christensen, 2010; DeCarlo, 1998). Consequently, the core issue about generalized linear 
regression is whether the underlying SDT model is appropriate.  
The standard regression model to quantify type 2 sensitivity involves the subjective 
measure as predictor, task accuracy as dependent variable, and the logit function f(x) =
 log (
x
1−x
) to convert the probability of being correct bounded by 0 and 1 to a variable that is 
free vary between -∞ and ∞. This model corresponds to an SDT model assuming logistic 
distributions with equal variances for correct and erroneous trials. Specifically the assumption 
of equal variances in correct and incorrect trials is not consistent with standard models of 
perceptual decision making: Assuming that participants choose a response to the task and 
make a report based on the same sensory evidence, the distributions for correct and erroneous 
trials are expected to be unequal and heavily skewed (Galvin et al., 2003). The consequence 
would be that logistic regression models confound participants’ type 2 sensitivity and 
participants’ criteria. For another measure that relies on the assumption of equal variances, 
type 2 d’, there is empirical evidence that it depends on participants’ criteria (Evans & 
Azzopardi, 2007). Under the assumption of the equal Gaussian SDT model, type 2 d’ it is 
maximized by conservative criteria (Barrett et al., 2013). The only difference between logistic 
regression and type 2 d’ is that the former assumes logistic distributions and the latter 
Gaussian distributions. Although the tails of the logistic distribution are heavier than the tails 
of the Gaussian, the two distributions typically converge to very similar results SDT 
applications (DeCarlo, 1998). Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that logistic regression 
underestimates type 2 sensitivity of liberal subjective measures, too.  
The reanalysis described in Chapter 5 revealed that logistic regression analysis and 
meta-da revealed by-and-large converging results with respect to the content of subjective 
measures and type 2 sensitivity (Rausch et al., 2015). As stimulus-related measures are 
typically associated with more conservative criteria but also smaller type 2 sensitivities when 
measured by meta-da or type 2 ROC curves, it might be expected that the use of logistic 
regression conceals the effect of contents on type 2 sensitivities. However, if there had been a 
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bias against liberal subjective measures, it would not have been sufficiently strong to mask 
the effect of content in the present experiments. Although there was no devastating bias in the 
present experiment, it would be a misinterpretation that the influence of criteria on logistic 
regression can be neglected at the interpretation of other studies: If logistic regression slopes 
are indeed maximized by a conservative reporting strategy, there are always two possibilities 
why an empirical effect on logistic regression slopes is observed: it could be a difference in 
type 2 sensitivity, but could also be a difference in criteria. Whenever greater logistic 
regression slopes are observed in a condition with more liberal criteria, it seems adequate to 
infer that the effect is due to type 2 sensitivity. As logistic regression slopes entail the risk to 
underestimate type 2 sensitivity of liberal criteria, a criterion confound cannot explain why 
there are greater slopes in the condition where the criteria are more liberal. For instance, in the 
experiment of Chapter 4, cumulative logistic regression slopes were greater for the visual 
analogue scale than for the discrete scale. This effect cannot be explained by a criterion shift, 
because the discrete scale was used in a slightly more conservative manner than the visual 
analogue scale (Rausch & Zehetleitner, 2014). In contrast, when greater logistic regression 
slopes occur in conjunction with more conservative criteria, the effect should not be 
interpreted as an effect of type 2 sensitivity: The effect of bias would go in the same direction 
and could account for the effect.  
A second downside of logistic regression is that the logit link function frequently fails 
to linearize the relationship between subjective measures and task accuracy. Whenever non-
linear trends occur, the logistic regression slope is hard to interpret as measure of type 2 
sensitivity because there is no single slope for each condition; instead, the slope varies over 
the course of the scale. In addition, non-linear trends may aggravate the confound with criteria 
in n-AFC tasks because more liberal subjective scales feature a greater number of scale steps 
where the transformed accuracy cannot decrease any further due to a lower bound of accuracy 
imposed by the guessing probability.  
Overall, those measures derived from SDT designed to control for criteria are clearly 
more promising options to quantify type 2 sensitivity than logistic regression. When 
interpreting the results of previous studies based on logistic regression, it should be critically 
considered whether an effect on logistic regression slopes can be explained by different 
criteria as well.  
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6.3.2. Alternative logistic regression models 
While the standard logistic regression model seems not optimal to quantify type 2 
sensitivity, there is still the question whether alternative regression models are more valid 
measures of type 2 sensitivity. Specifically, two potential modifications of the logistic 
regression model seem promising as solutions to some of the problems raised before: 
(i) a model with adjusted link function to account for the probability of guessing in n-
alternative forced-choice tasks (Brockhoff & Müller, 1997) 
(ii) cumulative logistic regression with subjective reports as ordinal dependent variable to 
account for criteria (Ramsøy & Skov, 2014) 
The first method addresses the bias of logistic regression by the lower bound of the 
logit transform of accuracy caused by the probability of guessing the correct response. If the 
participant has a chance of correctly guessing of p, the logit transform of the accuracy does 
not vary between -∞ and ∞; instead, the transformed accuracy is bounded at log (
p
1−p
). To 
account for the guessing probability, it was proposed to use a link function that ensures that 
the transformed accuracy is free to vary in the full range between -∞ and ∞. This can be 
achieved by the adjusted link function f(x) = log (
x−p
1−x
) (Brockhoff & Müller, 1997; 
Knoblauch, 2014; Williams, Ramaswamy, & Oulhaj, 2006). As can be seen from Fig. 6-1, the 
adjusted link function creates fairly linear relationships between subjective measures and 
accuracy in the masked orientation task and the masked shape task, but linearization appears 
to fail in the global motion task.  
The major problem is that the adjusted link function still does not provide any means 
to differentiate between sensitivity and criteria. Although the adjusted logit regression model 
does not consistently favour conservative or liberal subjective measures, it favours subjective 
measures with criteria spread over a wide range of performance levels. Consequently, 
different regression slopes between two conditions are not necessarily due to type 2 
sensitivity; greater slopes can also be caused by one condition spreading participants criteria 
over a greater range of performance levels (Wierzchoń et al., 2012). In fact, the adjusted logit 
method was at the first place introduced as a method to quantify thresholds, i.e. criteria, not 
sensitivity (Brockhoff & Müller, 1997). As the adjusted logit link model does not control for 
criteria and does not even guarantee linear trends, measures such as meta-da and type 2 ROC 
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curves seem still more favourable option to quantify the relation between subjective measures 
and task accuracy.  
 
Figure 6-1: The relationship between subjective reports and accuracy transformed according 
to the adjusted logit link, separately for decisional confidence (upper row, blue) and visual 
experience (lower row, orange) in the masked orientation task, masked shape task, and the 
random-dot-motion discrimination task. 
  
The second alternative to the standard logistic regression model is the cumulative 
logistic regression model (Ramsøy & Skov, 2014). In such a model, the cumulative 
probability of each rating category is predicted by trial accuracy (for a more thorough 
introduction into cumulative link models, see Christensen, 2015a). Again, cumulate logistic 
regression depends on a link function that relates predictors and probabilities. However, the 
model explicitly fits criteria that delineate between each two adjacent rating categories, and 
there is no assumption about a continuous linear relationship with subjective reports 
(Christensen & Brockhoff, 2013). This model is equivalent to the yes-no rating SDT model 
with logistic distributions (Christensen, Cleaver, & Brockhoff, 2011; DeCarlo, 1998). The 
model can include a scale parameter that allows distributions of different variances of 
evidence for correct and incorrect trials (Christensen, Cleaver, & Brockhoff, 2011). 
Moreover, slope and scale parameters can be converted into the area under the type 2 receiver 
operating characteristic (Christensen et al., 2011), a standard measure of type 2 sensitivity 
(Fleming et al., 2010). Overall, cumulative logistic regression has several promising features: 
explicit control over subjective criteria, unequal variances between correct and incorrect trials, 
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as well as easy conversion to the area under the ROC curve. It should be noted that many 
standard models of decision making predict quite asymmetric distributions of evidence 
(Barrett et al., 2013; Galvin et al., 2003; see also Fig. 5-1). The cumulative logistic regression 
model assumes logistic and thus symmetric distributions of evidence for both correct and 
incorrect trials, while the scale of the distributions can be different. Although cumulative 
regression can also be used with asymmetric distributions such as the log-log link 
(Christensen, 2015b), it is unlikely that these functions are able to emulate the precise 
distributions of evidence in correct and incorrect trials. However, models that describe 
subjective reports based standard models of decision making have come under pressure 
because several studies suggested that evidence for subjective reports can generated in 
parallel to discrimination performance (Fleming et al., 2015; Scott et al., 2014). The 
distributions of evidence generated by parallel or dual-route models have not been 
mathematically formulated yet; consequently, it would be premature to reject cumulative 
logistic regression based on theoretical intuitions concerning the shape of distributions while 
these intuitions have yet to be substantiated. Among the different options to quantify type 2 
sensitivity based on regression, cumulative logistic regression is clearly the most promising 
option.  
6.4. Subjective measures: useful data for consciousness research? 
Subjective measures of conscious awareness have not been considered appropriate for 
an objective science for several decades (Boring, 1953; Danziger, 1980; Eriksen, 1960; 
Hannula et al., 2005; Irvine, 2012; Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). This widely held belief within 
the scientific community sharply contrasts the philosophical view that mature sciences of 
psychology and neuroscience should strive to explain participants’ subjective reports about 
their conscious experience just as they should explain any other behaviour of human beings 
(Dennett, 2003, 2007). The present series of studies suggests that subjective measures are 
eligible for non-trivial research about conscious awareness. 
On the one hand, subjective measures were able to contribute data of great relevance 
to widely debated topics in consciousness, specifically to the debates about the NCC, the 
partial awareness hypothesis, and the gradual transition between unconscious and conscious 
perception. In addition, subjective measures proved to be heuristically fertile: The behavioural 
difference between stimulus-related subjective measures and response-related subjective 
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measures can be seen as a new constraint to existing theories of conscious awareness, which 
could not have been identified based on objective measures alone.  
On the other hand, the present work also highlights that researchers need to invest time 
into careful considerations about their experimental designs when they use subjective 
measures: First, it is necessary to consider which conscious content are appropriate to 
measure in the context of a specific research question. Second, given the “subjective” 
reputation of subjective measures, it is always useful and for some research questions 
necessary to supplement subjective measures by a frame of reference based on more 
“objective” data: either by a measurement of neural events, or by computing the association 
between subjective measures and performance in a discrimination task. However, both 
requirements are relatively easy to implement. Consequently, consciousness research would 
benefit from the more wide-spread usage of subjective measures of conscious awareness. 
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